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Bayreuth International Graduate School of 
African Studies (BIGSAS) 
Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive ‘Excellence 
Initiative’ by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the 
German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic aims of 
BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and non-
African scholars to work jointly in the field of African Studies and to 
offer a centre of creative and innovative PhD training and research. 
On 15 June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded 
‘Centres of Excellence’ which were granted support for the next 5 
years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior fellows from 25 African, 
American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this 
experience and offers a multi- and interdisciplinary research 
environment based upon three clearly defined general Research 
Areas which are:  
A. Uncertainty, Innovation and Competing Orders in Africa 
B. Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion 
C. Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of 
Development 
The Research Areas allow for challenging theoretical studies 
sensitive to emerging basic problems; they also take into account 
practical questions and problems of the African continent. Thus, the 
BIGSAS Research Areas encompass basic, strategic and applied 
research. BIGSAS also contributes to the creation of an African 
universities’ network. It brings together African and European 
networks and fosters partnership not only between the University of 
Bayreuth and universities in Africa but also between the universities 
in Africa themselves. Six African Partner Universities, namely the 
University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou (Benin), Moi-University, 
Eldoret (Kenya), Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat (Morocco), 
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo (Mozambique), the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (South Africa), and Addis 
Ababa University (Ethiopia) cooperate closely with BIGSAS in 
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recruitment, selection, training and mentoring of doctoral students. 
Other partners are the Universities of the Africa-Europe Group for 
Interdisciplinary Studies, AEGIS.  
 
PhD training in BIGSAS is based on various strategies which ensure 
a quality in the field of African Studies: multi- and interdisciplinary 
research with a multidisciplinary mentorship; specialist academic 
training with a cross-disciplinarily focus; clearly structured Individual 
Research Training Plans (IRTP). Also of high importance are: the 
offer of employment-oriented transferable skills, individual career 
planning, early integration into the international academic community, 
shorter time-to-degree with structural and financial encouragements 
or specific support of female Junior Fellows.  
 
Over the past 20 years Bayreuth has amassed considerable 
experience in co-ordinated research programmes, integrating various 
disciplines into a stimulating research in the field of African Studies. 
The Institute of African Studies (IAS) promotes 63 researchers and 
coordinates African studies at the University of Bayreuth in 12 
subject groups distributed over five of the six faculties of the 
university. 
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BIGSASworks! 
With BIGSASworks! we aim at offering Junior Fellows at the 
Graduate School of African Studies a platform for publishing 
research-related articles. This new online-journal provides an 
excellent platform for representing and promoting the idea of 
BIGSAS. It opens a space for showcasing on-going research, 
creating transparency of the work carried out by Junior Fellows and 
providing a space for trying out articles and working jointly on them 
towards further publication. Each issue focuses on a certain thematic 
field or theoretical concept and Junior Fellows from any discipline are 
invited to submit papers, enabling common interests beyond the 
predetermined BIGSAS research areas to flourish. At the same time 
BIGSASworks! offers its workgroup participants deeper insights into 
and practical experience of what it means to be an editor. Last but 
not least BIGSASworks! makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), (i.e. 
us!), visible before our theses are published.  
The name BIGSASworks! had various implications. First and 
foremost it is an abbreviation of ‘BIGSAS Working Papers!’. Second, 
it is meant to show the work of our BIGSAS ‘works groups’, so 
indeed it is the works that are resulting from a structure like BIGSAS. 
Third, taking ‘works’ as a verb, it demonstrates the work that we as 
BIGSAS Fellows carry out, with BIGSASworks! guaranteeing us a 
visible output in addition to our theses.  
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Foreword 
By Prof. Dr. Dieter Neubert 
After the post-development debate of the 1990s (Escobar 1995; 
Rahnema 1997) analysed the concept of development as a 
construction imposed on the global South to subordinate its people, 
talking about development seemed to be outdated. Especially in the 
humanities, post-colonial studies gained interest. The new debates 
showed that concepts that were for a long time taken for granted 
needed to be revisited from a critical perspective. But despite radical 
deconstruction of the concept of development, the notion of 
development is still alive. This holds true not only at the level of the 
development institutions whose institutional survival is closely linked 
to the promises of development co-operation, but also at a local level 
where people claim their right to development. The intellectual 
deconstruction of development did not solve the challenges of 
survival and change in everyday life. Therefore, the presence of 
ideas of development in the everyday life of the global South cannot 
be ignored. Against the background of the post-development debate 
and the work of critics of development practice (e.g. Mosse 2005; 
Rottenburg 2009), notions of development and change cannot be 
taken as given, but are topics requiring empirical research. Produced 
by development institutions, notions of development are challenged 
from an everyday life perspective. The tensions and processes of 
negotiation between development and state institutions on the one 
hand, and people’s understandings and needs on the other hand are 
the topic of this publication.  
As the editors show in their introduction we should not 
misunderstand these tensions as representing a dichotomy between 
the local and the global. The term development itself with its local 
interpretation shows that it is not possible to separate local from 
global processes. They are interconnected and the notions of 
development to which this publication refers are negotiated between 
different global and local actors. This underlines not only the agency 
of the people involved, but also that concepts used in the 
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negotiations, such as urban improvement in a Sudanese shanty 
town, economic development in South Africa, or environment 
protection in Ghana, have been appropriated by the local 
communities according to their own terms. With their studies of this 
topic, the contributors link up with earlier studies carried out at the 
Bayreuth Institute of African Studies on local action in the context of 
globalisation (Probst/Spittler 2005; Loimer et al. 2005) and make a 
big step forward with their empirical analyses. 
This fourth volume of BIGSASworks! represents main features of 
BIGSAS in a remarkable way. The articles underline the 
interdisciplinary approach of BIGSAS and show that studies from 
Social Anthropology, Geography, Media Studies, Political Sciences 
and Sociology share a common research focus and together present 
a multi-perspective, comprehensive picture of the common topic. At 
the same time, the Junior Fellows, who come from all three BIGSAS 
research areas,1 document in an impressive way that the different 
research areas are deeply interlinked. In the research area 
“Knowledge, Communication and Communities in Motion”, the media 
studies paper (Irina Turner), with its focus on new media, adds an 
important new twist to the analysis of economic policy. The paper 
grounded in social anthropology (Mohamed A.G. Bakhit), from the 
research area “Uncertainty, Innovation and Competing Orders in 
Africa”, uses the notion of competing orders to analyse the 
negotiation of change. And the papers in the research area 
“Negotiating Change: Discourses, Politics and Practices of 
Development”, from geography (Girum Getachew, Peter Narh), 
political sciences (Felix Brinkmann) and sociology (Julia Boger), 
refer to situations of uncertainty and processes of innovation. This 
publication, developed and presented by BIGSAS Junior Fellows, 
demonstrates the lively und highly productive discussion in BIGSAS, 
which transcends borders between disciplines and research areas. 
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Challenging notions of development and 
change from everyday life in Africa 
Introduction 
By Girum Getachew Alemu and Peter Narh (editors) 
Research on the processes of globalisation and development in 
Africa takes two apparently opposing views. On the one hand, 
globalisation and development are depicted as processes with their 
roots in the global North and travel to the global South (Mazrui 2005; 
Mudimbe 1988; Grillo and Stirrat 1997, Rostow 1971). On the other 
hand, studies on local level values and knowledge systems 
accentuate the capability of local actors to pursue their own everyday 
life independent of global forces (Bruijn et al. 2007; Binsbergen et al. 
2004; Arce and Long 1992). However, in this highly interconnected 
world, the dichotomy of the local and the global do not capture the 
full picture of grounded realities in Africa. Rather, the global and local 
are constitutive with one another (Long 2001) and their 
manifestations in the various everyday spheres of social life - 
environment, media, migration, development interventions, and 
resource utilisations - are characterised by attempts of co-habitation, 
resistance, innovation, and appropriation to mention a few.  
Against this backdrop, research on the interaction of broader socio-
political and environmental forces with that of local level actors and 
how the two influence each other have been approached from 
various disciplinary perspectives. In some strands of social science 
disciplines the unprecedented influence of structural barriers on local 
actors is magnified whereas in others the mechanisms through which 
local actors use their agency to resist, subvert or go along with 
structural forces is celebrated. However, throughout this series we 
show that these seemingly polar opposite understanding of global 
structural forces and local everyday practices are mutually 
constitutive. Accordingly, contributions to the series have taken up 
the interdependence of global development paradigms and local 
contexts in the spheres of migration, communication platforms, 
environmental governance, and politics of resource utilisation, in 
order to further elucidate the understanding of ‘development’ in the 
African context.   
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This issue of BIGSASworks! seeks to present this interdependence 
of paradigms and practices in global, national, and local spheres 
from different disciplinary perspectives and foci. The contributing 
papers present various ways in which the daily livelihood activities of 
community people in different parts of sub-Saharan Africa represent 
this interdependence. Together but in different ways, the authors 
address the question of how global development paradigms affect 
people’s lives, what meanings are there in the everyday things 
people do to live that may synchronise with or be at variance with 
these global paradigms. Indeed, global paradigms may conflict with 
or hamper values people place in things that affect their lives. But at 
the same time they may also provide new opportunities for the 
livelihoods of many. The papers in this issue of BIGASworks! in 
respective ways challenge us all to take another look at our approach 
to development in Africa and its entanglements with broader forces.  
Mohammed Bakhit and Irina Turner present to readers the manifest 
conflicts and negotiations between national level development 
policies and the citizenry. With a case study research in 
Anthropology in Sudan, Mohammed investigates the living conditions 
of the shantytown of Elbaraka around Khartoum since the 1960-70 
rural-urban migrations. The gist of his paper is that in pursuing urban 
development, ideology is pitched against practice in Elbaraka. The 
author attempts to analyse how the ideologies and practices of three 
main actors in Elbaraka – the local people, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and the central government - mix, negotiate, 
and share practices of development and power to achieve respective 
objectives. Whiles all three actors share a common urgency to 
improve living conditions in the shantytown, they however support 
different practices to attain this improvement. Notwithstanding 
cooperation in some instances between the state actors, NGOs, and 
local people, struggles between their different ideologies strongly 
manifest in others. There are core contestations among the three 
actors in the way they see their role in the development of the 
shantytown. Government and NGOs relate to each other as 
‘outsiders’ with power, perceiving local people as unable to provide 
critical urban services for themselves. The author makes the point 
that such perception of the central government and the NGOs fails to 
recognise the agency of local people to self-govern their own lives. 
The author concludes that in view of these contestations over the 
meaning of local development in the shantytown, support from the 
state and the NGOs is often at variance with local practical needs, 
and seems rather to advance the peculiar objectives of the state and 
NGOs, whiles the needs and interests of the local  people remain 
unmet. 
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As in Sudan, contestations over state development policy between 
national actors and local people is the substance of Irina Turner’s 
paper on the Republic of South Africa. In this country, government 
economic policies clearly are not in favour with majority of local 
people. Irina’s paper, with a focus on media and economy, discusses 
internet resources such as social networks and blogs as media for 
South Africans to engage with their country’s macroeconomic 
policies. The discussions in her paper seek to sketch answers for the 
currently pressing question of whether social media are politically 
used by South Africans to challenge hegemonic and mainstream 
notions of development and whether online platforms can provide a 
tool for maintaining or even expanding on the current level of 
freedom of expression in the country. Macroeconomic policies in the 
Republic of South Africa, founded on the New Growth Path (NGP) 
national development strategy, are reflected in the annual state of the 
nation address. The strategy seeks to reduce the gap between the 
rich and the poor in post-apartheid South Africa by finding solutions 
to the needs of the poor, based on a developmental state agenda. 
Basing her work on the social media platform ThoughtLeader, 
Facebook, as well as a complimentary offline survey, the author 
traces the evolution of public notion of the developmental South 
African state and contrasts the country’s official government version 
of the developmental state and its vision brand, with people’s real-life 
experiences uttered online. She contends that though state economic 
policy contained in the ‘state of the nation’ address, seeks to speak 
on behalf of the nation from a political perspective, official 
mainstream solutions cannot reflect subjectively experienced 
perceptions of individual citizens.  
From Development Studies and Social Geography backgrounds, 
Peter Narh and Girum Getachew focus the contestations between 
competing notions of development on natural resource governance. 
Both authors bring to the fore ways in which state regimes on 
environmental resources interfere with customary property rights and 
traditional livelihood strategies in Ghana and Ethiopia respectively. In 
Peter’s paper, he presents results from empirical research he 
conducted in Dormaa, Ghana to show that community people, 
conscious of their customary property rights regime, hold values of 
their natural environment that derive largely from the communal 
property rights regime. These values in many instances come in 
conflict with those held by the public regulatory regimes, which 
promote tree planting to reclaim so-called degraded forests on the 
basis of individual rights to trees and incentives to plant these trees. 
For the public regimes, tree planting is promoted as though land 
belongs to an individual in perpetuity. In view of the hold on people of 
the communality of values in natural resources in Dormaa, individual 
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landowners and land users eventually are constrained to utilise 
incentives from public regimes for tree planting. Thus, Peter’s paper 
shows that national level notions of environmental governance, which 
are carried from global discourses, and translating into tree planting 
do not conform to values and conceptions of local people about their 
natural environment. In other words, Peter found in his research that 
the protection of the natural environment as a resource in the 
discourse of public environmental governance policies and 
programmes, through mainly individual property rights approaches is 
inconsistent with the communal values local people hold in their 
natural environments. Indeed, it is these communal values that 
shape their everyday livelihood activities.  
Girum takes the divergence between broader and local notions of 
development off from the perspective of politics of resource 
utilisation. In his contribution to the series, Girum notes how politics 
of resource utilisation leads to entitlement failure for the local people 
in the upper Awash valley in Ethiopia. He approaches this from a 
historical vantage point of interaction between broader structural 
sources of vulnerability and the local strategies of dealing with these 
structural barriers. By approaching the problem through political 
ecology that emphasises on local agency, he attempts to show us 
how the locals, even under the most severe social and political 
conditions, try to navigate their own way and make use of scarce 
resources. He further shows that the local pastoral community in 
upper Awash have managed to bring-in new forms of resource 
arrangement so as to deal with social as well as climate related 
sources of vulnerability. According to Girum, this is a clear instance 
of how local people in rural areas use their agency to deal with 
structural barriers than becoming simply passive victims of processes 
that are rooted in broader and misinformed (under)development 
interventions. 
Julia Boger and Felix Brinkmann, a Sociologists and a Political 
Scientist respectively, highlight how people utilise their agency and 
knowledge to negotiate global and development intervention and 
practice at the local level. Julia Boger explores ways German-trained 
returned skilled migrants negotiate between professional knowledge 
on the ‘Green economy’, which is a concept in global development 
discourse, and unfavourable local working conditions in Ghana. In 
her paper, returned migrants with environmental and resource 
development skills are often willing to lend the knowledge they 
acquire in their studies abroad to contribute to environmental 
sustainability and eco-industrial development in Ghana while making 
a living. Julia notes that highly skilled migrants, particularly in their 
working age, return to Ghana after their graduation from specific 
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environmental programmes. Subsequently, many of them become 
important drivers of change, primarily through transfer of new ideas 
and knowledge to shaping environmental policies and implementing 
programmes at the local level. Julia shows however that though the 
returned experts hold potentials to contribute to environmental policy 
making and implementation at the micro, meso, and macro levels in 
Ghana, they also face challenges in lending their skills to use, and to 
find their feet in the local economy. The experts face inadequate jobs 
in the formal sector, poor remuneration, poor working equipments, 
and job opportunities being blocked to migrants by non-migrants. To 
overcome these challenges, they network and make use of 
programmes such the Returning Expert Programme (REP) and the 
Reintegrationprogramme (RE) established and implemented in 
Germany and Ghana to encourage trained experts to return home to 
congenial working conditions.  
Felix Brinkmann adds to the utility of agency in negotiating between 
national and local conditions. His paper shows how small-scale 
entrepreneurs manoeuvre weak national institutions to promote their 
trade. In a study in the Kitwe copper belt of Zambia, Felix finds that 
the economy of Zambia depends heavily on copper and therefore 
volatile copper prices on the world market pose a challenge to the 
Zambian economy. Coupled with weak a national institutional 
framework for their business, local copper dealers put in place all 
manner of informal and what Felix sees as illegal institutions to deal 
with the erratic prices of copper. In the Chisokone-Market, the 
second biggest market in Zambia, central governmental authorities 
have not been able to provide adequate institutional and logistic 
support for the SMEs to operate effectively. In consequence, local 
market association leaders with power and information take 
advantage of the weak national institutions to promote their SMEs, 
and assume control of all activities of the market, managing it to suit 
their personal and respective associational interests. Usually, the 
less powerful entrepreneurs are the losers. Felix suggests in his 
contribution that the kind of strategies successful SMEs employ to 
overcome the  challenges the erratic copper prices pose to their 
businesses, in the face of the weaknesses of the central state, are 
still to expend in future. How this expansion unfolds to impact on 
SMEs as well as on copper prices remain issues for further research. 
Suffice it to say that local entrepreneurs have been able to manage 
the weaknesses of the state to provide conducive conditions for their 
own trade. Thus, Felix’s paper affirms that local people have their 
own ways of life, and may draw on global forces to enhance their 
livelihoods.  
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From illegal squatter settlement towards legal shantytowns: 
negotiations of power and responsibilities in Khartoum 
shantytowns 
Mohamed A.G. Bakhit2 
Abstract 
The article intends to investigate how social services and 
development programmes in shantytown areas have been designed 
and implemented in a very specific way by the three actors involved 
(local people, NGOs and local government). Also, it examines the 
perceptions and ideologies behind the particular selection of social 
services and who actually determines the priorities and takes on the 
responsibilities involved. The discussion in the paper uses Elbaraka 
shantytown (located in the south-east of Khartoum, the capital of 
Sudan) as an example to uncover this complicated process. 
Keywords: shantytowns, local community, government, NGOs, 
agency. 
Introduction 
Despite its richness in resources, Sudan like many other countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed many years of political instability 
and civil wars since its independence in 1956. The country has also 
suffered from many other prolonged problems like ethnic conflicts, 
high rates of poverty, vast population displacement, the unequal 
distribution of social services, immense levels of immigration, many 
kinds of environmental disasters and poor quality of government 
services (education, healthcare, as well as low achievements in 
governmentality and rule of law). 
Indeed about 13.5 per cent3of the total populations of Sudan 
currently live in the capital Khartoum. Migrants to the capital city of 
Khartoum come from all parts of Sudan, due to its concentration of 
services and economic growth. The first waves of migrants arrived in 
the capital in the period from1960-70. These were economic 
                                                 
2 Mohamed A.G. Bakhit is an Anthropologist and lecturer in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, Sudan. His main research 
interests are identity change, urbanization, minority groups and migration. Currently, he 
is pursuing his PhD project in the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African 
Studies (BIGSAS). His thesis examines the identity construction and different lifestyles 
of the Elbaraka shantytown community, which is shaped largely by generational 
variations, rural-urban disparity, and cultural differences between Khartoum city and 
local people’s home areas in south and western Sudan. 
3 Statistical Year Book for the Year 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics, Republic of 
Sudan. 
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migrants, and the majority of them originated from the northern parts 
of the country, searching for employment in the newly established 
commercial and industrial sectors in the capital. Moreover the 
majority were educated, as only 23 per cent of all migrants to 
Khartoum aged 20-24 years in 1971 lacked any form of education 
(Galal-aldin 1980). The majority chose to live at the periphery, or in 
small villages near the city’s boundaries, until these were gradually 
swallowed up by the urban area. But the statistics show that a small 
number also came from areas in western and southern Sudan 
(between 5 and 8 per cent) to work as unskilled workers, and they 
lived near the industrial zones in illegal squatter settlements. Later on 
the government, under pressure from local residents, evacuated 
them and planned new, legal fourth-class settlements on the outskirts 
of the city. These formed the nuclei of the present shantytowns.  
The second wave of migrants arrived during 1980-2000, pushed by 
the civil war in the south and ethnic conflicts in Darfur, and drought 
and desertification in western Sudan. About two million people were 
displaced from their original areas and relocated in the capital city. 
They lived in different areas, some on any vacant land inside the city, 
others preferred to settle at the periphery of the city, near old legal 
shantytowns, but the majority of them inhabited squatter settlements. 
One study estimates the number of illegal squatter settlements in 
Khartoum in 1991 as more than fifty settlements, occupied by about 
1.5 million IDPs (Banaga 2001). 
Agency and power in shantytowns 
In the shantytown areas there are three agents (i.e. local people, 
government and NGOs) acting in the same sphere. Although 
ultimately their obvious purpose is to serve the local people of 
shantytowns and provide them with the services and development 
programmes they require, each agent has its own unique character 
and specific ideology, which means that they act differently in order 
to achieve their respective priorities. Furthermore, to be successful 
they are obliged to negotiate and share their power and 
responsibility. Moreover, each one of the three agents has specific 
course of historical development and resources; therefore clashes 
and disputes are likely to happen as unilateral successes and 
achievements occur. 
‘Agency’ in this paper stands for the freedom of the contingently 
acting subject over and against the constraints that are thought to 
derive from enduring social structures (Loyal and Barry 2001). 
Human beings have agency, i.e. they act independently of, and in 
opposition to, structural constraints, and thus are able to re-construct 
social structure through their freely chosen actions. This concept of 
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an agent ties agency directly to power. An ‘acting against the 
constraints’ (Loyal and Barry 2001) pre-supposes being able to 
intervene in your community, or to refrain from such intervention, with 
the anticipated effect of influencing a specific process or state of 
affairs. Action depends largely upon the capability of the 
individual/group to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of 
structures or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he/she 
or they lose the ability to ‘make a difference’, i.e. exercise some sort 
of power. 
Mike Davis’s book Planet of Slums is considered one of the most 
important references in slum studies. It reviewed the most significant 
approaches and policies dealing with the three actors: slum 
population, governments, and the international donors. He concludes 
his book by asserting that ‘the root cause of urban slumming seems 
to lie not in urban poverty but in urban wealth’ (Davis 2006). He starts 
with blaming the role of the IMF and the World Bank in imposing 
financial regulation upon the Third World countries, which led to 
agricultural deregulation and financial discipline, which in turn pushed 
huge numbers of rural labour to urban slums even as cities ceased to 
create new jobs. He also blames the new approach of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s mandate that the state depend upon international 
donors, then, NGOs. This approach influenced by the ideas of the 
English architect John Turner, stressed a sites-and-services 
provision of basic infrastructure to help rationalize and upgrade self-
help housing. The purpose was to make housing affordable to low-
income households without the payments of subsidies in contrast to 
the heavily subsidised public-housing approach, amidst great 
propaganda about ‘helping the poor help themselves’ (Davis 2006). 
However, Mike Davis criticised this approach as it paves the way for 
a withdrawal of state and local government intervention and support 
for slum dwellers, and puts them at the risk to market fluctuations.  
The author also criticised the recent approach of Hernando de Soto 
(Davis 2006), a Peruvian businessman who became an expert in the 
neo-liberalism approach in the 1990s. De Soto asserted that Third 
World cities are not so much in need of investment and jobs as 
suffering from the shortage of property rights. The slum dwellers, he 
argues, are in fact wealthy, but they are unable to access their 
wealth, because they do not have improved real estate in the 
informal sector, or could not turn real estate into liquid capital 
because they do not possess formal property titles. Titling, de Soto 
claims, would instantly create massive equity with little or no cost to 
government. Part of this new wealth, he suggests, would supply 
capital to credit-starved micro-entrepreneurs to create new jobs in 
the slums, and shantytowns would then become ‘acres of diamonds’. 
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But Mike Davis also made an important critique here by pointing to 
the fact that titling accelerates social differentiation in the slums and 
does nothing to aid renters, the actual majority of the poor in many 
cities. It even risks creating a large underclass population that is 
denied access to any form of affordable or acceptable housing. 
Finally, he criticised the national elites for creating patterns of land 
use and population density which recapitulated the older logic of 
colonial oppression and racial dominance. He noticed that throughout 
Third World cities, postcolonial elites have inherited and greedily 
reproduced the physical footprints of segregated colonial cities. 
Despite the rhetoric of national liberation and social justice, national 
elites have aggressively adapted the racial zoning of the colonial 
periods to defend their own class privileges and spatial exclusivity, 
the poor rural population replacing the former natives of the colonies. 
In general, the position of local people in the shantytowns is a very 
critical one; they are the subjects of the services and development, 
but still an agent responsible for providing them. Indeed, this double 
role is sometimes confusing even for local people themselves. 
Contributing to this is the existence of other agents also participating 
in this endeavour, sharing in the decision-making and the allocation 
of resources. Local people are often obliged to act differently in 
specific situations as decisions makers and providers, when they 
depend on their resources, in other situations as recipients and 
dependents, when the government or NGOs design and provide the 
services and developmental projects in question. In order to 
investigate the relations between the three agents and the provision 
of services and development programmes, it is necessary to explore 
the stages of development and change which have taken place in the 
Elbaraka shantytown in an historical order. 
The stage of squatter settlement 
The first stage of Elbaraka squatter settlement extended from the late 
1970s until the planning of the area in 1992. People lived on the 
basis of ethnic enclaves; every ethnic group having its 
neighbourhood ruled by an ethnic group leader (sultan), some of 
them appointed by local people and approved by their chiefs in the 
areas of origin, others appointed by themselves or only by their close 
relatives.4 It depended on whether the system of the respective 
ethnic group was centralised (e.g.Shilluk) or segmentary (e.g. Dinka). 
At that time, relations between ethnic enclaves were characterised by 
tensions and clashes, which were solved partially after the formation 
of a tribal leaders’ council. This council also dealt with disputes 
                                                 
4 Interview with Sultan William, Elbaraka shantytown, Khartoum, 15 August 2010. 
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between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds. Services and 
security were provided by the NGOs and the people themselves. 
Health centres, water wells and food assistance were provided by 
many international NGOs. Meanwhile, security was organised by the 
people themselves, albeit in a rather chaotic way, which gave the 
area its reputation for criminality. Kartun Kassala – the former name 
of the area – was associated with drug dealing, illegal local alcohol 
distribution, prostitution, and theft. That might have been one reason 
for the eagerness of the local people to plan and legalise their 
settlement. To make matters worse, the government took on a 
destructive role in the squatter settlement, considering it an illegal 
form of settlement, and indeed on several occasions destroying 
whole areas, in pursuing what can be called its ‘demolish-legalise’ 
policy. This policy always tended toward legalising some settlements 
by planning or upgrading them, usually in remote areas, and toward 
demolishing the squatter settlements located near the centre, or in 
real estate areas of high value. 
In 1988, the capital Khartoum was inundated by floods and heavy 
rains, causing the wholesale destruction of the shantytowns, since 
they were constructed of only mud and cardboard. As is usual under 
such disaster circumstances the poorer sections of society suffered 
most. Such people tended to live in mud houses and 82 per cent 
(Davies and Walsh 1997) of the damaged and destroyed houses 
were built using these materials. Those affected moved to a nearby 
new market and took shelter in its empty shops. Meanwhile the 
government represented by the Prime Minister refused to visit the 
area,5 unlike other nearby legal shantytowns, because it was not 
legally considered a part of the city. 
The stage of planning 
Initial contact between local people and the government was 
established during this phase, implying recognition by the 
government of shantytown settlers as part of the capital city. Local 
people agreed to participate effectively in the planning measures, 
because they had observed the benefit of planning in neighbouring 
areas. This participation included the selection of experts (ereef), 
local individuals who helped the planning bureaucrats directly, and 
local committees who contributed by informing the whole community 
about the procedure of legalising their homes. In fact, the 
bureaucratic procedures of legalising land ownership included 
several steps such as registration, investigation, providing 
documents, and paying the fees. It was very complicated for the 
                                                 
5 Interview with Saymon Ushan Ding, in 21 March 2009, Elbaraka. 
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majority of people, but it represented a first step towards integrating 
them in city life, a style of life characterised by placing more trust in 
‘paperwork’ than ‘informal (verbal) agreements’. 
Prolonged negotiations took place between local committees and the 
government about how many families had the right to settle in the 
area, and consequently about the size of each house in the area. 
Today differences still exist between the size of houses in the various 
quarters, for example, quarter No.2 has the smallest allocated space 
per house (217 m²) because the majority of inhabitants were from the 
same ethnic group (Fur). They wanted as many people as possible to 
settle together, and did not want members of their ethnic group to 
disperse to other quarters. As for the planning authority, it was 
obvious that they were concerned mainly with re-structuring the area 
to be more organised physically, meaning that in the negotiations 
they did not intervene on the makeup of the population or its 
distribution. Instead, they left all those issues in the hands of the local 
committees and the people, which gave the local population a sense 
of being participants, and local committees the feeling of being 
decision makers rather than merely recipients.  
The stage of planning extended to about two years (1992-1994). It 
included opening new streets, creating new open spaces, evacuating 
‘non-eligible’ inhabitants forced to leave, and re-locating other eligible 
settlers to new houses. All of those things happened with the 
participation of experts and local committees together with planning 
officials. It was the first real interaction between the two agents, 
interaction that included negotiations and sharing of responsibilities; 
it was the first time the local people felt that their collective agency 
could make a difference.  
Again the planning stage does represent the inclusion of shantytown 
people in the formal city boundaries in official or legal terms; however 
it is clear that the balance of power remained in favour of the 
government. In effect, planning gave legality to shantytown 
settlements but preserved the status quo hierarchy of the urban 
setting. In fact, the planning stage gave the low status of shantytown 
settlers its legitimacy and institutional dimension. 
The stage of planned settlement 
When the planning stage was over, a new reality began to emerge. 
The local committees became the official representatives of local 
people, not only because of their role in planning, but also in 
providing the most needed services such as water, electricity, etc. 
Conversely, the position of tribal leaders was weakened; it was 
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restricted only to personal issues and even this depended on the 
acquiescence of the individuals.  
The population in Elbaraka stands at about 38,580 people (National 
Census 2008), which represents about 75.5 per cent of the total 
population of Elbaraka in 1993 according to the National Census 
(1993). This decline is a direct result of the upgrading of the area in 
1994. However, shantytowns are still the most densely populated 
areas in the capital city, largely because the average house size in 
third class areas – the lowest grade for the middle class areas – is 
about 360-400 m². In addition, shantytowns generally accommodate 
more than one family per house as a result of the low-income jobs 
available to inhabitants. 
The role of the NGOs also diminished considerably under the 
pressure of the government, which accused NGOs of implementing 
foreign agendas. This was largely a product of the Arabic-Islamic 
ideology of the government after the Islamic movement party took 
power in 1989. Remarkably, the first action initiated by the 
government after planning was to change the name of the area to 
‘Elbaraka’,6 an Islamic name denoting clearly the government’s vision 
for the area. People meanwhile established more relations with other 
shantytowns, especially their ‘core area’; impressive permanent 
houses appeared and shops packed with diverse goods. A huge 
change came with the introduction of electricity (2007). Although 
before that people used private generators for lighting at night, with 
electricity connection, people had their first taste of a different urban 
life with an enormous array of electronic devices becoming 
accessible.  
All schools were transferred into the management of the government 
(i.e. 10 schools), except for one belonging to the Catholic Church. 
Besides these, a growing number of private schools sprang up, run 
by the educated young generation. Other members of this young 
generation born and raised in the area started to engage in lucrative 
economic activities inside and outside the area, such as driving 
rickshaws. Meanwhile, large numbers of their peers were working in 
government institutions in the lower ranks, in the police service and 
the army. The NGOs also continued their efforts in the field of 
healthcare, as there was no medical centre in the area funded by the 
government, while some NGOs supported small developmental 
programmes through local partners. 
                                                 
6 Holy blessing in Arabic, generally used in religious contexts. 
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Different perceptions of services and responsibilities 
The three agents differ in the manner and purpose in which they 
provide services to the shantytown’s people. These differences are 
the result of the diverse perceptions and understanding of the 
character of local people and the nature of the area. Meanwhile, local 
people’s perception is heavily influenced by their backgrounds and 
ideology, specifically by their rural background and urban aspirations, 
which shape their perceptions and priorities toward services. At the 
same time the government officials have been motivated by a 
different perception, again arising from their middle class background 
and their living in other parts of the city, so their priorities diverge 
from those of the other two agents. NGOs’ concerns are motivated 
by their western experiences of humanitarian works, which influences 
their designs and funding of services and development projects. 
The issue of government-local people relations in worldwide slums 
was the focus of an important report written by one of the UN-
agencies. The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human 
Settlements 2003, represents the first global assessment of slums by 
an international NGO. The report proves that slum dwellers 
increased substantially during the 1990s (UN 2003). It is further 
projected that in the next 30 years, the global number of slum 
dwellers will increase to about 2 billion, while urban population in less 
developed regions has increased by 36 per cent in the last decade. 
Adapting an optimistic attitude, the report praises governmental 
approaches to dealing with slums, describing them as a shift from 
negative policies such as forced eviction, neglect and involuntary 
resettlement, to more positive policies such as self-help and 
upgrading, facilitating and rights-based policies. The report 
suggested that informal settlements, where most of the urban poor in 
developing countries live, are increasingly seen by public decision-
makers as places of opportunity, as ‘slums of hope’ rather than 
‘slums of despair’. Furthermore, the report stressed that to encounter 
the challenge of slums, urban development policies should address 
the issue of livelihoods of slum dwellers and urban poverty in 
general, thus going beyond traditional approaches that have tended 
to concentrate on improvement of housing, infrastructure and 
physical environmental conditions. 
The report also discussed approaches for dealing with slums, and 
considered that slum upgrading is among the most important 
strategies, receiving greater emphasis in recent years, though 
upgrading is only one solution among several others. The failure of 
past slum upgrading and low-income housing development has, to a 
large extent, been a result of inadequate allocation of resources, the 
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report stressed, accompanied by ineffective cost-recovery strategies. 
The report also suggested that there is great potential for enhancing 
the effectiveness of slum policies by fully involving the urban poor 
and those traditionally responsible for investment in housing 
development. In addition, the report claimed that it has long been 
recognised that the poor play a key role in the improvement of their 
own living conditions and that their participation in decision-making is 
not only a right, thus an end in itself, but is also instrumental in 
achieving greater effectiveness in the implementation of public 
policies. Indeed, it is vital here to deal in detail with the respective 
background of each agent, to understand their ways of dealing with 
services, and to analyse their respective priorities. 
Local people’s perception of services 
The perception of local people has been shaped by their desire to 
become a part of an urban community, and thus have access to the 
same services as other parts of the city. Nonetheless, there are 
different social groups settled in the shantytown, meaning different 
perceptions can co-exist in this environment. Namely, there are 
traditional people of the first generation of immigrants, the second 
generation, and the educated middle class – the latter having a 
louder voice in many cases. They understandably assume that their 
view represents the whole area, especially because they tend to form 
the local committees. Yet, for other groups the desire for more urban 
services is fundamental, as all of them have the desire to stay in the 
shantytowns at least for the foreseeable future. 
With the background of these strong motivations, people of 
shantytowns wanted services that create links between them and the 
other parts of the city, like planning and electricity. Planning is 
important for it gives them recognition and the ownership of their 
houses. Electricity is vital because it represents the visible difference 
between the rural and urban lifestyle, in the sense that people cannot 
imagine living in an urban area without having electricity. Then law 
and order, education and water appear on the list of services for the 
people. A consequence of these priorities is that perhaps most of the 
local resources at people’s disposal have been directed toward the 
demand for planning and electricity. In fact, the procedures of gaining 
ownership of the houses during the legalisation of settlements were 
very expensive; it included acquiring many documents. Moreover, 
there were fees for registering the ownership of the house. It was not 
possible to exempt any owner of house unless by permission from 
the Minister of urban planning, which was difficult to obtain.  
People began using electricity even before planning, connecting to 
small private generators. In fact, investing in generating and selling 
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electricity was one of the most lucrative economic activities before 
the area was connected to the public network. Even connection to 
this network is very expensive, being provided by private companies 
that currently charge SD837 (about US$28)8 per month in fees and 
SD1,500 (about US$500) in total for connecting one house, forcing 
many neighbours to share electricity. However, very few homes go 
entirely without electricity, which means that most of the economic 
resources of local people are directed toward obtaining this service. 
While water is not as much of a priority for the people, it is 
nevertheless in insufficient supply. Most of the wells were dug by 
NGOs, but are still administered by the local committees, and many 
local people are dissatisfied with their management.  
With respect to education, although the government has opened 10 
primary schools in the area since planning and all of them have 
Islamic names, these still are outnumbered by private schools. This 
reflects the fact that many local people are ready to pay the monthly 
fees (about US$3 per child) for their children to attend private 
schools, as opposed to the semi-free public schools, because they 
expect access to higher qualification for their children at the end of 
the primary level. 
Health institutions are run mostly by NGOs. Some are international 
and some are local NGOs. There is no governmental health 
institution, and even private clinics are located outside the area. 
People need more medical institutions but seem to be waiting for the 
NGOs to provide these services as they used to. For example, I 
attended a ‘health day’9 in the Elbaraka area, where hundreds of 
people came to receive free medical treatment, at which doctors and 
assistant staff who agreed to work voluntarily were not able to 
examine all of the people waiting in the queue. 
Government perception of services and responsibilities 
Obviously, the ideology of government is driven by the way of life of 
the urban middle class. On the one hand it intends to physically 
change the shantytown to comply with the standards of a modern 
city, in line with the educated modern character of the northern 
Sudanese middle class. Consequently, government often transforms 
                                                 
7 Sudanese pound. 
8 According to the exchange rate at the fieldwork period (US$1= SD3). 
9 The health day was organized by a local NGOs founded by members of the educated 
youth, in cooperation with medical staff from heath centre located outside the area. The 
day included also health education lectures about major health problems in the area 
such as malaria, HIV and circumcision.  
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the shantytowns into fourth class areas, which means changing them 
from illegal squatter settlements to poor urban areas. On the other 
hand middle class identity in Sudan has had an Arabic-Islamic 
character over the last two decades, which determines all the policies 
and activities of the government and is promoted by the government 
(Beck 1998). Furthermore, shifting shantytown dwellers identity to be 
an Arabic-Islamic identity serves as a mechanism for keeping them 
under control, and perpetuating their low status, since acquiring a 
high position in the Islamic-Arabic hierarchy is difficult if not 
impossible as it depends largely on genealogy (i.e. having Arab 
origins). 
Meanwhile, it is still important to distinguish between government and 
the northern middle class groups who dominate the city and the 
country as a whole. Although the government consistently claims 
representation of the middle class groups, in fact not all members of 
these groups share this view even if they are employed by the 
government. At the same time the government is trying hard to win 
over the northern middle class by adopting part of their ideology and 
vernacular, especially the Arabic-Islamic base. 
For all these reasons, the priorities of the government in providing 
services to shantytowns tend to focus on urban planning of the area 
without much concern about which groups or individuals are going to 
live in the area. The second priority is law and order, since the area 
before planning was considered a source of criminal activities. 
Indeed, the police use more violence and assume more authority in 
the shantytowns than is common elsewhere. Besides that, I also 
noticed that most members of the young educated class aspire to 
become law students, and those students who drop out of formal 
education prefer to work for the police departments or army. 
The third priority is education. For the purposes of making the identity 
of the shantytown residents conform more closely to Arabic-Islamic 
culture, schools were considered an ideal device through control of 
the curriculum. Consequently, the government prohibited NGOs from 
working directly in the shantytowns and closed all their schools, 
before introducing ten primary schools, some of them supported by 
Islamic NGOs. 
The fourth priority is mobilising political support for the government. 
The local committees have been used as a means to achieve this, 
along with civil society organisations such as youth organisations, 
and also some religious institutions like the Zakat institute (Islamic 
tax collector). The aim here is clearly to make political affiliation with 
the government the only way for shantytown people to participate in 
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and influence the provision of government services. As a result, the 
majority of local committee members are also members of the 
National Congress Party (NCP), which is the ruling party in the 
country. Indeed to be qualified for membership in a local committee, 
candidates must show that they embrace the Arabic-Islamic culture 
even if they are not Muslims. 
NGOs perception of services and development projects  
The main ideology behind the efforts of the NGOs in the shantytowns 
comes down to a humanitarian perspective. Originally local people 
were perceived as IDPs suffering from war and natural disasters in 
their home regions, and all programmes and services were planned 
to provide basic humanitarian relief. Following the planning stage, 
these humanitarian programmes were followed by several 
‘development programmes’. When we examine the nature of services 
and aid currently provided by NGOs, it is easy to conclude that they 
provide poor quality and quantity of services. However, one important 
reason for this is the policy of government towards the work of the 
NGOs, especially in placing obstacles in their way and in preventing 
their activities in general. On the ground there are surprisingly few 
projects and services offered by the NGOs – mostly medical services 
– and even these are small in scope when compared to the number 
of potential beneficiaries. 
I attended a course offered by the United Nations Advance Mission in 
Sudan (UNAMIS) at the Elbaraka community police station. It 
concentrated on the psychological needs of people affected by 
disasters, strangely enough with the lecturers wearing army fatigues 
and speaking English through a translator. But what struck me most 
was the lunch provided. While the lecturers and UN staff enjoyed 
catering from what appeared to be one of the most expensive 
restaurants in Khartoum, the participants received sandwiches. It 
was clear that they considered themselves outsiders. As a matter of 
fact, they told me that they had held the same course for the police 
officers, which they considered had been received successfully as 
well. 
The incorporation of local people in services and projects provided by 
the NGOs is very limited, because NGOs staff patronisingly assume 
the people to be needy and without the resources or ability to 
determine their own priorities. NGOs come to the area with ready-
made programmes and policies, which leave very little room for 
locals to direct the projects towards what they need. Thus in the end, 
local people look on what is offered by the NGOs as extra free 
services; they benefit from them but they are not necessarily what 
they need. 
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Although NGOs and government are considered to be opposing 
powers in the context of shantytowns, in fact they have much in 
common. They both engage with shantytowns as outsiders, and 
although they have differing ideologies, they impose them in the 
same way on the ground, from similar views of the beneficiaries. 
They both look on the locals as not being able to choose what they 
want. Perhaps their common falling is their inability to acknowledge 
the free agency of local people. 
What do the people want? What do the people get? 
Regarding all of the above, the discussion revolves around what the 
local people want, and whether they are able to get what they want. 
As I mentioned earlier, there are at least three distinct groups living in 
Elbaraka shantytown. The first generation’s perception is derived 
from their rural life experiences, and consequent urban life 
experiences. Their needs are a mixture of the two lifestyles, but the 
decision makers in the shantytown are the local committee members, 
characterised by education and a middle class lifestyle. Beyond this, 
other providers of services are urban-based institutions (i.e. NGOs, 
the government); therefore they work to fulfil the needs of the urban 
side and neglect the rural-based needs of the first generation 
population. 
One example of this is the use of local alcohol (marisa) in the area by 
different ethnic groups, whether Muslims or Christians. The local 
beer is considered an integral part of social life and communal 
activities in different rural areas in Sudan (Manger 1987). However, 
according to the standards of urban middle northern class, using 
alcohol is against the Islamic law and thus considered to be 
uncivilised behaviour. It is often possible to observe police raids on 
the places known for making and drinking alcoholic beverages. In 
order to fulfil these needs, local people are driven to a life under 
threat of punishment or being accused by the others in the city as 
having less urban qualities. Apparently, many local people choose to 
use their agency by opting to fulfil their needs at the largest open 
space in their area. Every afternoon these open spaces are used as 
temporal market places for alcohol and other complementary 
products (e.g. roasted meats). 
Many scholars have recently suggested that ideology and not 
objective science or a genuine desire to promote development is at 
the root of development policies in African countries. As examples of 
this, Nojoh identified and discussed four ideologies (Njoh 2009): 
indigenous elitism (pre-colonial era – 1884); European racism 
(colonial era, 1884–1960s); modernism (1960–1980s); and globalism 
(1990s–present); these have been at the root of public health 
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elements of town planning in Africa since the pre-colonial era. The 
article argued that with the exception of indigenous elitism, all the 
ideologies are alien to Africa. Furthermore, the author asserted that 
the problems associated with ideology as the basis of development 
policy are magnified when the ideology is of the imported variety than 
when it is native. 
The article employed the case of public health elements of town 
planning schemes to argue that development policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa often fail because they are typically driven by ideology rather 
than objective science or a genuine desire to promote meaningful 
development. But, in fact, ideologically-based policies are also 
implemented in many other aspects of town planning, e.g. physical 
planning, and the same failed results are likely to occur, as we have 
seen from the example of NGOs and government policies in the 
Elbaraka shantytown. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it might be clear that the alternatives of local people to 
satisfy their needs are limited by the efforts and ideologies of the 
agents providing the respective services.  Also, the urban-rural 
differences in lifestyles work to widen the differences between the 
local people. However, it is the mutual understanding of the three 
agents, and their recognition of the equal stands of the other agents, 
which lead to the co-operative design and establishment of public 
services and developmental programmes. Above all, recognising the 
local differences between the three local groups (i.e. first generation, 
educated, and youth) remains the key for developing success stories 
in the world of the shantytowns in Sudan. 
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Opposing the Developmental State online: how do South 
Africans make use of online platforms to challenge 
government’s macroeconomic strategies? 
Irina Turner10 
Abstract 
The performance of a nation is measured by financial indices like the 
gross national product (GNP) and development statistics like the 
Human Development Index (HDI) taking dimensions like mortality 
rate, standard of education or income per capita into account. 
Whether the development of these figures is positive or negative is 
determined in comparison to other nations. However, well-being in 
terms of spirituality, social relationships, ethical values etc. is not 
considered. In global discourse (Fairclough 2006) it assumed that 
material wealth makes for happier people and therefore economic 
growth is the most important feature to foster development. A 
nation’s official self-assessment and interpretation of these figures is 
collectively uttered by politicians channelled to the outside world 
through the president as the epitome of official nation’s 
representation. State-of-the-nation speeches serve as a condensed 
peak of a nation’s self-evaluation. This mainstreamed generalization 
however, cannot reflect the qualitative or subjectively experienced 
perception of changing life for individual citizens. The new social 
media Facebook and Twitter as well as the possibility for online 
citizens to post their comments on blogs is a way of expression 
deviating opinions from the collective voice of government. On the 
example of South Africa’s recent history, this article contrasts the 
official government’s version of development evident in the-state- of-
the-nation speeches with people’s real-life experiences uttered 
online. A critical discourse analysis (Blommaert 2006) of four state-
of-the-nation speeches by South African president Jacob Zuma 
(2009-2012) compared to selected postings on Facebook, Twitter 
                                                 
10 Dr. des. Irina Turner is a qualified Arts Manager (Potsdam University of Applied 
Sciences, Germany) and holds a M.A. degree in Media Theory and Practice from 
the University of Cape Town, South Africa. In summer 2013, she finished her to-
be-published PhD project on Political Discourse in post-apartheid South Africa at 
the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Bayreuth 
University, Germany. Her research interest lies in interdisciplinary approaches of 
Cultural Studies, Media Studies and Applied Linguistics in exploring questions of 
communication practices and language change in Africa. Besides having worked in 
Administration and Human Resources of the academic, public, and private sector 
in Germany and South Africa, Irina is also an experienced tutor for Media Studies 
and currently lectures Media and Presentation skills at the chair of African 
Language Studies at Bayreuth University.  
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and Newspaper-Comment-Blogs, allows for an assessment of the 
gap between official rhetoric and people’s real life experiences. 
Keywords:  new media, contestations, development policy, South 
Africa. 
Is South African democracy escaping to the internet? 
The annual State-of-the-Nation-Address (SoNA)11 delivered at the 
Opening of Parliament holds a pivotal position in communicating the 
South African government’s macroeconomic agenda and political 
vision to the media and the public. The current SoNA discourse is 
dominated by transforming South Africa into a so-called 
Developmental State via the vision of the New Growth Path (NGP), 
which tries to rectify the ever increasing disparity between rich and 
poor through strategic state intervention in the economy. Although 
the speech represents the ‘State of the Nation’ and speaks on behalf 
of it from a political perspective, the official government version does 
not necessarily reflect the perceptions and experiences of individual 
citizens. The SoNA is traditionally a suitable occasion to respond to 
and challenge the official mainstreamed version of the ‘State of the 
Nation’.  
Compared to the apartheid era, South Africans seemingly enjoy great 
freedoms – online and offline – in expressing their opinions and 
directing their views about and towards government. Upon closer 
inspection, however, the country is currently experiencing a 
presidency that appears to open avenues for public participation via 
social media and other platforms,12 while at the same time legally 
restricting the dissemination of information,13 suppressing freedom of 
speech and sometimes violently repressing oppositional voices of 
protesters (cf. Duncan 20 August 2012; see also Van Rensburg 
2012: 96). 
The possibility to post views and comments on New Media platforms 
like blogs, social networks or in comment sections of online 
newspapers opens relatively safe ways of exchanging and 
                                                 
11 The South African State-of-the-Nation-Address (SoNA) is held by the President at 
the Opening of Parliament in Cape Town in February each year to a joint sitting of 
Parliament and ‘marks the formal beginning of the parliamentary term’ (Parliament of 
RSA 2004: 97).  
12 For instance, a presidential hotline receiving service delivery complaints (GCIS 2 
May 2013). 
13 For instance, the Protection of Information Bill, also called ‘Secrecy Bill’ enables 
government officials to classify contentious information (see n.a. Mail & Guardian 
Online 14 June 2012; also R2K Campaign 18 February 2013). 
BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa  
24 
 
 
expressing deviating opinions from the collective voice of 
government for recipients of news with content producers and peer-
audiences.  
In an application of Critical Discourse Analysis (Blommaert 2006), 
this article contrasts South Africa’s official government version of the 
Developmental State and its vision brand the New Growth Path with 
people’s views expressed online. It seeks to sketch answers to the 
currently pressing question of whether social media outlets are used 
politically by South Africans in order to challenge hegemonic notions 
of development and whether online platforms can provide a tool for 
maintaining or even expanding on the current level of freedom of 
expression in South Africa. 
After outlining the relationship between media use and democracy 
with a focus on South Africa, the South African notion of the 
Developmental State is explored from various perspectives. 
Examples from three different online formats responding to the 2012 
SoNA and the notion of the Developmental State give insight into the 
gap between official rhetoric and people’s experiences: first, 
comments to an online newspaper article (Mail & Guardian Online 9 
February 2012); second, three blogs and their comments on the 
online platform Thoughtleader (Gumede 9 July 2008; Saunderson-
Meyer 11 February 2012; Potgieter 12 June 2012); and third, 
postings on the day of the SoNA on the President’s Facebook page 
(The Presidency 9 February 2012). 
Democratisation and the New Media in South Africa 
As the South Africa case proves, democratisation is not only the 
transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society, but also 
implies its stability and sustainability. Democracy is sustained by a 
balance of offers of the rulers and demands of the ruled (Nisbet et al. 
2012: 250). Citizens’ demands are expressed through political 
participation, e.g., elections and public expressions in the press or 
other formats (ibid.). Campbell and Kwak argue that political debate 
is the ‘fundamental building block of participatory democracy’ 
because through talk people overcome uncertainty, establish 
coherence of their perceived reality and filter relevant information 
(2001: 1007).14 The Habermasian model of Deliberations in the 
Public Sphere, whereby – simply put – political consensus is reached 
through exchange of ideas in a space between the people and the 
                                                 
14 Also argued by Katz (1994); Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun (2006) (in Campbell 
& Kwak, 2011: 1007). 
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state, lends itself ideally as a metaphor for the Internet15 (see e.g., 
Van Rensburg 2012: 99). 
Scholars are of two minds when it comes to the Internet’s positive 
effect on democratisation and political education.16 Some suggest the 
Internet has ‘a very limited role in promoting democratic citizenship’ 
(Hardy and Scheufele, 2005: 73)17. An American based study by Hill 
and Hughes found that most chat room debates are concerned with 
events and personalities rather than with political issues and are 
dominated by ‘normative statements that require little evidential 
backing’ (1998: 118 in Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 75). Furthermore, 
Gergen (2008), Sunstein (2001) and Mutz (2002) reason that users 
tend to select content coherent with their world view and meet peers 
online who, in a type of ‘echo chamber’ (Sunstein 2001), resonate 
existing political opinions (in Campbell and Kwak 2001: 1010/1018). 
Others argue that a higher Internet penetration increases indices of 
democracy (Best and Wade 2009; Groshek 2009; Howard 2009 in 
Nisbet et al. 2012: 251). 
Whether utilised or not, the Internet potentially provides features 
known to enhance the level of democratic citizenship like pluralism of 
opinion and political knowledge (Nisbet et al. 2012: 252). Especially 
the possibility for interactive exchange of ideologies, news, agendas 
and experiences can foster democratic awareness and political 
activation from ‘the bottom up’ (Nisbet et al. 2012: 252; see also 
Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 74 and Van Rensburg 2012: 94). 
Interpersonal discussion, either online or offline,18 moderates the 
political input by the media, leads to differential learning and more 
strategic information gathering, and might result in individual action 
(Hardy and Scheufele 2005: 72/73/80). Hardy and Scheufele argue 
based on Habermas (1962) that political decision making is not 
                                                 
15 For a detailed elaboration on the relation between Habermas’ theory and the 
Internet, see Dalhberg (2001), Heng et al. (2003). 
16 For further studies on the effect of the Internet on democratisation see Groshek 
(2009); Howard (2009); Mozorov (2011); Shirky (2011) (cited by Nisbet et al. 
2012: 249). 
17 Hardy & Scheufele argue that reliability of online information is more flawed 
compared to traditional media; exacerbated by the ‘nonlinear nature of this 
medium’ and its ‘fuzzy layout’ making differentiation between hard and soft news 
more difficult (2005: 74/80). Nisbet et al. point out that the relationship between 
Internet penetration and democratisation depends on contextual factors (2012: 
253). 
18 Hardy & Scheufele found that in terms of the moderating effect through peer debate 
there is no difference between online and offline, i.e., to face-to-face discussion 
(2005: 72/73; 81). 
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merely a result of accumulating information but that ‘the deliberative 
aspect is critical in this process because it allows citizens to weigh all 
different viewpoints and integrate them into their final 
decision’(2005: 80).19  
Unlike most other available scholarship,20 Nisbet et al. also looked at 
the effects of Internet use on political activity in developing countries 
and conclude that ‘Internet use may play a more meaningful role in 
strengthening and enhancing young democracies through impacting 
citizen attitudes rather than promoting outright democratic transitions 
among autocratic regimes’ (2012: 261).  
One of the few studies examining the effect of the Internet on 
democratization in South Africa is provided by Van Rensburg (2012). 
She argues that the Internet holds great potential for Africans to 
strengthen their right of self-determination after decades of colonial 
and post-colonial suppression (2012: 94 based on Ott and Rosser 
1999: 137). Many information services provided by the South African 
government in particular, e.g., Matric results, health information, 
reservation of bus tickets etc., are available online via mobile phones 
(Van Rensburg 2012: 105). This suggests that in South Africa, the 
Internet is highly important for sustaining democracy as long as a 
sufficient amount of people have access to it. 
Internet use in South Africa 
Internet access in sub-Saharan Africa is growing rapidly and was four 
times higher in 2009 than in 2005 (Nisbet et al. 2012: 254). The lion’s 
share of access points is in South Africa, where in 2007, 15 per cent 
of adults had access to the Internet via computer (Gillwald and 
Storck 2008: 26 in Van Rensburg 2012: 95). By 2011, this number 
had already climbed to 17 per cent of the population (World Wide 
Worx in Samie 4 June 2012). Access hereby refers to ownership and 
proximity (Kreutzer 2009: 18). There are no current numbers for 
Internet access via mobile phone in South Africa but developments 
suggest that this number is even higher than access via PC21 and 
rapidly growing especially among youths (van Rensburg 2012: 95).22 
                                                 
19 Kwak et al. (2005) found that people are more likely to participate in an online debate 
when they are in a small group with like-minded discussants (in Campbell & Kwak 
2011: 1009). 
20 For instance, Bimber (2003); Norris (2000), Xenos & Moy (2007) (in Nisbet et al. 
2012: 252). 
21 In his study of the Internet/mobile phone habits of 441 urban youths (grade 11 
learners) from deprived areas of Cape Town, Kreutzer found that ’68 per cent of 
respondents were found to use the Internet on a mobile phone on a typical day’; the 
most favoured website had been Google (2009: 53). The most frequently used media 
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The social media community in South Africa is currently growing 
about 300 per cent a year; whereby 80 per cent of the people with 
online access are active in social media (Shier E News Channel 9 
February 2012). Despite this growth, over 80 per cent of South 
Africans are left with no access to the Internet. A study comparing 28 
democratic and non-democratic countries from Africa and Asia found 
that the number of broadband users in South Africa, which was 
classified as a free country, was low in comparison (Nisbet et al. 
2012: 262). This is due to the extremely high cost of Internet access 
and the monopoly of the service provider Telkom (Van Rensburg 
2012: 104).  Kreutzer, however, points out that access figures do not 
speak about the intensity and varieties of usage of New Media23 and 
that ‘ownership or access to a certain technology is a poor predictor’ 
of socioeconomic development per se (Kreutzer 2009: 19). An 
increase in access points does not automatically lead to beneficial 
educational effects for the users or raise ‘civic engagement and 
social capital’ per se (2009: 20). 
The individual’s motivation for engagement is equally important, as 
Van Rensburg argues (2012: 99ff. based on Van Dijk 2005: 21). 
Motivation is determined by the resources available to the individual; 
i.e., material resources, software and hardware for instance, social 
resources, i.e., agents who support learning and using the Internet, 
and cognitive resources, i.e., a culturally and intellectually stimulating 
environment to make use of the Internet (Van Rensburg 2012: 100). 
Van Rensburg states that despite the economic hurdle, socio-cultural 
barriers also play an important role in preventing South Africans to 
engage with the Internet: ‘Learners’ and students’ lack of inclination 
towards mathematics, science subjects and traditional cultural 
practices lead them away from using technology, a problem specific 
to South Africa (Levin, personal communication, 1 December 2010)’ 
(2012: 108). She further argues that this distortion can only be 
rectified by government (Van Rensburg 2012: 108). The state 
                                                                                                                            
type of the sample group had been TV (81 per cent had watched TV ‘yesterday’); 
whereas web access via mobile phone or PC scored 56 per cent (used ‘yesterday’) 
(Kreutzer 2009: 65). A surprisingly large group of the young people had read a 
newspaper the previous day (56 per cent) (Kreutzer 2009: 65). 13 per cent had read 
the news on the previous day on a mobile device, and 9 per cent on a PC (Kreutzer 
2009: 67). 
22 For a study on the politically activating effects of mobile-based communication see 
Campbell & Kwak (2011). 
23‘One exception is the figures provided by the marketing research company Nielsen 
Online, some of which are regularly published by the South African Online Publishers 
Association (OPA)’(Kreutzer 2009: 15).  
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interventions proposed by the Developmental State might be a step 
in the right direction. 
The Developmental State as a model for South Africa 
The ever-increasing rift between rich and poor in South Africa since 
the dismantling of apartheid, has urged the government to redress 
their macro-economic outlook in finding a balance between economic 
growth and development needs of the poor (Reitzes 2009: 13). 
Marquis (2009) describes the simultaneous existence of three 
competing notions of development within South Africa in politics and 
the media (see also Banda 2008). The modernistic approach, which 
is centred on the ‘metaphor of growth’, sees development as a ‘linear 
and irreversible process’ whereby underdeveloped countries should 
imitate developed countries (Marquis 2009: 18). This approach 
foregrounds ‘quantitative differences’ and frames underdevelopment 
as a result of resisting reforms and new technologies (Marquis 2009: 
18). In South Africa, the shift to the neo-liberal concept Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR; introduced in 1996) can be 
seen as an embodiment of a modernistic macroeconomic strategy 
(Marquis 2009: 18). 
The second notion of development is the dependency paradigm 
which emerged in the 1960s (Marquis 2009: 20). This notion gave up 
on the idea that underdevelopment is self-inflicted but acknowledged 
the influence of external factors and the interdependence among 
developed and underdeveloped countries (Marquis 2009: 20). The 
proposed solution to underdevelopment was a delinking from the 
world economy (Marquis 2009: 20). In South Africa, this paradigm 
has been mostly reflected through the Redistribution and 
Development Programme (RDP; introduced in 1994), which was a 
change from the modernistic economic policies of the apartheid 
regime (Marquis 2009: 21).  
In the 1970s, a multidimensional approach emerged emphasising 
notions of endogenous and participatory self-development (Marquis 
2009: 21). Marquis sees this approach manifested in South Africa, 
through the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)24 which were the 
basis for the policies of the Developmental State (2009: 17ff.). By the 
end of Mbeki’s first tenure in 2004, it became clear that both post-
apartheid macro-economic strategies, the RDP and GEAR, had not 
                                                 
24 The targets were to be achieved by 2015 but remained unspecific; e.g. ‘ensuring 
environmental sustainability’ (Levin 2008 in Reitzes 2009: 13). For the only quantifiable 
goal of ‘halving poverty’, a definition of poverty was lacking in South Africa (see Reitzes 
2009: 16; Oosthuizen 2008).  
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produced the desired results25 (Thompson 2001: 281). The notion of 
the Developmental State as a third alternative became prolific but 
initially still remained vague and unspecified (Reitzes 2009: 12). 
In May 2005, in a speech to the National Assembly President Thabo 
Mbeki pronounced the new outlook for the first time and called for a 
‘strong state’ and more political intervention: 
On this occasion, he reflected upon the decline of the 
“Washington Consensus’, the ideas which had set the 
stage for the reduction of the role of the state in the 
‘development thinking’ of global bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
since the 1980s’ (Southall 2006: xx). 
The shift, as Daniel et al. point out, was less a result of looking back 
at the ANC’s socialist roots, but more active benchmarking with 
comparable countries such as the developmental capitalist Asian 
Tigers like Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore (2005: xxviii in Southall 
2006: xvii). The Asian-style fostered state’s protection and incentives 
for selected companies and trades; this protectionist policy met the 
scepticism of the World Trade Organisation (Nattras 2011: 2).  
Compared to the Tiger States, South Africa had a few distinctly 
different parameters that would challenge the implementation of an 
‘Asian style’ Developmental State: a deficiency in human resource 
capacity, tight-knit embedment in a globalist production system, a 
high level of democracy and public involvement, a low level of social 
coherence, as well as generally less ‘favourable and historical 
industrial conditions’ (Southall 2006: xvii/xxxii/xliff.).  
In 2006, as a first step towards the new model, the Mbeki 
administration committed to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG), which were translated into measurable national targets on 
service delivery26 (Levin 2008 in Reitzes 2009: 13). After the tide-
turning Polokwane27 conference in 2007, the governing party issued 
                                                 
25 In 2008, the government admitted in a review that economic growth does not 
trickle down to the poor or automatically results in an easily accessible labour 
market for unskilled workers (South African Presidency 2008: 103 in Reitzes 
2009: 16/17). 
26 By 2007: eradication of the ‘bucket system’; by 2008: potable water provision to 
2.07 million households; by 2010: sanitation provision to 3.7 million households; by 
2012: electricity provision to 3.4. million households (Levin 2008, 54-55 in Reitzes 
2009: 13). 
27 At the ANC’s 52th national conference in Polokwane in December 2007, Thabo 
Mbeki was publicly humiliated and eventually got unceremoniously unseated as the 
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a more precise definition on the Developmental State including the 
following features: 
 ‘(…) strategic orientation: an approach premised on people-
centred and people-driven change, and sustained 
development based on high growth rates, restructuring of the 
economy and socioeconomic inclusion. 
 (…) capacity to lead in the definition of a common 
national agenda and in mobilising all of society to take part in 
its implementation. (…) 
 (…) organisational capacity: ensuring that its [the state’s] 
structures and systems facilitate realisation of a set agenda. 
(…) 
 (…) technical capacity: the ability to translate broad 
objectives into programmes and projects (…). This depends 
among others on the proper training, (…), and on acquiring 
and retaining skilled  ‘personnel’ (ANC July 2010. [bold in 
original]).  
Along with this definition, the ANC set itself further targets at 
Polokwane; amongst the more specific ones were the 
implementation of a comprehensive social security system, reduction 
of certain illnesses and maternal deaths, reduction of violent crime 
and road accidents, intensifying education in mathematics and 
natural sciences, and expanding the nation’s artisanship base 
(Reitzes 2009: 12ff.). Due to the fact that the concept of the 
Developmental State for South Africa seems vague, discourse and 
criticism on the notion is broad. Southall describes three critical views 
represented by the economic liberals, the Jacobins, and the 
developmentalists (2006: xxiiff.). The economic liberals28 fear an 
ideologically driven ‘developmentalism’ that plays into the self-
serving interests of the ANC elite and hence, they call for a reduction 
in state control in order to boost the economy (Southall 2006: 
xxiiff.).29  
Economic liberals share their concern with the so-called Jacobins,30 
the second critical faction, namely that large-scale state intervention 
                                                                                                                            
party’s president and consequently president of the country in favour of his rival 
Jacob Zuma (Tabane & Ludman 2009: 88). 
28 The most prominent proxy is opposition leader Tony Leon of the Democratic Alliance 
(Southall 2006: xxiiff.). 
29 Southall argues this stance results from ‘neoclassical economic thinking which 
commends the minimal state as a prerequisite for growth’ (Southall 2006: xxiiff.). 
30 The term Jacobins was coined by Itumeleng Mahabane in Financial Mail ‘in echo of 
the most radical wing of the bourgeoisie revolutionaries in France after 1789’ who 
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invites large scale corruption (Southall 2006: xxxiii). This group sees 
itself as the ‘organic representation of the majority’ and believes ‘that 
individuals must submit their desires to the general will’: 
In summary, the Jacobins espouse what is at heart a 
radical nationalist position which views African 
economic liberation as involving a radical 
transformation of ownership and control in favour of 
black capitalists and producers’ (Southall 2006: 
xxivff.). 
However, the creator of the Jacobins label, journalist Itumeleng 
Mahabane, doubts whether the ANC currently holds the necessary 
intellectual capacity and philosophical innovation to carry out such a 
social revolution (Financial Mail 25.02.05 in Southall 2006: xxivff.). 
The third faction of critics, the so-called ‘developmentalists’,31 agree 
with the Jacobins that there is a ‘need for the state to promote a 
class of black  capitalists’ but call for state control of the free market 
and for raised action of meeting ‘mass social needs’ (Southall 2006: 
xxvii). Other than the ‘need for a strong developmental state’, there is 
little consensus within this group due to the broadness of the 
Developmental State concept (ibid.). 
Southall argues that implementing the Developmental State in South 
Africa according to the authoritarian Asian model would inevitably 
result in tarnishing ‘hard won’ democratic freedoms and states that 
‘this problematic aspect of the Developmental State has been 
downplayed by its promoters’ (2006: xxxviii). In 2010, South Africa 
realised the second step in implementing the Developmental State by 
introducing the vision of the New Growth Path (NGP). The 
programme aims at creating 5 million jobs by 2020 ‘through a mix of 
direct government job creation, social-democratic consensus building 
and macroeconomic, labour and industrial policies’ (Nattras 2011: 1). 
The formulation of this vision remains a vague ‘broad set of 
objectives’ (ibid.).The NGP however formulates some aspects of the 
Developmental State that deviate distinctly from the Asian model, 
e.g., with regard to labour, as Nattras points out: 
Whereas wages and working conditions improved in 
East Asia only once the labour-market tightened after 
                                                                                                                            
called for a radical social transformation (Southall 2006: xxivff.). According to journalist 
Ryan Coetzee, ‘the entire ANC leadership’ falls under the Jacobins label (ThisDay 
29.07.04 in Southall 2006: xl). 
31 Southall names Neva Makgetla (e.g., Business Day 22 April 2005) and Jeremy 
Cronin as proxies (2006: xxvii). 
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decades of strong growth, the NGP proposes to 
advance the South African trade union agenda of 
‘decent work’ (…) which favours the employment of 
full-time skilled workers. (…). This is an even more 
daunting challenge than achieving a 6% annual real 
growth rate’ (2011: 2ff.). 
The author criticizes the NGP document for failing to address the 
‘clash between the objective of high-wage, high-productivity growth’ 
and for missing the opportunity to identify the rigid labour market as 
South Africa’s main challenge (Nattras 2011: 5). She further criticizes 
that NGP does not provide adequate details on how to increase 
government’s efficiency or eliminate corruption (Nattras 2011: 3).  
The Developmental State becomes tangible for the public in the 
restructuring of state-owned-enterprises (SOE) and infrastructure 
development as the drivers of jobs and growth described in the NGP 
(Government of South Africa 2010: 10; see also Southall 2006: 
xxxvii). In 2012, infrastructure development as envisaged in the NGP 
was the central theme of President Jacob Zuma’s deliberations in his 
state-of-the-nation-address. As in the previous years, Zuma used the 
2012 SoNA to promote himself as a highly accessible listening 
president; embedded by a massive media campaigning not least in 
the social media. Prior to the SoNA, Zuma had invited the public to 
make suggestions for the speech on Facebook, Twitter or by phoning 
in. He referred to this process in the speech: ‘I received a lot of 
valuable correspondence in the run-up to this SONA. Such 
interaction enables us keep in touch with our people and their needs’ 
(SoNA 2012).  As a testimony, he mentioned Mr. Mzukisi Mali who 
had written an email to him regarding his problem with housing. 
Zuma responded directly to Mali in his mother tongue promising a 
new insurance scheme enabling banks to issue housing loans (SoNA 
2012). The President thereby gave the impression that he was in 
direct dialog with the people and heeding to their concerns. He 
further emphasised this impression of ‘working together’32 with the 
public when he appealed that ‘a pact will be required’ between 
government and the population (SoNA 2012).  
Zuma said that the South African Constitution, adopted sixteen years 
ago, served as a ‘vision statement’ for South Africa (SoNA 2012). His 
motto for 2012 was to address the ‘triple challenge of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment’ (ibid.). He defined the objective of his 
SoNA as an undertaking of ‘a mid-term review, looking at progress 
                                                 
32 This motto, also in its Venda version ‘Faranani’, has been a consistent SoNA theme 
since the early Mbeki era. 
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from 2009 till now instead of the usual annual review’ (SoNA 2012). 
This review pointed at the NGP’s features ‘tourism, agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing and the green economy’ as core ‘job drivers’ 
(SoNA 2012). Building on his 2011 motto –‘the year of job creation’– 
a ‘massive infrastructure drive’ was announced as the major step in 
the NGP for 2012 (ibid.). Zuma emphasized and redefined the new 
economic outlook and government’s responsibility: 
As a developmental state that is located at the centre 
of a mixed economy, we see our role as being to lead 
and guide the economy and to intervene in the 
interest of the poor, given the history of our country’ 
(SoNA 2012). 
In well-known fashion there was no deviation from the ANC paradigm 
that economic growth of big business would eventually alleviate the 
plight of the poor: ‘The solution for the country therefore, is higher 
growth and job creation to reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty 
and inequality’ (SoNA 2012). This confirms Marquis’ observation 
(2009) of the simultaneousness of varying notions on development in 
the South African public sphere and a resilience of the ‘modernistic’ 
view. 
Quantitative survey on online activity around the 2012 SoNA 
The public online activity in social networks around the 2012 SoNA 
was examined by the media effects researchers Tim Shier 
(Brandsyeye.com) and Wadim Schreiner (Media Tenor) (E News 
Channel 9 February 2012).33 They found that in 2012 the number of 
registered ‘real time  feedback’ messages to the SoNA on social 
media, most of them in English, were more than four times higher 
than in 2011 (ibid.).34 Shier found that in the anticipation phase 
before the speech, most contributions were assessing whether the 
2011 SoNA promises had been delivered (ibid.). 
In 2012, the declared ‘year of infrastructure’, the online responses to 
Zuma’s central SoNA issue, namely that ‘investment and 
infrastructure must generate skills and job creation’ were meagre, 
according to Shier (E News Channel 9 February 2012). The topic did 
not feature prominently in the social media conversations, because it 
                                                 
33 TV show ‘News night special edition: State of the Nation Address 2012: Social media 
Reaction’ on E TV. Shier and Schreiner were interviewed by Jeremy Maggs (E News 
Channel 9 February 2012). 
34 Registered ‘real time feedback’ messages/conversations on social media in 
response to the SoNA: 6,000 in 2011 as opposed to 28,000 in 2012 (E News Channel 
9 February 2012). 
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was ‘not very tangible and immediate’ (ibid.). In Shier’s view, there 
has been mentioning of the keyword ‘year of infrastructure’, but to the 
people it was not ‘really clear what it meant’ and there were no 
‘cross-discussions’ on the topic (ibid.). The reactions reflected a 
‘reporting on the state-of-the-nation-address, rather than a discussion 
about it’ (ibid.). Schreiner added that the topic of infrastructure was 
complex and contained lots of figures and statistics and therefore it 
did not ‘entice an immediate reaction’; he surmised that people would 
talk about it at a later stage, after they had processed the information 
for a while (ibid.). 
The study compared traditional to social media in terms of frequency 
of topics and heterogeneity of opinions in the anticipation of the 2012 
SoNA.35 While for both the issue of job creation was on top of the 
agenda, the economy featured four times more often in the traditional 
media than in social media conversations36 (E News Channel 9 
February 2012). Traditional media also made reference to service 
delivery more often (250 references) than social media (80 
references) (ibid.). In Shier’s opinion, the range of opinions on social 
media was broader and more extreme than in the traditional media 
(ibid.). Schreiner said that 10 per cent of reporting in the traditional 
media has been negative and overall largely critical and confirmed 
Shier’s observation of a gap between the social and traditional media 
in terms of content (E News Channel 9 February 2012). Although an 
increase in political online activity around the SoNA event is 
apparent, the following qualitative examples can complement the 
lacking depth regarding the quality and type of online responses to 
the 2012 SoNA in Shier’s and Schreiner’s quantitative study. 
The online evolvement of public notions on the Developmental 
State 
For the analysis of citizen’s comments on the Developmental State, 
several examples have been selected from the Mail & Guardian 
Online and its blogging platform ThoughtLeader. The Mail & 
Guardian has been of interest to media scholars in South Africa for 
several studies (e.g., Marquis 2009; Steenveld 2007; McDonald & 
Jacobs 2005) due to its high quality investigative reporting drawing 
                                                 
35 The validity and usefulness of the results of this media effect study is partly 
questionable, because it is commercially motivated and funded. Furthermore, in terms 
of traditional vs. social media it does not take into account that the platforms attract 
different user profiles. 
36 over 350 references to job creation in traditional and social media; less than 100 
references to economy in social media as opposed to over 400 references in the 
traditional media (E News Channel 9 February 2012). 
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on comments and contributions from leading South African 
intellectuals and its reputation to report critically and independently. 
The newspaper is known to have a high-brow middle-class 
readership located on the left end of the political spectrum (Marquis 
2009: 27). Due to the Mail & Guardian’s long history of investigative 
journalism covering the issues of the labour movement and economic 
welfare (Marquis 2009: 27),37 its little digital sister, the Mail & 
Guardian Online, is an ideal site for analysing public engagement on 
the Developmental State. Since the concept of the Developmental 
State is based on the Millennium Development Goals (see Reitzes 
2009: 12ff.), their representation in the print media, offering 
interpreting frames of complex macroeconomic issues for the public, 
is a good starting point for understanding people’s online responses 
on the issue.  
In her study of the Mail & Guardian’s coverage of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) between 2000 and 2007, Marquis found 
that while initially ‘not frequently represented’, the coverage ‘only 
increased towards their midterm evaluation, when it became 
apparent that they would not be attained’ (2009: 97). The author 
pointed out that the newspaper did not portray a coherent concept of 
development but that it depended on the personal view of the 
respective author (Marquis 2009: 97). Marquis also examined the 
way ‘ordinary’ citizens and ‘non- bureaucratic’ sources were cited as 
testimonies and found that they were ‘numerically underrepresented’ 
due to news room routines, whereby preference was given to reliable 
and easily accessible ‘official’ sources (Marquis 2009: 98). While 
Marquis’ study seems to only have taken offline newspapers into 
consideration, a look into the Mail & Guardian Online also allows for 
capturing ‘unofficial’ voices of ‘ordinary’ citizens who used the 
comment function on the online report. 
Example I: comments on an online newspaper article 
Through the comment function, ‘ordinary’ citizens are able to 
challenge and complement accounts of the print media online and in 
doing so, they blur the lines between traditional and social media 
                                                 
37 Founded in 1985 as Weekly Mail, the Mail & Guardian used to be part of South 
Africa’s ‘struggle’ press with a focus on development and labour interests (Marquis 
2009: 27). Although the paper had been critical towards the apartheid regime, it did not 
have partisan alliances; for instance, to the ANC (Marquis 2009: 27). In 1994, the Mail 
& Guardian merged with the UK Guardian and although it meanwhile had lost its 
‘alternative’ appeal and was run commercially, the paper kept its critical no-lobby 
approach (Marquis 2009: 27). In 2002, Newtrust Company Botswana, owned by 
Trevor Ncube, bought the Mail & Guardian’s majority shares and so provided financial 
independence for the paper (Marquis 2009: 27). 
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content.38 The first example shows online reactions to the editorial 
article ‘Dreams of China vs. local realities’ (n.a. Mail & Guardian 
Online 9 February 2012). In advance of the SoNA, the article 
discussed the application potential of the Chinese economic model to 
South Africa: 
President Jacob Zuma dreams of China: of 10% 
growth and an elite bureaucracy (…). The president’s 
State of the Nation address next week seems sure to 
paint a South African version of this dream (…). It is to 
be a year of infrastructure; of truly huge projects with 
the potential to put us on a Maglev train to growth and 
employment’ (ibid.).  
While the article lauded the prospect of infrastructure investment, it 
also pointed out that the idea is not new39 (ibid.). The Chinese model 
would imply ‘centralised co-ordination, ministerial arm-twisting and 
public money’ as opposed to Mbeki’s ‘classical corporate governance 
model and market-based finance approach’ (ibid.). Private 
companies would be asked to invest in exchange for government 
refraining from ‘serious intervention’ at a later stage (ibid.). However, 
the article argued that there are some great differences between 
China and South Africa and therefore the model cannot be applied 
one-to-one. The discrepancies according to the Mail & Guardian 
Online are the lack of a ‘mandarin elite’, an ‘overstretched’ public 
service system, and the lack of financial resources of South Africa’s 
national bank (ibid.). Not least it is a matter of the political system: 
‘Finally, central control is simply harder in democracies, even – 
perhaps especially – ones with dominant ruling parties beset by 
factionalism’ (ibid.).  
The editorial triggered various online responses among readers. 
‘Dave Harris’40called the article ‘shallow’ and ‘misleading’ regarding 
the SA-China relations and coined the editorial symptomatic for the 
degeneration of the critical media in South Africa into ‘ridicule of 
government and fear mongering’ (Comment section. Mail & Guardian 
Online 9 February 2012). ‘Harris’ argued that China can be indeed a 
                                                 
38 New Media are not merely the new technologies that the introduction of the Internet 
in 1993 has provided, but rather they are hybrid formats that emerged from these new 
technologies and traditional media like online newspapers or e-books (Kreutzer 2009: 
12). 
39 Initially, the infrastructure drive had been former President Mbeki’s ‘big push’ during 
his second term of office (n.a. MG Online 9 February 2012). 
40 According to the blogger profile ‘Dave Harris’ is a male South African (Blogger 1999–
2013).  
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role-model but the media chose to focus on the negative and ignored 
positive aspects (ibid.). 
An equally critical stance terming the article ‘hostile’ towards 
government was taken by the poster ‘Helene Passtoors’.41 Like 
‘Harris’, she expressed her disappointment in a newspaper ‘that once 
was a champion for democracy’ (Comment section. Mail & Guardian 
Online 9 February 2012). ‘Passtoors’ took issue with the positive 
representation of Mbeki’s neo-liberal policies which exacerbated the 
gap between rich and poor in South Africa (ibid.). She further argued, 
Brazil rather than China will be the role model for South Africa when 
it comes to implementing the Developmental State and contested the 
‘preconceived idea’ that this necessarily has to go hand in hand with 
‘an authoritarian regime to succeed’; naming Sweden and France as 
counter-examples (ibid.). 
‘Anton van Niekerk’42 argued that South Africa was far from China’s 
excellence with regard to education and therefore lacked the capacity 
to produce sophisticated manufacturing or recruit skilled people for 
civil service (Comment section. Mail & Guardian Online 9 February 
2012). He refuted ‘Eric Scott’s’ reproach43 to be advocating a one-
party dictatorship and romanticising China’s version of repressive 
State Capitalism by agreeing that China was a dictatorship but 
reiterating his opinion that ‘the urban education system in China is 
producing the best in the world’ (ibid.). ‘Van Niekerk’ also defended 
his position against the criticism by ‘David Harris’, who named 
Apple’s manual manufacturing in China as a counter-example 
against the exclusive application of robot technology (ibid.). He 
argued that logistics, design and management did indeed require a 
high level of know-how (ibid.). 
This example showed that the Mail & Guardian Online editorial 
managed to elicit informed and well-reasoned response and debate 
from different angles. Some posters defended China while others 
said China was not an appropriate comparison for South Africa at all. 
The posters also engaged in direct contact with each other. While the 
commentators displayed sluggish spelling and were quick to use 
insulting language, especially when directly referring to each other, 
they appeared to be from an educated background politically situated 
                                                 
41 Likely, this is the real person Helene Passtoors. She is a former anti-apartheid 
activist imprisoned during apartheid for her activity in Umkhonto we Sizwe (South 
African History Online n.d.). 
42 Likely, this is the real person Anton van Niekerk. He is Professor for Philosophy at 
the University of Stellenbosch (van Niekerk n.d.). 
43 For this blogger, no identification could be found online.  
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on the left and therefore represented the typical readership profile of 
the Mail & Guardian. 
Example II: comments on ThoughtLeader blogs 
Three exemplary blogs and their commentary on the Internet 
platform ThoughtLeader (Gumede 9 July 2008; Saunderson-Meyer 
11 February 2012; Potgieter 12 June 2012) trace the evolvement of 
the public notion on the Developmental State on blogs. 
ThoughtLeader is a blogging space administered by the Mail & 
Guardian Online and promotes itself as an ‘editorial group blog’ with 
the objective to ‘provide a platform’ for debate among writers from 
‘various industries and political spectrums’ and the opportunity for 
readers to comment (Mail & Guardian Online 2013a). Over 100 
bloggers from academia, journalism, and business as well as 
Diaspora South Africans and some organisations like the Archbishop 
Tutu Fellows who are advised to ‘try not to be simply a spokesperson 
for [their respective] organisation or company’ are registered and 
presented with a photograph and short profile description (ibid.). The 
site is structured into categories of Business, Equality, Gender 
Violence, General, Lifestyle, Media and Marketing, News and 
Politics, Perspective, Sports, and Tech (ibid.). Writers are asked to 
write mainly in English (ibid.). 
In 2008, Vusi Gumede44 wrote on ThoughtLeader about his 
conference paper45 that assessed the extent to which South Africa 
represents the Developmental State46 (9 July 2008). The paper 
‘tentatively concluded that South Africa indeed encapsulates most of 
the key features’ but found that South Africa’s implementation, 
influenced by Amartya Sen’s approach to development, was 
relatively weak and ineffective; despite the relative decline in poverty 
(Gumede 9 July 2008). According to Gumede, Evan’s concept of 
‘embedded autonomy’ (1995), i.e., the networking between 
bureaucrats and business, has not yet fully materialised in South 
Africa (ibid.). Responses to the blog were largely positive, although 
Gumede failed to go into details on key concepts of the policy 
(Gumede 9 July 2008 Comment Section). 
                                                 
44 Prof. Gumede has worked for the South African presidency for 12 years and is now 
working as an academic and writer (WhosWho n.d.). 
45 SA Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC): Conference on the potentialities 
for and challenges of constructing a democratic developmental state in South 
Africa; 4 to 6 June 2008; Cradle of Humankind, Johannesburg. 
46 Robinson & White (1998), Edigheji (2005), Evans (1995). No reference list in blog 
format. (Gumede 9 July 2008). 
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Three years later, blogger Elnari Potgieter47 still identified 
implementation backlogs (12 June 2012). Potgieter criticised that 
although the Developmental State was prominently framed in the 
government’s agenda in Zuma’s 2012 SoNA, it remained a label only 
(ibid.). She argued that the main feature of the Developmental State, 
as realised by Japan for example, was a ‘strong, reliable, predictable 
and skilled bureaucracy’, which South Africa lacked considerably 
(ibid.). Potgieter elaborated that efficient bureaucracy required ‘a 
sense of mission’ and ‘vigorous standards’ in the recruitment process 
(ibid.). She advocated for performance-based rewarding and long-
term career development (ibid.). All of this would result in ‘a sense of 
unity and ‘corporate coherence’ amongst bureaucrats’ (ibid.). 
In response to Potgieter, ‘TumiM#’ provided an expert’s voice as a 
practitioner ‘coming from the public sector’ in the blog’s comment 
section:   
(…) I can assure you that the problem of delivery is 
about more than just skills and capacity. (…)  In the 
institution I work for, there have been COUNTLESS 
suggestions for implementation, most of which are 
shot down (…) because there is no political support 
(…). When there is political will, (…) I believe (…) 
there will be more room for independent decision 
making (…), and higher standards of delivery’ 
(Potgieter 12 June 2012 Comment Section). 
Vigorously defending government, ‘Tofolux#’ argued that 
implementation was lagging because business and the media were 
not realising their commitment to work together with the president on 
the Developmental State but ‘operating in isolation of each other and 
holding onto old ideologies’(Potgieter 12 June 2012 Comment 
Section). He saw government’s role as the planning force setting 
targets whereas business remained the responsible ‘motive force’ 
realising the plans (ibid.). 
Blogger ‘The Creator#’ disagreed with ‘Tofolux#’ and argued the 
implementation of the Developmental State was foremost the 
responsibility and capability of government but the Zuma 
administration was not using its power because it was ‘a tool of big 
business’ who in turn were ‘obsessed with fantasies of profit without 
investment’ and therefore ‘unresponsive to real developmental 
needs’ (Potgieter 12 June 2012 Comment Section). 
                                                 
47 MA Student for Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch (Potgieter 12 June 
2012). 
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A blog by William Saunderson-Meyer48 related directly to the 2012 
SoNA (11 February 2012). The blogger gave a practical example for 
government’s implementation of the Developmental State and 
argued this idea originally stemmed from the apartheid government:  
To commit R300-billion to infrastructural spending, the 
equivalent of two-and-a-half Soccer World Cups, is 
bold indeed. These are first steps to the 
developmental state that President Zuma admires and 
attributes to China, but which in SA can in fact be 
traced back to the massive and successful state 
corporatism of the early National Party years’ (ibid.).  
Saunderson-Meyer pointed out that Zuma, keeping the international 
investors in mind, carefully avoided certain sensitive aspects of the 
strategy: ‘He spoke about the importance of mining but never spoke 
the word ‘nationalisation’, the mere prospect of which has cost 
billions in investment and scores of thousands of jobs’ (ibid.). The 
blog invited 31 responses. ‘jandr0#’ disagreed with Saunderson-
Meyer on calling Zuma’s investments ‘bold’: 
‘Now please explain to me how Zuma was ‘bold’ in spending 
taxpayers’ money? (…) I would argue on the contrary, that he 
was taking no risks – that everybody knows spending on 
infrastructure is generally perceived as a ‘home run’.(…) In my 
opinion, a ‘bold’ Zuma would have tackled (say) corruption 
head on. Why is this bold? Well, because it may cost him 
some support from already corrupted ANC cadres, that’s why’ 
(Comment section. Saunderson-Meyer 11 February 2012). 
Saunderson-Meyer argued in response that long-term infrastructure 
investment was ‘bold’ indeed as its benefits do not immediately ‘show 
in the statistics’ (ibid.). 
Thoughtleader blogs attracted the same type of user profile like the 
comments on the Mail & Guardian Online’s editorial. However, the 
blogs appear more like a chat-room inviting direct debate with the 
writer. Compared to the comments to the online article, the blogging 
format allows for a dynamic eye-level conversation and progressing 
cross-talk with multiple participants rather than stating an after-the-
fact opinion to a static article already published by an anonymous 
detached editor. 
                                                 
48 Saunderson-Meyer is a columnist writing also for The Weekend Argus, The Citizen, 
Weekend Witness, and Sunday Times (Mail & Guardian Online  2013b). 
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Example III: Facebook comments on the Presidency’s page 
The last example displays yet a different audience and format, viz. 
Facebook. The Government’s Communication and Information 
Services (GCIS) has maintained a Facebook page since 23 January 
2008, called the presidency in order to ‘increase awareness of 
branding activities and mobilize South Africans and global 
ambassadors for the South African brand’ (GCIS 2011: 50).49 The 
presidency’s Facebook page invited real-time direct responses; partly 
while Zuma was presenting his speech (The Presidency 9 February 
2012). On 9 February 2012, the day of the SoNA, Zuma’s PR staff 
issued two postings linking to a live streaming and a written version 
of the speech which invited 35 and 151 comments respectively (The 
Presidency 9 February 2012).50 
Based on the profile photos and names, the majority of 
commentators seemed to be young (between 15 and 35 years) and 
black. Facebook seems to however, appeal more strongly to adult 
professionals who want to network and stay in touch with friends and 
family who might be living elsewhere rather than to youth aged 15-18 
(see Kreutzer 2009). Most comments seemed to have been posted 
via smart phones, since they are often short and in typical text 
message lingo and coding.51 This temporal and spatial confinement 
also had an effect on the quality and complexity of comments. 
English was the predominant language on the Facebook page. Most 
commentators – perhaps in the illusion of directly speaking to ‘the 
president’ on ‘his’ Facebook page – lauded the speech and 
commented positively (The Presidency 9 February 2012). A large 
part of the comments and also inter-posters conversations focused 
on the fact that president Zuma did not greet in Zulu and Venda at 
the opening of the speech (ibid.). 
However, some criticism was also apparent. Jayd Naidoo broke the 
illusion of the ‘people’s president’ by ironically posting: ‘president 
must be sharp, updating his facebook status while giving his speech’ 
(The Presidency 9 February 2012) and earned three ‘likes’ for 
pointing out that Facebook was used as a marketing device. Tshidi 
                                                 
49 In addition to its presence on Facebook, the South African government currently 
runs four further official social media accounts: on Twitter: @SAPresident and 
@PresidencZA; on YouTube: PresidencyZA; as well as on Flickr: presidencysa (The 
Presidency 5 June 2011). President Zuma does not have an individual personal 
account (The Presidency 5 June 2011). 
50 t has only been possible to differentiate between comments made from PCs or from 
mobile phones since 2013. 
51 Comments are quoted verbatim. 
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Moreane accused the president of lying and election campaigning by 
promising the housing loans:  
He is telling lies how is he going to give ppl earning 
3500,00 a month a subsidy? (…)  I dnt thnk it will be 
possi ble 4. Banks to finance those ppl earning 3500 
like me. Pure lies mr prez, u only wnt to score political 
socrs 4 nxt term’ (The Presidency 9 February 2012). 
Tsholofelo Nkoane called the SoNA an uninspiring ‘pavement 
speech’ which was more about the party than about the nation (The 
Presidency 9 February 2012). He pointed out that Zuma did not 
mention ‘rhino poaching, the secrecy bill nor the immigration’ and 
criticised the costly campaign of renaming public places. Nkoane 
concluded that the content of the speech ‘was how the ANC will 
benefit from government in 2012’ (ibid.). The Facebook space did 
allow people to refer to specific issues. Bongani Wakwa-Maridili 
complained that government had discarded ‘the concept of Local 
Economic Development & that of Small Town Regeneration’ but 
instead concentrated on the cities resulting in a ‘skewed’ 
development reminiscent of apartheid structures (The Presidency 9 
February 2012). However, Wakwa-Maridili expressed explicit 
appreciation for the investment in the region of Waterberg (The 
Presidency 9 February 2012).  
People responded in real-time when issues were addressed that 
pertained to their life. Amanda Ndumndum reacted when Zuma 
spoke about a Housing Funding scheme that would allow people to 
take affordable loans: ‘Mr President I'm in the police I hope u keep ur 
word abt the loans bcos I dnt qualify for RDP house’ (The Presidency 
9 February 2012). Although Facebook seems to be mostly accessed 
via mobile phone and therefore only allows for relatively short 
statements, it is used by a broad political public reflecting a great 
variety of opinion and does not have the elitist appeal of Mail & 
Guardian Online and ThoughtLeader. As a result, the debates on 
Facebook also lack the depth and complexity of the Mail & 
Guardian’s blog and online newspaper format and give only 
superficial reference to the notion of the Developmental State. 
Nevertheless, Facebook also provides concrete accounts of the 
actual consequences of government’s policies for citizens, while 
ThoughtLeader and Mail & Guardian Online tend to discuss the issue 
in abstract and theoretical terms. 
Online opposing as a form of freedom of speech 
This article has shown a range of online activity in response to the 
SoNA. Despite the drastic legal infringements of Freedom of Speech 
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South Africa is currently experiencing52, the Internet seems a suitable 
and yet openly accessible outlet for public debate and critique of 
government. South Africans indeed use the Internet to express their 
political opinion and dare to challenge mainstream notions and act as 
a complementing force for the traditional media frames.  
Activity on social media in South Africa is at an all-time high and 
conversation is also politically motivated. According to Schreiner, 
South Africans do not see social media merely as a lifestyle tool but 
are also ‘ready to discuss policy issues’ online (E News Channel 9 
February 2012). However, for complex issues like the evolvement of 
the Developmental State, spatially restricted social media forums like 
Facebook are not a suitable platform. They merely allow for briefly 
sharing how policies affected personal experience or a ‘like’/‘dislike’ 
kind of statement. However, this is not to discard the possibility of 
Facebook becoming a mass movement tool as seen in the Arab 
Spring should the need for a refuge platform become more pressing. 
The more sophisticated and complex platforms like Thoughtleader 
allow for detailed and informed comments with reasonable and 
differentiated arguments partly in favour, partly against government. 
The concept of the Developmental State seems still to be too vaguely 
defined by government to be challenged directly. Its evolvement is 
currently in progress. 
Except through policies that keep the provision of broadband access 
unaffordable to most South Africans, the Internet in South Africa is 
not (yet) restricted by government and growing access to the Internet 
especially via smart phones suggests that an increase in online 
expression of political opinion can be expected in future. This, 
however, does not automatically improve the quality of information 
available to the public. Nevertheless, some state secrets might be 
harder to keep under the lid, the more people participate in online 
debates. Future research in that field should systematically examine 
user profiles and trace contentious political stories that have run 
‘viral’ in order to further explore the power of the Internet for political 
activation in South Africa. 
                                                 
52 Currently impeding progress is the “Protection of Information Bill”, also called 
“Secrecy Bill”, which among other freedom restrictions enables even provincial 
government officials to classify contentious information (see n.a. Mail & Guardian 
Online 14 June 2012). One of the most contentious issues in this bill is the 
criminalisation and punishment of journalists and whistleblowers who reveal classified 
and information by pointing out corruption and dubious practices in government 
(Williams 11 March 2013; see also R2K Campaign 18 February 2013). 
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Transcending dominant notions of environmental resource and 
its governance in Ghana 
Peter Narh53 
Abstract 
Environmental sustainability today holds currency as a dominant 
paradigm of development. In Dormaa, the common notion on the 
natural environment amongst state agencies and some individuals is 
that of a degraded environment. Thus, to ensure a sustainable 
environment, everyone in Dormaa is expected to identify with the 
dominant notion of environmental degradation and its implications for 
socioeconomic development. On this basis, the Dormaa forest 
services division, a state agency responsible for forest protection, 
provides incentives for community people to plant teak trees to 
replenish degraded forest reserves as well as on private lands. Yet, 
community people place different social, political, economic, and 
cultural values in these incentives, which are different from the 
values the forest services division places in these incentives to shape 
human action on the environment. With empirical data collected in 
Dormaa, this paper seeks to point out that conceptions of the natural 
environment and how human action affects its protection are socially 
constructed and transcend notions brought to a people by external 
agents. Thus, the author suggests that environmental governance is 
beyond the scope of particular environmental regimes. No one 
regulatory regime, and for that matter no particular notion of the 
environment can work alone to ensure environmental protection. 
Environmental regulatory regimes always interact with other regimes 
and notions to provide peculiar incentives to different people. 
Therefore, effective environmental policy making and implementation 
require the identification of factors on which different environmental 
notions and regimes are formed.  
Keywords: environmental protection, property rights, teak planting, 
transcending notions. 
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Introduction 
Ostensibly, everyday human use of the natural environmental in 
Dormaa is standard rural economy practice. Yet deeper analyses of 
these practices such as tree planting reveal that they are the results 
of how land users concurrently draw a combination of incentives as 
well as disincentives from the existing public environmental 
regulation regime and the Dormaa customary property rights regime. 
Eventually, these incentives and disincentives lead to human actions 
and inactions that do not form part of the dominant conceptions of 
how environmental behaviour should protect the environment. In 
certain instances, tree planting is at variance with public-promoted 
conceptions of environmental protection. In other words, how the 
natural environment constitutes a resource for community people and 
how this shapes their actions seem different from how public 
environmental agencies conceptualise the environment as a 
resource and ways to protect it.  
To this end, from empirical research conducted in Ghana between 
February and April 2012, the author addresses different overlapping 
and sometimes conflicting notions of the environment and of 
environmental protection. Specifically, the author explores notions 
community people hold on the environment as a resource and on 
environmental protection, which transcend those notions held by 
public environmental agencies. With instances of public-supported 
planting of teak as an economic tree and to protect the environment, 
the author shows that community people, bounded by their 
customary property rights regime, hold notions of teak planting and of 
environmental protection that derive largely from their communal 
property rights regime. These notions largely overlap and sometimes 
come in conflict with those held by the public regulatory regimes. The 
aim of the paper is to point out that to protect the environment, it is 
necessary for environmental policymaking and implementation to 
recognise that no one environmental regime and notion alone can 
effectively provide complete incentives to achieve environmental 
protection. Therefore, regime interaction and how it leads to 
environmental behaviour should be the focus of environmental 
policymaking.  
Following the introduction, the paper is organised in the following 
sequence: the methodology comes next, then a description of the 
teak tree and the state support programmes for teak cultivation. More 
empirical data and analysis follow in a section on environmental 
regimes and notions in overlap and conflict. Next is analysis of how 
environmental protection is rooted in societal epistemologies. After 
that are some general reflections on the discussions, drawing from 
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existing literature. The final section is the conclusion, with policy 
implications of the issues discussed. 
Location and economy of Dormaa 
The paper focuses on the Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east 
district together as a case study of environmental governance and 
how different notions of the environment and its protection transcend 
each other. The two administrative areas (Fig. 1) are located in the 
midwestern part of Ghana, close to the border between Ghana and 
the Ivory Coast. The Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east district 
together lie within longitudes 2o 30´ and 3o 30´ west and latitude 6o 
80´and 7o 30´ north. The municipal capital is Dormaa Ahenkro, 
located about 80 kilometres west of the regional capital, Sunyani, 
while Wamfie, the capital of the Dormaa east district lies to the east, 
about 55 kilometres from Sunyani. With over 500 settlements, the 
two districts together cover a total land area of 1,373 square 
Kilometres (917 square kilometres for Dormaa municipal, and 456 
square kilometres for Dormaa east district). As at 2010, the Dormaa 
municipal and Dormaa east districts together has a total population of 
210,660 (159,789 for Dormaa municipal and 50,871 for Dormaa east) 
(GSS 2012: 102). There are three electoral constituencies, that is, 
Dormaa east, Dormaa west, and Dormaa central.  
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Fig. 1: map of Ghana showing the study communities and location of Dormaa 
municipal and Dormaa east district. 
Source: Centre for Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Services 
(CESGIS), Legon, Accra, Ghana (with data supplied from the author’s field 
research, March 2012). 
The two districts form part of the Dormaa traditional state, which is an 
Akan-speaking traditional kingdom in Ghana. The Dormaa state is a 
constitution of four chiefdoms: Abesim, Bormaa, Chraa, and Dormaa 
main (Dormaa Ahenkro and Wamfie area). Thus, in this paper, 
Dormaa stands for Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east district. 
Nonetheless, since a part of the focus of the paper is the Dormaa 
customary property right regime, some of the themes treated 
transcend the two districts to the entire Dormaa traditional area. 
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Dormaa’s economy is mainly rural, with crop cultivation, poultry, 
forestry, and sand winning constituting the main livelihood activities 
(Dormaa municipal assembly 2012). Due to extensive cultivation and 
rampant wild fires, large tracts of what was originally forestland have 
turned into extensive areas of elephant grass and bush. Dormaa 
abounds in a number of natural environmental goods, some of which 
are only recognised and exploited as resources. These include clay, 
gravel, and sand deposits, forests, and water bodies. Moreover, 
there are some gold deposits that remain unexploited (Dormaa 
municipal assembly 2012). Use of these resources is governed 
concurrently by a public environmental regulatory regime and a 
customary communal property rights regime. These two different 
regimes complement, conflict, and overlap each other in shaping 
human use of these resources.  
Dormaa’s degrading natural environment 
The Dormaa municipal and Dormaa east districts have wet semi-
equatorial climates with a double maxima rainfall regime, and a mean 
annual rainfall between 125 cm and 175 cm. The major vegetation 
types are the reserved and off-reserve forests, and bush, which are 
extensively cleared in some areas. Sjoerd and Voorhoeve (1990: 
712) introducing the Dormaa in their book on Dormaa traditional 
herbal medicine note that the original Dormaa vegetation of tropical 
rain forest has been largely replaced by cocoa-farms and by food 
crop cultivation. The protected forests include Mpameso (197.67 
square kilometres), Pamu-Berekum (116.80 square kilometres) and 
Tain II (297.6 square kilometres) (DMA and DEDA 2012). These 
forest reserves, as well as the off-reserves provide valuable timber, 
flora, and fauna to the state and community people as sources of 
revenue and food. Timber species include Teak (genus Tectona 
grandis), Wawa (Tripolichiton Scleroxylon), Odum (Milicia excelsa), 
Sapele (Guthagrophrama) and Mahogany (Khaya invernesses) 
(DMA 2012: 9; DEDA 2012: 28).  
A large part of the off-reserve forests have been extensively 
cultivated leading to an invasion of grassland and sandy soils. As 
such the vegetation in the two districts in large parts is dominated by 
elephant grass and a few short scattered trees with heights ranging 
between 15 m and 28 m high. As a result of extensive farming 
activities in the communities, these vegetation types as well as soils 
are threatened and the forests, for instance, continually change to 
grassland. Associated with this change is increasing deficiency of soil 
nutrients for agriculture. The threat extensive cultivation and irregular 
logging pose to forests has been a major discourse promoting public 
environmental regulation in Dormaa to replenish lost forests (see 
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also Ghana environmental policy 1995). Key environmental concerns 
in the districts include deforestation, indiscriminate sand/clay/gravel 
winning,54 pollution of water bodies (refuse dumps sited close to 
water bodies), persistent annual bush fires, illegal lumbering, 
indiscriminate disposal of poultry waste, and excessive use of agro-
chemicals in farming (DMA 2012: 34; DEDA 2012: 33). There are 
indications that these environmental concerns feed the dominant 
discourse of environmental degradation in state policies, which 
recreate communities as primary causes of land degradation and 
forest lost (see the Ghana environmental policy 1995).  
Methodology 
Empirical dataset for this paper is drawn from twenty-six individual 
qualitative and five group discussions in Dormaa with migrant and 
indigenous farmers, landowners, officials of the Dormaa forest 
services division, officials at the Dormaa municipal assembly, and the 
Dormaa customary land secretariat. The discussions explored 
participants’ perceptions, experiences, and knowledge of the natural 
environment and practices towards its protection. On the basis on a 
social constructionist perspective, participants were encouraged to 
show how their customs and social interactions could possibly 
contribute to these perceptions, experiences and knowledge they 
held. The whole set of data obtained from these discussions is 
however, part of the author’s doctoral study programme. In various 
sections of the paper, these empirical dataset is presented in 
quotations to support the discussions. Largely, the unit of analysis is 
the incentive community people draw from the combination of the 
public environmental regulatory regime and the Dormaa customary 
property rights regime for their actions on their environment. The 
Atlas.ti computer assisted data analysis software was used to code 
and retrieve relevant data segments.   
Social construction of the environment and its protection: a 
basis of the methodology  
With the focus on notions of the environment and how incentives in 
property rights regime manifest in human environmental actions, the 
paper is framed within social constructionist perspectives. With this, 
notions of the natural environment and the incentives to shape 
behaviours on the environment are constructs people give to them. 
Such constructs are grounded on culture and social relations. This 
implies that to assure incentives that will enable use and protection of 
the natural environment, it is imperative to understand the culture 
                                                 
54 Emphasis ours 
BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa  
55 
 
 
and social processes of a society and how such culture and social 
processes influence the ways landowners and land users construct 
these incentives. This is the only way for public environmental policy 
to ensure synergy between regulation and human action.  
In Dormaa, constructs of the environment and environmental 
incentives are socially bounded. In the context of this paper, the 
communal customary property rights regime constitutes the culture 
that directs social relations with regard to nature. Thus, the 
customary property rights regime influences incentives in the public 
environmental regulatory regimes to protect the environment. 
Community people’s construction of the natural environment as a 
resource and the incentives that enable their use of such resources 
depend not only on state-imposed notions of what a resource is, and 
the incentives to encourage human actions on the environment in 
certain particular ways. Rather, community people’s construction of a 
resource and environmental incentives are shaped largely also by 
the influences their customary property rights hold on their daily lives. 
What this means is that public environmental regulatory regimes, 
based on conventional notions, can impose incentives to shape 
human action on the environment. But such incentives will always be 
reinterpreted by people within their own notions. Trees and forests 
may be considered resources only to the extent that some sort of 
value is imputed to them by people themselves, bounded by their 
daily property rights regime.  
The practice of tree cultivation 
The teak tree 
Teak (genus Tectona grandis) is a large deciduous tree of the family 
Verbenaceae. It is dominant in mixed hardwood forests, and one of 
the most valuable timbers. It has small fragrant white flowers and 
papery leaves that are often hairy on the lower surface (Fig. 2). 
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The teak tree has a straight but 
often buttressed stem (i.e., 
thickened at the base), a 
spreading crown, and four-sided 
branchlets with large quadrangular 
pith. The leaves are opposite or 
sometimes whorled in young 
specimens, about 0.5 m (1.5 feet) 
long and 23 cm (9 inches) wide. In 
shape they resemble those of the 
tobacco plant, but their substance 
is hard and the surface rough. The 
branches terminate in many small 
white flowers in large, erect, cross-
branched panicles.  
Fig. 2: the teak tree 
Source: Peter Narh, field research, March 2012. 
Teak timber is valued in warm countries principally for its 
extraordinary durability. Teakwood is used as electric poles, fine 
furniture, door and window frames, wharves, bridges, louvers, 
flooring, panelling, shipbuilding, among many other purposes. An 
important property of teak is its extremely good dimensional stability. 
It is strong, of medium weight, and of average hardness. Termites 
eat the sapwood but rarely attack the heartwood; it is not, however, 
completely resistant to marine borers. 
The state belief in teak: statutory support for teak cultivation in 
Dormaa 
The cultivation of teak trees is one of the instruments the forest 
services division promotes to reforest degraded areas in and off state 
protected forests. Reforestation is one of the programmes through 
which the state governs the environment in Dormaa, through the 
Dormaa forest services division. The reforestation programme with 
its associated planting of teak is supported by the National Forest 
Plantation Development Programme (NFPDP). The NFPDP is a 
nation-wide programme that seeks to halt the alarming rate of forest 
degradation in Ghana by providing technical and logistic support to 
farmers to plant commercial trees within and outside state protected 
forest reserves.55  
                                                 
55 <http://www.fcghana.com/>, accessed 20 April 2013. 
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In the protected forest reserves, farmers are allocated plots of 
degraded forests to intercrop trees with food crops, a cropping 
culture called the Modified Taungya System (MTS). Both in and 
outside the forest reserves, teak is cultivated by individuals and 
groups of people on small plots between one and ten acres, or on 
plantations of over one hectare of land. Outside the protected 
reserves, teak is grown on private plots of land and plantations. Teak 
farmers in the protected forests sell their trees to private contractors 
at government-controlled market prices. Those growers on private 
plots however sell their trees to private individuals at prices agreed 
between the farmer and the buyer.  
For its valuable nature, teak provides financial income to growers 
when the trees are harvested after maturing between fifteen and 
twenty-five years. Depending on the age and size of the tree 
harvested, a teak tree could fetch about Gh₵04 (Ghana cedis, about 
2 euro) and Gh₵20 (10 euro). An official of the Dormaa forest 
services division expresses the financial benefits from planting teak 
as:  
OA: Oh I think it is both. You cannot plant trees just 
for planting sake, no, I don’t think it is wise to do that. 
You plant a plantation because you want to make 
some money. However, this also helps sustain the 
environment. It is the value of the trees for the 
environment. People have realised they can make a 
lot from teaks. A lot of people earn good money from 
the trees. We also educate them about the 
improvements that protecting the environment can 
bring to them. For the people in Koradaso, they are 
doing very well. They are hardworking. And now, with 
this modified Taungya system we have, you agreed 
with the people that if you farm this place, the 
paramount chief has got 15 per cent share of the 
proceeds, the community has got 5 per cent, I mean 
the community in which you are living, then the 
government has got 40 per cent, and you – the one 
planting the tree and taking care of it – have got 40 
per cent..  
<ref>P41:D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest 
officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:32 [(66:66)] 
by peter narh</ref>56 
                                                 
56 For anonymity, we only provide the initials of the discussion partner. The 
quotation reference at the end of each quote is interpreted with the following 
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The Dormaa forest services division is the decentralized agency of 
the Forestry commission of Ghana57 for the Dormaa forest district. 
The division is located in Dormaa Ahenkro, the capital of the Dormaa 
municipal. Its task is to oversee the management and protection of 
forest and wildlife resources, as well as the management of 
concessions for off-reserve lumbering in its catchment area. The 
catchment area comprises four political administrative districts in the 
Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. These are Dormaa municipal, Dormaa 
east, Goaso, and Brekum districts.  
Environmental regimes and notions in conflict  
In the next sections are instances that reveal conflicting incentives to 
plant teak. In these instances, it can be seen that while the state 
forest services division supports teak planting to mainly reforest 
degraded forests and provide income through lumber, community 
people are constrained to plant the teak due to communal values of 
their customary property rights regime. If any of them plant teak at 
all, they indeed do so for its economic value, but this comes at a cost 
to the communality of land rights. Planting teak brings people into 
conflict due to communal ownership of land, where an individual 
cannot perpetuate his or her use of land. For this reason, planting 
teak has not been sustained in Dormaa outside private plots. Though 
extensive land areas under communal ownership are degraded 
through extensive cultivation and sand winning, only a few patches of 
land outside state-protected forests are planted with teak.  
                                                                                                                            
example: <ref>P41:D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest officer_dormaa 
district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:32 [(66:66)] by peter narh</ref>. 
 “ref>” stands for reference; “P41” means primary document 41, that is, discussion 
transcript document 41; “D” refers to Dormaa; “FA” stands for formal authority; “ID” 
stands for individual discussion; “DA” refers to Dormaa ahenkro; “OA” is discussion 
partner’s initials; “assistant forest officer_dormaa district” is the official title of the 
discussion partner; “01 mar 2012” is the date on which the discussion was held; 
“rtf” is a computer file format; “41: 32” refers to 32th quotation in transcription 
document 41; “[(66:66)]” means quotation begins and ends in paragraph 66 of the 
document; “peter narh” is the name of the researcher. 
57 The Forestry Commission of Ghana was established by the Forestry 
Commission Act, 1999 (Act 571.) It is responsible for the regulation of utilization of 
forest and wildlife resources, the conservation and management of those 
resources and the coordination of policies related to them. It embodies the various 
public bodies and agencies that were individually implementing the functions of 
protection, management, the regulation of forest and wildlife resources. These 
agencies currently form the divisions of the Commission: 
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Teak planting and communality of land rights 
Under the National Forest Plantation Development Programme 
(NFPDP), the state grants loans and also provides seedlings free of 
charge to landowners to plant teak trees on their lands to reforest 
degraded lands. On the surface of it, it is laudable that the state 
provides such technical and logistics support to individuals and 
groups who may not have been able to secure this assistance 
themselves (Dragun 1999). The Dormaa forest services division sees 
the financial support under the NFPDP as a significant boost to tree 
planting:  
OA: No, no, not the Forestry commission but the 
Board chair of the forest plantation development fund. 
The fund is part of the commission and Nana is the 
Board chair of the fund. The fund has contributed a lot 
to forest plantations here, both on private lands and in 
reserved forests. Yes, the loan is accessible to 
everyone, insofar as you have land to plant on. But 
when you meet the Osagyefoe, he will tell you more 
about it. Even the migrant farmers at Koradaso have 
been asking for loans to cultivate their trees, and I 
have told them to send their application to Nana. So 
everyone can apply for it. 
<ref>P41: D_FA_ID_Da_OA, assistant forest 
officer_dormaa district_01mar2012.rtf - 41:28 [(29:29)] 
by peter narh</ref> 
OB: Ya, the loan is for private people who 
are...whether you plant in the off-reserve or inside the 
reserve. You can just apply. But normally they give to 
those in the reserve... the amount is maybe bigger as 
compared to those not in the reserve.  
<ref>P43: D_FA_ID_Da_OB, dormaa forestry 
officer_06apr2012.rtf - 43:58 [(235:235)] by peter 
narh</ref> 
Such state support is in line with the main arguments of the public 
regulation paradigm in the environmental governance debate that 
state institutions are necessary to intervene and provide support to 
regulate human environmental actions because private property 
rights will fail to protect the environment due to private rational aims 
that may go contrary to values of society as a whole (Smith 1997).  
However, in the Dormaa municipal the customary property rights 
regime conflicts with the teak planting programme of the state. It 
shows the divergence of notions about the incentives for teak 
planting to protect the environment between public environmental 
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governance regimes and community people. For the public 
regulatory regime, planting teak is based on the illusion of the state 
forest services division that individuals have absolute control over the 
decisions they take on their lands. In the property rights regime of 
Dormaa, this is true only to the extent that while alive, the current 
cultivator enjoys the usufruct. Inasmuch as the Dormaa customary 
property rights regime is communal, the usufructary right is 
indefeasible, inalienable (Da Rocha and Lodoh 1999: 5), and subject 
to the rights of the land user’s family and the state of Dormaa. The 
customary communal property rights regime only grants usufructary 
rights to citizens of Dormaa by descent. Customarily, all lands in 
Dormaa belong to the people of Dormaa collectively; individuals hold 
only use rights, the usufruct.  
To this end, support for planting teak to reforest so-called degraded 
areas is a normative obligation of land use imposed by the state not 
only on the individual, but also on the family to which the individual 
belongs, as well as on the Dormaa state. It is normative because it is 
at variance to the customary property rights regime of the Dormaa. It 
is external, based on ideas of the state about incentives to plant teak 
for people and for improving environmental condition. Such 
normative programmes of the state constitute a denial of the 
community of the choice to determine how they pursue their 
livelihoods. It is a denial because in view of the communal rights in 
land, when teak is planted on a piece of family land for instance, it 
constrains the rights of others to the use of that same piece of land 
for one generation or more. The next paragraph explains this further. 
The normative obligation to plant teak may work to protect the 
environment. Aside the negative implications, planting teak certainly 
provides vegetative cover to replenish degraded land. Nonetheless, 
in view of the communal property rights regime, planting teak may 
disrupt the lives of future generations who have equal rights to the 
land as the current cultivator does. The disruption results if future 
generations wish to use the land for a different purpose other than a 
teak farm. The land on which one cultivates now belongs to the 
present cultivator as well as to other siblings, nephews, nieces, 
cousins, and so on, living, dead, or yet unborn. It is to say that a 
piece of land cultivated now belongs to an entire extended family. 
The current cultivator has a right over such land inasmuch as other 
members entitled to it have the same use rights. Upon the death of 
the current cultivator, family members can turn the existing farm into 
whatever they prefer, or they can develop it in an entirely different 
way. But this may not be easy in the case of a farm full of teak trees. 
Indeed, this comes close to what Anderson and Leal (1991) report on 
free market environmentalists’ approach to environmental 
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governance. They note that state involvement in environmental 
regulation leads to disadvantages for private entrepreneurs; that is, 
state subsidies for certain environment-based activities to protect the 
environment may undermine the profitability of the environment for 
other people in the same activities. In Dormaa, the entrepreneurs are 
the other family members who have same use rights to the land as 
the current cultivator. These ‘entrepreneurs’ who lose out on their 
profits may turn to other economic activities that may not favour the 
environment and are less economic for them. For example, members 
of the family who may not desire to plant teak may turn to sand 
winning on already degraded land.  
A usufructary right over a piece of land does not allow the user to 
take possession of the land in perpetuity. But this is what planting 
teak trees will mean. The teak trees take between 15 and 25 years to 
mature for harvest. For this period, the teak farm cannot be taken 
away from the possession of the current cultivator. In the face of this 
‘injunction by cultivation’ placed on the land against other holders of 
rights in the land, a feature of the teak tree is that a few weeks after 
harvest, it will shoot from the trunk and grow into another tree. 
Therefore, generations of a teak tree can continue to grow 
continually on the same piece of land for several decades. If the teak 
tree effectively maintains the land in the possession of the current 
cultivator, it merely implies that when a teak tree is harvested, but 
shoots and grows into another generation of tree, the current 
cultivator only extends his or her user rights over the land. In effect, 
this only means denying other potential users the right to use the 
land the way they see fit. 
Taking the communality of the Dormaa customary property rights 
regime into consideration then, it can be said that teak will be planted 
solely on private plots of land. Strictly private plots of land can be 
acquired through gift or lease. However, many usufructary land rights 
holders are planting the trees on communal lands. Most do this with 
the hope that their own children will inherit their rights in the land 
immediately after them. Yet, empirical evidence in Dormaa shows 
that this is not always the case. Other family members often lay claim 
to the land in the event of the death of the current cultivator. Where 
there is teak on the farm, the right to inherit the farm is not easily 
determined between the teak owner’s immediate family and the 
extended family. Consequently, some informants report that planting 
teak results in family tensions in many instances.  
Cultivation of teak to renew degraded lands by itself is not necessary 
unproductive. Instead, it is important to note that by the communality 
of property rights, teak cultivation do not accrue the same incentive 
BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa  
62 
 
 
to all individuals or families over time. One cannot take decisions 
over land completely as an individual without due reference to the 
family, clan, or the community. The environmental actions of 
individuals are always judged by their influence on the family and the 
Dormaa state as a whole. In the customary property rights regime, 
the current cultivator only has use rights, while it is the family through 
the community that possesses the ownership rights. Thus, land 
cannot be treated as in individual complete perpetual ownership.  
Competition between teak trees and food crops 
Another instance of conflicting incentives between the state and 
community people in planting teak trees is the competition for arable 
land between teak trees and food crops. In Dormaa, land under teak 
cultivation implies reduced space for food crops cultivation. Findings 
of this study indicate that the competition is the result of land 
immobility in Dormaa. Land is immobile for two main reasons. One, 
there is land scarcity and virtually no land is uncultivated, lying idle 
currently and not planned for. Tracts of land can be seen 
uncultivated, but many apparently lie idle because owners consider 
them too degraded to cultivate, or owners have other plans for them 
other than food crop cultivation. Outside the state protected forests, 
land is scarce due to increasing population and increasing division of 
land within the family. Two, by some norm, Dormaa people rarely 
ever rent out agricultural land. Thus, agricultural land does not easily 
move between different users outside the landowning family. 
Perhaps land has not been vacant to a large extent like in the cocoa 
growing areas in the western part of Ghana, which have attracted 
migrants from other parts of the country and beyond since the mid-
20th century to acquire large tracts of uncultivated yet fertile land (see 
Alhassan and Manuh 2005; Benneh 1987; Aidoo 1989; 1996; Hill 
1963).  
With land immobility, landowners have rights to a piece of land over 
their life time, and that of their progeny. On this same piece of land, 
food crops and cash crops may be grown. There is no competition 
between crops for space if different types of crops will grow well 
together. This is not the case with the teak tree. After between three 
and five years, food crops interplanted with the teak do not grow well. 
The canopy of the trees prevents sunlight from effectively reaching 
the crops underneath. Moreover, the land under teak over time loses 
its soil structure conducive for food crops cultivation. According to 
informants, loss of soil structure results from cultivating teak because 
the roots of the teak tree spread out shallowly just beneath the top 
soil, blocking out other crop roots. A community elder laments:  
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NH: A number of women are planting the teak. But the 
problem is that the teak destroys the land and nothing 
else can be planted on the land when the teak grows. 
For us women, you know that we have to cultivate a 
lot of food stuff yearly to sell to take care of the home. 
So when one plants the teak and she does not have 
another farm elsewhere, within the time the teak takes 
to mature, there is lots of hardship for the woman.  
<ref>P 7: 
D_TA_ID_Ms_NH_queenmother_25mar2012.rtf - 7:8 [ 
(15:15)] by peter narh</ref> 
People usually plant teak trees on a part of their lands, leaving a part 
for food crops. But then they can no longer use the teak-planted area 
for crops after a few years, compelling them to remain fixed to the 
existing parts of the land for crops production. However, land 
immobility in Dormaa as explained above keeps people to cultivate a 
piece of land over a very long time until the land loses its fertility. 
Ironically, the degraded land cannot be left idle for a long while to 
fallow, because it will be taken over by another person in the family. 
Consequently, the communal property rights constrain land mobility 
and land fallowing which then leads to soil and vegetation 
degradation. Some discussion partners indicate the problem of land 
immobility, land scarcity and associated implications as follows: 
MA: You see this year there have not been any fire 
outbreaks. Everyone was farming, but no one thought 
we should leave a place for the forest to grow. If you 
did that, it meant that you have plenty of land and you 
cannot farm all so you left some. But this not the case; 
land is getting scarce as our population grows higher 
so no one will leave a piece of land just like that. Then 
other people in the family will quickly go and take it. 
<ref>P16: D_IF_GD_Ms_MA_Women 
group_25mar2012.rtf - 16:28 [ (75:79)] by peter 
narh</ref 
AN: And for our own forest, because we farm the 
same forest all the time, all the animals have run away 
into the government forest. 
<ref>P28: D_IF_ID_Tf_AN, community 
elder_18mar2012.rtf - 28:26 [ (215:215)] by peter 
narh</ref> 
KT: If the forest had not been there, we will never 
have gotten any wild animals by now even to show 
our children about them. For instance, my land, I have 
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cultivated it so much that there is no wild animal in it 
anymore. My neighbour may also has cultivated his 
land so much that there is no wild animal anymore.  
<ref>P24: D_IF_ID_Ms_KT, community 
elder_25mar2012.rtf - 24:34 [ (215:215)] by peter 
narh</ref> 
But then, if land is planted with teak to replenish the vegetation, it still 
leads to soil structure loss as expressed by informants in this study. 
Thus, while constant cultivation of a piece of land degrades it, land 
under teak leads to the same degradation effect. This is double 
causation of environmental degradation as a result of state notions of 
incentives to plant teak brought to community people that do not 
necessarily align with their customary property rights regime. Indeed, 
institutions or regimes (for that matter dominant notions cannot be 
judged as being successful in conserving renewable resources if the 
resource is not maintained in the long run (Acheson 2006: 119). In 
Dormaa however, in the long run, land under teak leads to loss of soil 
structure and deprivation of arable land for food crop production.  
The point here is that the notion that planting teak trees will protect 
the environment may not be a successful environmental protection 
approach in the long-run. It rather leads to soil degradation because 
of its misfits with the communal nature of land. To this end, tree 
planting can in itself be a cause of environmental degradation! 
Acheson (2006: 119) writes that the primary reason for conservation 
failure in many instances is that effective institutions often are not 
devised. In this respect, Acheson is right. The state in devising its 
reforestation programmes (with teak) is guided by the dominant 
notion that teak trees protect the environment. But the state seems 
oblivious to the fact that planting teak trees also causes 
environmental degradation due to constraints imposed on land use 
by the communal customary property rights regime.  
Rootedness of environmental protection in societal 
epistemologies 
For environmental protection that is legitimate, durable, and 
workable, it must be based on home grown epistemologies. External 
notions of incentives to plant teak do not fit the communal customary 
property rights regime. The discrepancy is because for community 
people, individual decisions of land users derive directly from the 
communality of the environment. In epistemological terms, the 
Dormaa customary property rights regime places high emphasis on 
intergenerational equity with respect to land rights and land use. This 
is how people know and impute meaning into their environment. 
Intergenerational equity in land rights and land use denote 
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communality of property rights. Communality of property rights 
ensures togetherness, and preserves the longevity of the commune; 
individuality is analogous to death of the roots of a tree, and therefore 
death of the tree (community). This is because the African knowing 
person is never an individual but a community. For community 
people, the environment per se is linked with present, future, and 
past generations. Such is the basis of the Dormaa communal 
property rights regime.  
In the communal property rights regime, the natural environment is 
more than biological; it is also the spirit, power and force of the 
community of people. Thus, in terms of communal property rights, 
the natural environment is fundamentally multifunctional. Due 
consideration is given to how decisions on the environment affect its 
function as the embodiment of the community of people. Community 
people will not just grow trees to preserve the environment. Rather, 
they will consider also how growing trees affects the existence and 
preservation of the biological and spiritual force and power of the 
community of people. As Zambakari (2011) notes, environmental 
governance that sustainably maintains nature must prioritise the 
process of how regulation affects the environment, rather than the 
outcome of that regulation. The implication of Zambakari’s view is 
that governing the environment is not about any human-imposed 
external rules, but about human-nature solidarity that exists in 
complex inter-nourishments. Therefore, environmental governance 
through externally-enforced rules is unsustainable, because it cannot 
meet the realities of other philosophies in their own contexts.  
Contrary to state notions, the economic benefits from teak trees 
alone are often not what matters most to community people. Instead, 
people may plant teak based on other incentives. For instance, there 
is passive resistance to the power of the allodial rights holder (the 
Paramount chief) to allocate land, though people do not show or 
express this resistance publicly. The Paramount chief by virtue of 
holding the allodial rights in all Dormaa lands in trust of the people 
holds the authority to claim plots of land and allocate them for 
physical development. Many usufructary rights holders cultivate teak 
on pieces of land to attract high compensation value for their lands in 
the event their lands are allocated for physical development. 
Therefore, the value of teak trees in this situation for usufructary 
rights holders is not as much to reap economic rents or reforest a 
degraded area. Instead, it is more of value to protect one’s property 
rights. 
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Some generation reflections 
New development paradigms and agendas from the global arena are 
crafted and recrafted onto existing social contexts of people to suit 
emerging themes of development. This crafting encourages 
community people to follow patterns of behaviour that meet and fit 
the objectives of the state bureaucracy and other stakeholders, but in 
the process deprive communities of their customs and will to manage 
and benefit from their resources as they see fit (Li 2007: 280). Li 
expresses this author’s field research finding that planting teak trees 
leads to loss of soil structure and therefore fertility. The state 
promotes teak plantations, primarily to halt forest degradation and 
also to provide for timber.58 Ghana’s timber is mainly exported for 
foreign exchange revenue. Thus, international demand for timber 
largely fuels government drive to encourage teak plantations.  
In Dormaa, many people profess their trust in the state to better 
protect the environment. Such a recognition of the state suggests a 
state-reproduced image of community people as destructive agents 
and incapable of managing their own resources. The result of this 
state reproduction is that it creates a dependency of community 
people on and subservience to the state which furthers its (the 
state’s) own objectives, one of which is to encourage teak plantations 
to yield timber for export. The global and the national connect in 
representing people and their relationships with environmental 
resources in particular ways; this informs present environmental 
interventions in Dormaa, which reproduce these constructed images 
of people and their environments (Fairhead and Leach 2000: 175).  
To Fairhead and Leach (2000: 181), which is also the findings of this 
study in Dormaa, West African forest services agencies derive 
revenues from the sale of permits and licenses for timber and wildlife 
exploitation, and from fines for breaking state laws. They are able to 
do this only by removing control over the management of resources 
such as trees and areas of forested land from inhabitants, seeing 
inhabitants as inadequate resource custodians whose activities are 
destructive of forests and require repressive regulation. Revenues 
are thus ensured by a reading of the landscape as gravely 
deforested. The economic structures within which forest services 
operated can thus be seen to help frame the production of 
knowledge about forestry problems and to produce localities 
accordingly (Fairhead and Leach 2000: 181).  
                                                 
58 National Forest Plantation Development Report Annual Reports, 
<http://www.fcghana.org/library_info.php?doc=41&publication:National%20Forest%20
Plantation%20Development%20Progamme%20Annual%20Reports%20&id=18, 
accessed 10 May 2013>, accessed 10 February 2013.  
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Indeed, in defining degradation, Nsiah-Gyabaah (1994: 26, citing 
Hotelling 1931; Fisher and Peterson 1977) agrees that it is a situation 
where there is “…a reduction in the environment or in its capability to 
fulfil its functions.” Nsiah-Gyabaah notes that these functions include 
provision of food, energy and material inputs, purification, 
microclimatic conditioning and utility yielding services essential for 
human welfare. On the basis of Nsiah-Gyabaah’s definition of 
degradation, what then is the relevance of public environmental 
governance, if planting teak eventually constrains the utility 
landowners derive from their lands.  
Acheson (2006: 124) cites failures of science and engineering as the 
reason for government failure in environmental governance. Acheson 
gives an example such as failed irrigation schemes, importation of 
foreign trees to areas that are not conducive to growth (disease, 
inadequate soil or water, etc.) as one instance. The list can be 
extended by one more point: that there is importation of incentives for 
tree cultivation that does not conform to the customs of people. In 
this respect, it is correct for Underdal (2008: 61) to say that the 
search for effectiveness in environmental governance comes at the 
expense of the recognition that environmental governance has 
effects on societies in significant ways beyond just regulating human 
action on the environment. 
Green ecologists call for a rethinking of the current focus on 
institutional, managerial, and economic issues of environmental 
governance, which alienates people from nature, to one that 
addresses fundamental beliefs, values, and structures that will bring 
people back to a true attached relationship with nature (Dobson 
2007; Meadows et al. 2005). While this author does not necessarily 
align his views with the thesis of green ecologism, he shares in a call 
for profound changes in social and political behaviour in 
environmental governance that will recognise people have other 
incentives (in their communal property rights) beyond those of the 
state.  
Robbins (2000) points to the need for a more synergistic approach to 
environmental governance. In a synergistic approach, different 
notions and regimes on the environment are responsive to each 
other, and recognize the mutual influences they have on each other. 
It is only through this synergistic approach that environmental policy 
can effectively combat environmental degradation. Sekhar (2004: 
140) is also of the view that local knowledge and experts’ knowledge 
should not be considered in opposition to each other but that it is 
necessary to interpret all knowledge as mediated by institutional as 
well as cultural contexts. In the context of this paper, environmental 
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governance at the community level indeed is mediated by the 
customary property rights regime. Instead of remaining oblivious to 
this mediation, state agencies and their environmental regimes will 
do better in protecting the environment if the influences of the 
customary property rights are acknowledged and taken seriously.  
Conclusion 
The paper calls for a recognition that environmental regulation entails 
different notions of incentives and of the natural environment that 
may conflict with each other. It thus becomes necessary to identify 
these different notions and ways in which they conflict in shaping 
human actions on the environment. In this regard, it is important in 
environmental governance to integrate different notions and 
incentives, both external and internal to a community, to achieve 
holistic environmental management and protection. In Dormaa, this 
means how to implement state-supported incentives to shape human 
action on the environment and at the same time keep the communal 
nature of society intact. It means a synergy between state and non-
state notions and incentives that does not compromise on the 
management and protection of the environment. Like the green 
ecologists argue, the environment itself has an intrinsic value in 
keeping communities together. This is to say that the environment 
has both instrumental and social values that are connected and must 
remain protected simultaneously. The environment remains valued 
not only in connection with economic but also social roles. As 
Dobson (2007: 29) suggests, any definition of environmental 
management and protection for its sustainability must answer the 
fundamental question, ‘what is to be sustained?’ In Dormaa, what is 
to be sustained is both the environment and the communal values of 
Dormaa society. This question must guide environmental policy 
makers and implementers in designing and implementing state 
interventions in environmental governance.  
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The politics of resources, vulnerability and pastoral practices in 
Upper Awash Valley, Ethiopia 
Girum Getachew Alemu59 
Abstract 
In light of continuing environmental and social sources of changes, 
Karrayyu pastoralists are responding in various ways. Broadly 
speaking, these responses can be categorised into two areas: 
responses that combine different norms and rules of accessing 
scarce resources and diversification of livelihood activities. In this 
paper I present new forms of resource arrangements as adaptation 
strategies that have resulted out of the socio-ecological and 
demographic pressure on Karrayyu land. However, this article does 
not limit itself only to these factors, since the change in pastoral 
livelihood practices could not be attributed to one factor only. 
Comprehending the changing livelihood practices should take into 
account, parallel to the demographic pressure, other interrelated 
factors such as government policy interventions and their impact on 
pastoral land ownership. This is also in line with the political ecology 
theoretical framework that emphasizes the need for the recognition of 
the political, economic, historical, geographical and ecological 
determinants to understand the changing pastoral livelihood 
practices.  
Keywords: new practices, pastoralists, political ecology, vulnerability.  
Introduction 
The structural factors and processes shaping vulnerability are largely 
a product of rapid social change, driven by distant processes. By 
social change, I mean the broad range of ‘human’ factors that affect 
local adaptation, as opposed to biophysical factors influencing 
                                                 
59 Girum Getachew Alemu has earned his B.A in Sociology and Social 
Anthropology and his Master’s degree in Development Studies from Addis Ababa 
University. Currently, he is a PhD student at the Bayreuth International Graduate 
School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Germany. In his PhD research he interrogates 
the international climate change adaptation agenda and the associated concept of 
vulnerability by zooming-in at the local level and locating climate change 
adaptation in broader ‘social’ context in dry land parts of upper Awash valley in 
Ethiopia. Girum’s research focuses on the constellation of development, 
environmental governance and local livelihoods. Particularly, he explores how 
these interconnections influence the constitution of human-environment ruptures 
like disasters, climate change, and their aftermath. In his research Girum also 
targets applied audience in the sphere of policy making by unearthing the agency 
of local resource users in pursuing novel responses and adaptations to both 
disaster and climate change.  
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exposure. Social change thus encompasses social, cultural, 
economic, and political factors and processes. Any endeavour to 
better understand the ways in which local actors adapt must start by 
exploring the dynamic social, political, and demographic context of 
vulnerability. These dynamics have, I argue, critical implications for 
understanding contemporary local adaptations in the face of climatic 
stress.  
Accordingly, the major sources of vulnerability that have influenced, 
in one way or another, the decision making and adaptation 
processes of local actors in the semi-arid environment of Upper 
Awash Valley are explored. The data presented and analysed in this 
paper was generated using various sources. Secondary sources of 
information such as government documents concerning the major 
activities in the Upper Awash Valley were consulted. In addition, 
primary data were obtained through focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews with elders, while various PRA tools such as 
problem identification and ranking were utilised in focus group 
discussions. 
The Karrayyu pastoralists in Upper Awash valley have been 
vulnerable to various socio-political and ecological forces over the 
past six to seven decades. Although groups, individuals, and 
communities may be vulnerable to climate change, vulnerability is 
indicative of broader social dynamics—thus vulnerability is 
processual. This process of vulnerability was in motion during my 
field research, and was manifested in the way the Karrayyu 
pastoralists deploy various strategies while interacting with the 
natural environment, particularly with respect to the recurrent drought 
and the various actors that are actively present in the locality.  
In order to approach the problem, I apply a political ecology approach 
that takes into account general contexts within which both 
environmental problems and management issues arise (Forsyth 
2003). Many authors (such as Bohle et al. 1994) have also defined 
political ecology as a combination of political economy and human 
ecology approaches to the interactions between nature and society. 
Political ecology varies from the political economy approach since it 
puts emphasis on the environment as an independent variable that 
structures social relations. In other words, the influence of the 
environment on societal change was recognised in the political 
ecology approach. 
National development-local vulnerability nexus 
Access to entitlements denotes the options that individuals, 
communities and social groups have available to them to minimise 
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the negative impacts of climate change and take advantage of the 
opportunities. The encroachment of large-scale commercial farms 
into Karrayyu territory has made pastoralists susceptible to recurrent 
drought and famine by disrupting their localised adaptation strategies 
that were tailored towards mobility of livestock and people. The 
political ecology approach accounts for the close connection between 
the expansion of development programmes in Awash Valley and the 
recurrence of drought and famine in the region. In other words, social 
and political sources of vulnerability relate to social developments 
such as changes in the political regime, including altered power 
relations at the regional and communal level. For instance, 
development policies may, at least temporarily, add to political 
uncertainties at various levels, since they may redistribute resources 
and powers between various actors. In a similar manner, multiple, 
simultaneous interventions by the state and other groups may cause 
confusion and generate unanticipated outcomes.  
In this regard, entitlement theory shifts our attention away from 
climatic forces as an explanation of famine (Downing 2003). Rather 
than approaching famine and food insecurity as a product of drought 
and crop/livelihood failure, Sen (1981) framed famine as a result of 
‘entitlement failure’. The powerlessness of individuals or groups to 
access resources crucial to coping with extreme climatic conditions 
such as drought is at the centre of entitlement failure. From this 
perspective, resource availability and the ability of individuals to 
mobilise these resources are central to an understanding of 
vulnerability (Adger 2006).  
This is important in the context of the Karrayyu pastoralists in Upper 
Awash Valley for it highlights the fact that local-scale vulnerability is 
created by processes which are beyond the capacity of the locals 
and with distant forces such as shifts in policy. In this regard, 
vulnerability to climate change can also be considered within the 
framework of entitlements (Watts and Bohle 1993; Bohle et al. 1994; 
Adger and Kelly 1999). According to Bohle et al. (1994), the concept 
of entitlements includes cultural and intra-familial entitlement to 
resources, as well as encompassing wider structures of 
empowerment by which these entitlements are secured and 
contested. Entitlements therefore extend beyond material and 
economic measures of well-being to encompass the multitude ways 
in which resources necessary for well-being are accessed, 
distributed, and contested over space and time (Kelly and Adger 
2000). Access to entitlements denotes the options that individuals, 
households, communities and social groups have available to them 
to minimise the negative impacts of climate change and take 
advantage of the opportunities. 
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Commercial farms and the loss of pastoral spaces of adaptation 
In the 1960s, charting out its path through five year development 
plans,60 the modernist government preferred to see the Awash Valley 
in terms of one or two of its resources and disregarded the rest. This 
resulted in incalculable damage to the environment and the well-
being of the many local communities in the valley. For instance, 
those interested in the ‘agricultural development’ of the valley only 
tended to see the Awash Valley as nothing but potential agricultural 
land that could generate foreign exchange and move the national 
economy. The well-being of local communities and their livestock 
were not taken into consideration. Because the Upper Awash valley 
is endowed with agricultural potential, both in terms of natural 
resources and through its proximity to local and international 
markets, the Karrayyu land has attracted the government and 
become a ‘bone of contention’ between the locals and the 
‘interventionist’ government (Ayalew 2001; Müller-Mahn et al. 2010). 
The loss of access to critical ‘spaces of adaptation’ by the Karrayyu 
pastoralists started with the establishment of the Metahara Sugar 
Factory (MSF) under an agreement between the Imperial Ethiopian 
Government and Hendels-Vereeniging Amsterdam (HVA) in 1967. 
This agreement resulted in the gradual allocation of 10,000 ha of 
land for irrigation purposes on the other side of Awash River, taken 
from the prime dry season grazing area of the Karrayyu pastoral 
groups. The mill, with a crushing capacity of 17,000 quintals of 
sugarcane, became operational in 1969. The factory started to 
produce 1,700 quintals of sugar per day. This brought the number of 
sugar factories in the Awash Valley to three, namely, Wonji, Wonji-
Shoa and Metahara, established in 1954, 1960 and 1969, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 It is to be recalled that the First Five Year Plan, from 1957 to 1961, gave priority 
to infrastructures, while the Second Five Year Plan, from 1962 to 1967, allotted 
pride of place to directly productive undertakings, particularly manufacturing 
industry, mining, electricity, etc. and the Third Five Year Plan, 1968-1973, 
introduced a substantial shift of emphasis from the preceding plans by placing high 
priority on agriculture.  
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Fig. 1: the proliferation of irrigated farms in the Awash Valley 
 
With the establishment of MSF, the Karrayyu pastoralists lost their 
dry season grazing area and watering points along the Awash River. 
The particular ecological importance of the area on which the sugar 
plantation was established was that it was dominated by Acacia 
Nilotica, Acacia Syal and Acacia Tortilis, and tall grasses. 
Furthermore, it was the tall trees that grew along the river bank that 
used to give sufficient protection against the sun during the dry 
season. On top of this, according to my key informants, the area 
used to harbour more than ten spiritual sites along the river which 
were of great importance to the Karrayyu people.  
In-migration of non-locals to Karrayyu land 
Another important demographic factor is the movement of non-locals 
into Karrayyu territory, which has put a lot of stress on the limited 
resources that have been left after encroachment by the large-scale 
commercial farms and conservation measures. Particularly important 
here was the immigration of the Ittu, which increased in magnitude in 
the 1950s and continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s as a result 
of war with the Issa Somali over resource use and ownership in their 
ancestral land.  
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After the migration, some Ittu settled alone in villages like Benti, and 
others lived together with the Basso Karrayyu in Kobboo, Degha 
Hedhu, Galcha, and Moogassa. The first three are located in the 
foothills of Mount Fentalle, and the fourth near the sugar cane 
plantation and the park. The relations between the newcomers and 
the hosts were good from the very beginning, since the migration 
was conducted in agreement with the Karrayyu. The friendship and 
solidarity between the Ittu and Karrayyu that characterised the pre-
migration period were further strengthened after the migration 
through marriage, reciprocal exchange of stocks and gifts, 
cooperation in the payment of blood compensation in particular and 
pastoral life in general. Drought triggered the migration of the Ittu 
only in 1984/85. Otherwise, what made the migration of the Ittu of 
this period different from the previous ones was that until 1984/85, it 
was only the pastoralists who migrated to Fentalle. But this time, the 
absence of rain for two consecutive years and the subsequent 
drought and famine in west Hararge also forced the agro-pastoralist 
Ittu to migrate to the Karrayyu territory in Fentalle Woreda. 
Pastoral agency and new practices 
Pastoralists actively employ their agency in order to deal with the 
structural sources of vulnerability. The ‘duality’ between structural 
forces of vulnerability and pastoral agency leads to the formation of 
emerging practices through active engagement by the actors. 
Consequently, rather than viewing actors as unintentionally 
responding to structural shifts in power relations emanating from 
above, this research takes seriously the notion that local resource 
users are agents in their own right. However, this ‘requires a concept 
of human agency that is neither determined by social structure nor 
entirely voluntaristic’ (Gezon 2006: 15). Actors, in this framework, are 
seen as socially positioned with systematic and patterned affinities 
and dispositions (Rocheleau 1995), while at the same time, seeking 
their own benefit, constantly engaged in negotiation and ‘the work of 
social change’ (Bailey 2001). Actors are also situated within 
differential, yet dynamic, power matrices, where identities such as 
gender and ethnicity and other collectivities frame strategies and 
shape social interaction. Giddens (1979) also takes the concept of 
agency and defines it as ‘the capability of an actor to act otherwise’. 
In this section I explore how the Karrayyu pastoral groups have 
managed to actively balance their traditional livestock-based 
mechanisms of dealing with vulnerability with cultivation in the 
process of interacting with their broader environment. 
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Increase in farming practices and disruption of pastoral social 
relations  
As stated in the previous section, for several decades the Karrayyu 
were exclusive pastoralists deriving their sustenance from rearing 
livestock. Nevertheless, within the last six to seven decades, due to a 
combination of broader social as well as climatic factors, the role of 
the pastoral way of life based on livestock production as a sole 
source of livelihood has gradually declined. The main reasons for this 
were the shrinkage of the resource base due to external interventions 
and consequent environmental degradation, and the recurrent 
drought.  
Development interventions like those of the commercial farms were 
not favourable to pastoralists in the valley, since this resulted in the 
alienation of the dry season grazing lands of the Karrayyu 
pastoralists (Ayalew 2001; Müller-Mahn et al. 2010). The Karrayyu 
case is further aggravated by the Ittu migration and the establishment 
of the Awash National Park and the expansion of Lake Beseka. 
These developments have led to increased vulnerability of the 
pastoral way of life by reduced access to resources that are crucial in 
supporting mobile strategies. The loss of pasture and the recurrent 
drought have resulted in a sharp decline in the size of the livestock 
population61 and impoverishment of the Karrayyu.  
All these processes of vulnerability have forced the once full-time 
pastoralists to adapt themselves flexibly to agro-pastoralism in which 
the herdsmen combine livestock raising with farming practices as an 
adaptive measure. Thus, a supplementary non-pastoral activity, 
namely farming, began to expand despite unsuitable climatic 
conditions. Farming is also dictated by the need to supply the 
increasing population with food, which the livestock sector alone 
cannot achieve.  
In the context of the Karrayyu, cultivation is practised in two different 
ways, namely, rain-fed and irrigated (Ayalew 2001). Both 
mechanisms of crop production in Karrayyu land have been used for 
the past three decades. The Karrayyu themselves have not 
developed an agricultural tradition. Agriculture was introduced to the 
Karrayyu areas in the wake of the migration of the agro-pastoralist 
Ittu. According to the Karrayyu elders, it was introduced by the Ittu 
migrants, especially by those agro-pastoralists who came to Fentalle 
                                                 
61 The mean number of livestock per household plummeted from 59.4 TLU (tropical 
livestock unit) in 1977 to 14.5 in 1997 (Tibebe 1997 cited in Ayalew 2001).  
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district for the first time during the 1984/85 drought due to the crop 
failure in West Hararghe.  
Bringing new principles in: the practice of fencing communal 
pasture 
Land in the Karrayyu area has been handled in the past by 
customary institutions. However, with the social sources of 
vulnerability, the role of these traditional institutions in the Karrayyu 
pastoral community has declined. For instance, an increased influx of 
non-local farmers from other areas, particularly the Ittu groups from 
West Harareghe, has brought about new world views and resulted in 
the expansion of small scale cultivation in Karrayyu territory through 
private enclosure. As a result, the handling of the natural resource 
base, mainly land, has also undergone changes. In other words, with 
the increased social sources of vulnerability, Karrayyu pastoralists 
have started to put in place mechanisms for handling the scarce 
resources, such as private enclosures, by using their ‘pastoral 
agency’. This means the well-off Karrayyu herders with large 
numbers of livestock did not sit back and watch while the communal 
pasture lands were taken over for farming purposes. Rather, as 
individual agents they introduced the idea of enclosing the land for 
grazing purposes, either individually or in a group. Locally, land that 
is enclosed for private farming purposes is called Qonna, while land 
that is enclosed for grazing purposes is known as Kalloo. In other 
words, the engagement of the pastoralists in counterbalancing the 
enclosure of land for private farming has led to the introduction of 
new practices/strategies among the Karrayyu that restrict open 
access to communal pasture. These were introduced among the 
Karrayyu after the shrinkage of their resource base due to the 
various sources of vulnerability, and represent an attempt to actively 
create mechanisms for dealing with these vulnerabilities. As such, 
Kalloo is aimed at resolving the problem of shortage of pasture in the 
seasons of Birraa (autumn) and Bonna (winter). Restrictions were 
placed on a portion of grazing land in their permanent villages by 
agreements made by the pastoralists themselves through the village 
leader. This decision was announced to the Woreda administration 
so that it would not be violated by anyone.  
The portion of grazing land on which restrictions are placed remains 
fallow until it becomes accessible to all members of the village in the 
dry season by another decision of the village leaders. But nowadays 
the severe shortage of land caused by the migration of the Ittu 
pastoralists from Western Hararghe to the Fentalle area, and the use 
of most of the wet season grazing zone (onna ganna) for settlement 
purposes and opportunistic farming have resulted in a failure to find 
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land that could be preserved for the dry season. Though during my 
field research I observed attempts to enclose and reserve land for 
communal grazing, the cattle go hungry even in the summer. So in 
some years, the pastoralists give up their decision by making another 
agreement, and what was left to be grazed for the dry season is used 
to satisfy immediate pasture needs in the rainy season. This makes 
the enclosure mechanism for using scarce resources difficult to 
operate smoothly. Here one may argue that even if the intent of 
introducing an enclosed pasture area is good, it has failed to fully 
meet its purpose. The increased competition for private farming land 
together with the lack of adequate rainfall even in the rainy season 
have forced the local Karrayyu pastoralists to cancel their 
agreements to maintain the enclosed pasture ahead of the dry 
season. This affirms the political ecology approach that 
acknowledges the role of the bio-physical environment in influencing 
human behaviour. According to this approach, the bio-physical 
environment also plays a role as agent by impacting human wills and 
behaviours (Latour 2004). Scholars contend that the political ecology 
approach needs to locate social interactions within the broader 
framework of ecological processes and should not be trapped in the 
futile debate of nature/culture duality (Gezon 2006; Latour 2004; 
Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). In their emphasis of the decisive and 
influential role of the bio-physical environment in influencing human-
environment relations, Zimmerer and Bassett further argue that ‘the 
environment is not simply a stage or arena in which struggles over 
resource access and control take place.’ (2003: 3) 
Emergence of hybrid institutions: strategies of accessing 
scarce resources 
Actors’ ability to access and secure scarce resources affects not only 
their ability to increase returns but also to deal with vulnerability that 
arises from social and climate-related sources. In line with this 
argument, the Karrayyu pastoralists have started to organise 
essential resources in order to better handle social and climate-
related sources of vulnerability. Accordingly, with the loss of spaces 
of adaptation that constrained the traditional mechanisms of 
vulnerability reduction, the locals are practising contemporary means 
of handling vulnerability such as farming.  
Land transfer through sharecropping is on the increase among the 
Karrayyu community due to the arrival of the Ittu farmers from 
Hararghe and with the introduction of irrigation water in the villages. 
Before the introduction of the irrigation scheme it was also common 
in some villages where farming was widely practised. To explain 
such behaviour, the new institutional economists argue that strategic 
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actors, acting both collectively and in their own individual self-
interest, negotiate institutional structures and rules over time in order 
to arrive at increasingly efficient outcomes. In this sense institutions 
are the ‘by-product of (a) strategic conflict(s)’ that, intentionally or not, 
coordinate(s) interests among disparate actors, arriving over time at 
equilibrium, or in other words ‘commonly agreed upon norms’ 
(Ensminger and Rutten 1990).  
These are the ways through which the pastoralists attempt to utilise 
the limited spaces of adaptation that require different mechanisms 
than in the past. For instance, in the Karrayyu pastoral community of 
Upper Awash Valley, Ye-ekul (half share of the produce) is becoming 
part of the contemporary practice of handling vulnerability. 
Nevertheless, currently the most pressing problem among the 
Karrayyu pastoralists at the study sites such as Giddara is finding 
partners for sharecropping arrangements, since most of the 
community members want to rent out either part or all of their 
holdings. Fantale Jilo, who has no oxen to cultivate the land himself, 
expressed his situation thus: 
…a few years back, people from town were looking for 
land and it was good for me. I also had an opportunity 
of renting my plot, which helped me to share better 
harvests. Now, the land does not yield much like 
before, and we had crop failures during successive 
years. As a result, 0.5 ha of my land is given up as 
fallow because I could not find someone who is 
interested in it (2010). 
However, the sharecropping arrangements are not always smooth for 
two main reasons. The first one is the problem of crop failure, which 
according to the Karrayyu pastoralists who practise farming is 
caused by excessive soil salinity and lack of farm inputs. The second 
factor is the gradual erosion of assets, particularly through sales of 
farm oxen by many people in order to meet their subsistence needs. 
Farmers dare to hire land only if they possess sufficient draft power.  
I observed another type of land transaction being practised by 
farmers around Galcha and Giddarra villages. Under this 
arrangement a farmer who is sharecropping land passes it onto a 
third party without the consent of the owner. One of my informants, 
who asked me not to reveal his name in connection with this matter 
because of the legality problem and the risk of losing trust and value 
in the community, stated: 
I sharecropped one hectare of land on the ‘ye-ekul’ 
(equal) basis from a female-headed household in our 
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community a few years ago, when I was able to use 
all necessary inputs on the farm. In the meantime, 
because of some constraints I encountered, I had to 
look to a close friend who could make up my 
shortfalls. This was how I managed the last two 
harvests. We provided half of the harvest to the 
landholder, and then shared the remaining produce 
equally between ourselves. I did not inform the 
individual from whom I initially got the land about the 
reality of the situation because of fear that she will 
snatch it back from me. 
The commercial farming operations along the Awash River in the 
1950s and the 1960s adversely affected local pastoral strategies. 
Pastoralists lost their entitlement to the ever expanding farms. These 
social problems aggravated the vulnerability of the locals to drought. 
In response to these multiple sources of vulnerability, the Karrayyu 
pastoral groups have started to use their agency and take up farming 
as a strategy in order to deal with these vulnerabilities. Initially they 
pursued farming as a strategy by locating their farms adjacent to the 
sugar cane and fruit plantations where water is used for irrigation. 
They have used peaceful and less peaceful mechanisms, ranging 
from simply benefiting from the extra water that they get from the 
plantation, to damaging the infrastructure overnight and diverting the 
water to their own fields. Thus, they use their power to manipulate 
the imposed structures that render them vulnerable. This is in line 
with what Scott labelled ‘weapons of the weak’ (1985). Recently the 
involvement of the Karrayyu pastoralists in farming activities has 
increased with the arrival of the new irrigation scheme by the 
Oromiya regional state.62   
However, the taking up of farming as an active response to the 
changing socio-cultural situation is not uniform among all Karrayyu 
pastoralists. It is also necessary to ask who is actively participating in 
the farming enterprise in the pastoral villages as there are varied 
reactions to the new irrigation scheme. Not all pastoralists have 
reacted positively towards the intervention, depending on the number 
of livestock they possess and the meaning they attach to the 
resources on the land. In the words of one of my informants in a 
pastoral village in Illala, who owns more than thirty camels: 
                                                 
62 The Fentalle Irrigation Scheme was a pilot scheme for the development of later 
schemes and programmes. It is now held up by the government as a flagship of 
good development. The Fentale Irrigation Scheme has led to the resettlement of 
4,500 Karrayyu pastoralist households out of an anticipated 22,000. 
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I am praying to Waqqaa so that he breaks the ‘legs’ of 
the tractors…they are tilling the land on which the 
acacia trees used to grow….they are cutting out the 
trees on which our camels browse….They brought the 
water to our villages and now they want us to put all 
our livestock aside and start farming. This is 
impossible! (Field note in Illala Village, 2010). 
For those pastoralists who own significant numbers of livestock and 
who wish to follow the traditional mechanisms of dealing with 
vulnerability, the increased push by officials63 towards farming 
through distribution of land in the pastoral villages is a further 
annihilation of their pastoral spaces of adaptation.  
Benefit-sharing arrangements  
One of the new institutional arrangements for accessing resources 
that I observed in my study areas is an arrangement in which profits 
are shared equally between someone who rents out land for mutual 
purposes and an individual willing to commit himself to a 
sharecropping agreement. The Karrayyu with a parcel of land rents it 
to someone with money and oxen. The person who leases the land 
prepares the plot for farming by putting up resources in addition to 
the oxen and labour. In many cases, the person who rents the land 
prefers to produce cash crops such as onion, watermelon and 
tomatoes that can easily be marketed. Both parties share the 
benefits after all the costs incurred have been deducted as 
expenses. However, the Karrayyu pastoralists do not like such 
arrangements, as the second party may deliberately exaggerate their 
investment costs. Nevertheless, in the process of interaction with 
other farmers, the Karrayyu have developed a profit-sharing 
arrangement in which they hire a farmer who works on their land, 
rather than renting out the land completely. This arrangement saves 
the Karrayyu from the risk of not getting the proper profit from their 
land, as in the kind of arrangement where they rent out the land to 
someone who invests on the land. My informant in Giddarra village, 
Jillo Hawas, described the arrangement for me as follows: 
                                                 
63 Here, it is important to note that not all government officials give full support to 
the conversion of range land to farming land by introducing the irrigation scheme in 
the Woreda. Informal personal communications by certain officials revealed that in 
view of the nature of the soil in the area and the skills of the Karrayyu, the irrigation 
scheme should have been based on a ‘livestock major crop minor’ principle. They 
also argue for the planting of fodder rather than cash crops in order to improve the 
soil in the area. In the current conditions, they argue that politics have been 
prioritised over sustainability of the project. 
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There are people who are interested in farming on my 
land because I have farm land which is near to the 
irrigation canal and not far from the tarmac road. So, 
there is no need for me to be in a hurry and rent out 
my land to the clever urban dwellers. They always 
exaggerate their costs and expenses for fertiliser and 
many other things... I have learned from that and I am 
doing it the other way around. I came to know an Ittu 
farmer who knows what to grow when and is good at 
identifying the weeds that affect the crops. So, I 
provided him with what he needed and he works on 
the farm. Then, after the harvest is sold, I take out all 
my expenses and then we share equally what is left 
as profit. There is no chance to deceive because we 
know each other very well and farming is not only this 
year…I also need this very good farmer next year. We 
don’t want to lose trust. (Interview with Jillo Hawas, 
March 2010). 
However, one of the challenges that the Karrayyu land owners 
mention is the problem of initial capital to cover all the costs of 
farming so as to get a better result. Sometimes they may not be able 
to satisfy the demands that come from the knowledgeable farmers 
who ask them to provide them with specific inputs at a specific time. 
In the absence of sufficient capital they jeopardise the outcome of the 
harvest.  
Conclusion 
This article has explored the new forms of accessing scarce 
resources that came with the changes in structural forces in Karrayyu 
pastoral community of Upper Awash valley. In response to the 
changing social and environmental factors, the Karrayyu pastoralists 
actively experiment on and introduce new forms of managing the 
scarce resources and thereby exercising their agency that goes 
beyond the structural constraints that they have been confronted 
with. As has been explained above, this process has also prompted 
some pastoralists to fence land for a grazing purpose that is entirely 
new to the Karrayyu community. In a nutshell, in the face of structural 
sources of vulnerability, where the customary pastoral institutions 
become almost non-functional, Karrayyu individuals have been 
obliged to adjust their livelihood practices and take-up new strategies 
to secure access to critical resources. With the rapid re-orientation of 
livelihoods, an important aspect in which Karrayyu pastoralists have 
tried to increase the mechanisms of access to scarce resources is 
through the emergence of hybrid institutions.  
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Ghanaian ‘green-degree’ graduates returning from Germany and 
their impact on environmental development in Ghana 
Julia Boger64 
Abstract 
This paper deals with international student migration of Ghanaians 
and the notion that it has positive effects on the development of the 
source country. Ghanaians study in Germany and specialise in 
subjects related to the environment and resource protection. Usually, 
migration studies on highly skilled Sub-Saharan Africans deal with 
out-migration. It is said that this out-migration causes a permanent 
loss, a ‘brain-drain’. The cases presented in this paper show the 
contrary. They show that migrants who go abroad in order to pursue 
their studies are likely to return and to contribute to the sustainable 
development in emerging fields such as ecology. The premise for this 
positive notion on the migration-development nexus is that the home 
country’s formal labour market offers employment for graduates who 
return. In this case, returning graduates can reinvest their enhanced 
knowledge in Ghana’s labour market. This knowledge transfer helps 
returning graduates impact society at different levels: they implement 
environmental policies (micro-level); they build institutional capacities 
(meso-level) and influence policy-making processes that shape 
environmental governance (macro-level). By presenting empirical 
data from fieldwork in Ghana, this paper clearly demonstrates that 
returning graduates from Germany achieve the strongest impact at 
the meso-level in capacity building. The analysis of qualitative 
interviews shows that this kind of ‘brain-circulation’ creates positive 
effects and return migration becomes a ‘brain-gain’. 
Keywords: migration and development, return migration, green 
economy, Ghana.  
Introduction 
Policy-related research and debates argue that highly skilled 
migrants from economically undeveloped countries can foster 
sustainable development in their countries of origin if they are able to 
apply their knowledge. However, the circumstances under which they 
can contribute to their home countries’ development are still not 
                                                 
64 Julia Boger holds an M.A. in Social Anthropology from Johannes Gutenberg-
University and is pursuing a PhD in Development Sociology at the Bayreuth 
International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS). She is writing her PhD 
thesis on the job-hunt experiences and professional trajectories of Cameroonian 
and Ghanaian graduates who have studied in Germany and who have returned. 
The project is closely linked to her practical work in the field of reintegration and 
development at World University Service (WUS) Germany. 
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clear. The general question of how migration influences development 
processes has created a vast research field labelled as the 
“migration and development-nexus” (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; 
Faist 2008; Nieswand 2011). Since the 1950s, one discussion thread 
led to controversial viewpoints: this controversy concerned the 
impact of return migration on development. Scholars advocating the 
positive notion of return migration perceived highly skilled migrants 
as potential “agents of change” who can contribute to development 
upon their voluntary return:65 
According to dominant views of the 1950s and 1960s 
in development theory, return migrants were seen as 
important agents of change and innovation. It was 
expected that migrants not only bring back money, but 
also new ideas, knowledge, and entrepreneurial 
attitudes. In this way, migrants were expected to play 
positive role [sic!] in development and contribute to 
the accelerated spatial diffusion of modernization in 
developing countries (de Haas 2010: 5). 
However, this optimistic view on return migration contributing to 
development seems not to apply equally to every region in the world. 
For instance, whereas return migration has become a success for 
many Asian countries, the opposite seems to be the case for Sub-
Saharan African nations. Only a few of their highly skilled workforces 
who go overseas ever return, because the obstacles are too 
manifold66 and the risk of suffering from ‘brain-waste’ is too high for 
them67. Their investment in higher education is wasted because they 
cannot fully apply what they have learned due to political restrictions 
in their home countries and because career prospects in most Sub-
                                                 
65 Today, European and United States (U.S.) governments are increasingly utilizing 
these estimated positive effects of voluntary return migration. The growing number of 
policy documents on this topic reflects this increase in interest (Black et al. 2004; 
BAMF 2006; EMN 2007; Schneider and Kreienbrink 2010; IOM 2010; Black et al. 
2011; Kovács et al. 2012). 
66 Many Africans who have migrated abroad have a strong return-oriented rhetoric but 
ultimately are reluctant to return to their countries of origin. Tsagué (2009: 21) explains 
the reasons for this with the example of Cameroon. Most Cameroonians fear returning 
because they expect to have difficulties in the scarce formal labour market. They also 
know that the endemic corruption causes serious problems in everyday life and that 
they would lack the kind of infrastructure they enjoy abroad (permanent access to 
electricity and water supply, healthcare). 
67 In particular, highly skilled African migrants risk wasting their brains either abroad or 
in their home countries. If they remain abroad, they often only access low-paid 
employment (for the case of Kenyans abroad see Oyelere 2007). In addition, their 
potential remains unused if they return and have to work outside their fields of studies. 
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Saharan African countries are far from being attractive. Despite 
promising growth rates of many countries’ GDPs and their 
extraordinary wealth of natural resources, governments have failed to 
transform this economic development into income generating decent 
employment creation. Today, formal labour markets in most Sub-
Saharan African countries still are extremely narrow: 
Formal employment is limited to about 10 per cent of 
the labour force, with most workers eking out a living 
in survivalist-oriented activities in the smallholder or 
subsistence agricultural sector and in the urban 
informal economy, both characterized by low 
productivity, low incomes and low protection. 
Moreover, little progress has been made in shifting the 
reliance of African economic growth away from 
agriculture and resource extraction towards 
manufacturing and other more dynamic and 
knowledge-intensive activities in the service sector 
(ILO 2007: 31). 
Thus, highly skilled Sub-Saharan Africans rather see emigration as a 
way out of poverty and since the 1980s, many nations have lost their 
brightest heads permanently.68 A ‘brain-drain’ occurs and the model 
of agent-related self-help within the migration-development model 
seems to have failed to meet the high expectations. Nevertheless, 
scholars such as Patterson (2007; 2008) have a vision that more 
“strategic” approaches could make return migration become a tool 
that stimulates a ‘brain-circulation’ in a very specific knowledge field 
by which Sub-Saharan African nations finally could become world 
leaders:  
(…) African governments can encourage and facilitate 
graduates of engineering and life science 
undergraduate programmes at home to seek graduate 
education in those fields in the United States and 
other Western countries throughout the next decade 
to be in a position to help pioneer and early adopt the 
ecological economy possibly just over the horizon. If 
Africans were to do this strategically and successfully, 
they would be establishing systematic brain circulation 
similar to what some Asian transnational groups have 
done around the digital knowledge economy 
(Patterson 2007: 146). 
                                                 
68 For instance, in Ghana the large amount of out-migration of highly skilled workers 
has created large gaps of trained personnel in the health care sector (Nyonator and 
Dovlo 2005). 
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Though the aspect of knowledge-transfer as a tool for development is 
not new, Patterson mentions this knowledge-transfer within an 
important and innovative specific field: that of ecological protection. 
Today, especially the poorest countries in the global South suffer the 
most from the negative side effects of industrialisation in the global 
North. Therefore, a global agenda was started to at least limit these 
negative effects and at the same time continue with economic 
growth: this agenda is also known as ‘green economy’ (UNEP 2011). 
By applying this agenda of a green economy, Sub-Saharan African 
governments will also have to shift towards exploring the 
opportunities of renewable energies. This shift towards a technology-
intensive economy will also increase the local labour market’s 
demand for highly skilled workforces. This specific demand, argues 
Patterson (2011), could motivate highly skilled Africans in the 
diaspora to return and contribute to this specific development. Their 
transferred knowledge would lead to a similar rapid development as 
has been seen in many Asian countries, like India, China, Taiwan, 
and Korea. These nations have become front-runners in specific 
knowledge-based technologies, like information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), thanks to their students who first went abroad 
and then returned with enhanced knowledge, which they then 
transferred to their home countries’ economies.69  
In this paper, I argue that this positive vision of voluntary return 
migration based on a paradigm shift towards a more ecologically 
economic development is already underway. My argumentation is 
based on empirical data deriving from qualitative interviews with 
Ghanaians who graduated from environmental programmes in 
Germany and returned to Ghana to work as employees. The analysis 
shows that in the case of Ghana two important premises apply: first, 
the graduates have a professional profile focussing on environmental 
subjects and second, Ghana enforces environmental activities on a 
policy level. For a better understanding of the country case, the 
paper first introduces the debate on contemporary return migration to 
Ghana. Next, I outline Ghana’s promotion of a green economy. Then, 
the current generation of Ghanaian students in Germany and their 
focus on ecological subjects, the ‘green-degrees’, is portrayed. 
Thereafter, I present case studies of returned Ghanaians and their 
knowledge transfer into the Ghanaian labour market. I show that 
Ghanaian graduates apply their environmental knowledge on three 
                                                 
69 Saxenian (2005) presented the case of Indian and Chinese software developers who 
had previously worked in Silicon Valley and then returned to their home countries’ 
economies. Similarly, for the case of China, Zweig (2006) showed how Chinese 
graduates returned successfully after their studies abroad. Recently, Pham (2010) 
investigated the country case Vietnam and its returning diaspora. 
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different levels: the micro, meso and macro-levels. Several factors 
that hinder their knowledge transfer are also presented. Finally, I 
reflect these empirical findings in light of the migration and 
development nexus. This summary leads to the conclusion that 
return migration in this specific knowledge field has positive effects. 
However, it can only unfold its full potential if governments and 
especially people working for the government welcome the returned 
migrants and also implement the urgently needed ecological 
paradigm shift.  
Studies on return migration to Ghana in the context of 
development 
Return migration to Ghana has increased during the last decade.70 
Especially Ghanaians living in the global North are returning more 
often.71 This return trend primarily concerns the young generation of 
highly skilled (Anarfi et al. 2005: 206) who pursue their second 
degree outside Ghana. They are in contrast to those migrants in who 
went abroad during the phase of the large-scale exodus in the 1980s 
and who remained in their host countries (Arthur 2008; Nieswand 
2011). Today’s young Ghanaian migrants living abroad of working 
age tend to return due to the fact that conditions in their home 
country have improved and hence, they find economic opportunities 
and political freedom, which in general encourages return migration, 
state Anarfi and Jagare (2005: 6).72 In brief, returning to Ghana has 
become an attractive opportunity especially for the highly skilled: 
                                                 
70 IOM (Quartey 2009: 58) presents an overview on the different estimations that range 
between 1 million to 3 million Ghanaians living abroad (overseas and on the African 
continent). 
71 The proportion of Ghanaians among persons who arrived in Ghana steadily 
increased from 18.6 to 34.6 per cent during the period from 2000 to 2007 (Quartey 
2009: 13). 
72 First, Ghana’s economy and political stability has improved (Elischer 2009). Second, 
the recent start of off-shore oil and gas exploitation has raised high hopes for further 
economic growth (Breisinger et al. 2009; Egyir 2012). Third, the Ghanaian government 
explicitly offered incentives to the diaspora to return and to contribute to Ghana’s 
development (Kleist 2011: 10). One of the main events was the Ghanaian Home 
Coming Summit launched by the government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2001. 
It was the first conference for Ghanaians living abroad (Manuh and Asante 2005: 298). 
The summit appealed to those living abroad to return and to invest in their home 
country. They were promised adequate investment opportunities and that they could 
benefit from dual citizenship (Quartey 2009: 16; Adepoju 2008: 36). However, in the 
midst of the latest economic crises, late president Attah Mills was reluctant to 
encourage diasporas to return because this would have created high pressure on the 
formal labour market (CNN 2009). 
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As these transnational migrants return home, it is 
argued that they can facilitate the transfer of the 
critical financial and human capital the developing 
world needs. Thus high skill migration is a vital part of 
that game, a joint venture from which both source and 
receiving countries and even the migrants themselves 
have the potential to gain, thus creating a ‘triple win’ 
situation to the benefit of everyone and for 
development and poverty reduction (Awumbila 2008: 
57). 
The increase of this return trend and the question how these 
transnational migration flows contribute to Ghana’s development also 
attracted scientists’ attention. One of the larger projects that was 
carried out to investigate this field of return migration to Ghana was 
the ‘Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa’ 
(Transrede)73 project funded by the UK Department for International 
Development through its Globalisation and Poverty programmes. 
Thanks to this project, a number of studies investigated migration 
from and to Ghana. Many of these studies had a comparative design 
and compared the situation of Ghanaian return migrants to that of 
Côte d’Ivoirian (Black et al. 2003a; Tiemoko 2003a; Tiemoko 2003b; 
Tiemoko 2005; Black and Castaldo 2009, Ammassari 2009).  
The majority of these studies identified entrepreneurs as prime 
agents of change having foremost an economic impact upon return. 
They contribute to the development of their countries by investing 
their savings in infrastructure and by starting their businesses, which 
in turn creates job opportunities for the population. Interestingly, only 
a minority of empirical studies have touched on the role of employees 
and their more intangible and social contributions to development 
upon return (Martin 2005; Taylor 2009; Bochmann et al. 2008; Olivier 
2011). This is surprising, because the majority of returning migrants 
from Germany to Ghana ultimately become employees (cf. Tiemoko 
2005: 193). They lack sufficient financial capital. Achieving this 
financial capital is often difficult, especially for foreign students in 
Germany. This has to do with the German language barrier; with the 
particular regulations of labour law and with the bureaucratic hurdles 
                                                 
73 Transrede is a collaborative effort by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research 
(SCMR) at the University of Sussex, the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Statistique et 
d’Economie Appliquée (ENSEA), Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and the Institute for Social, 
Statistical and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana. 
BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa  
92 
 
 
that students have to clear to obtain an official work permit after 
graduation.74  
Due to these obstacles, student migrants lack unfettered access to 
their host country’s formal labour market and often end up in low-paid 
jobs. In consequence, this leads to a devaluation of their education 
and degrees (Elwert and Elwert 2011). Thus, very few students in 
Germany accumulate enough savings to set up their business upon 
return. Therefore, it seems quite natural that most Ghanaians who 
return as graduates from Germany seek for employment 
opportunities at first.75 Being employees instead of employers, these 
returned graduates can become drivers of change, too. For instance, 
Ammassari (2009) concludes in her empirical study ‘the most 
important contributions reported by returnees were those in the 
workplace. This consisted of the introduction of new knowledge, skills 
and ideas and execution of some critical changes and reforms’ 
(2009: 292). To underline her findings she presents practical 
examples of employees ‘in the fields of research and teaching, 
administration and audit, marketing and human resources, banking 
and brokerage, environment and forestry, telecommunications and 
information technology’ (2009: 263-264). Ammassari points out that 
“change initiatives in the workplace mostly hinge on whether 
returnees have enough responsibility, authority and power and 
enough time to get established in such top positions” (2009: 293).76 
In addition, Arthur (2008) specifies this impact-level approach. He 
finds that returned graduates have most impact on development 
                                                 
74 Regarding student migration, initially foreign students in Germany could work 90 
days annually. After graduation, they had to depart immediately (DAAD 2012: 2). The 
German government has eased this legal regulation since 2005. Today, graduates 
may apply for a visa after their studies that allows them to search for work for 18 
months. Nevertheless, very few foreign graduates use this opportunity. The reasons for 
this are that they simply do not know of this regulation, cannot speak German fluently 
enough to secure qualified jobs, or have problems finding an adequate workplace 
(Sykes and Chaoimh 2012: 51). 
75 Evidence for this assumption is given by the fact that the interviews of the present 
study mentioned, that they would have preferred to start their business, but lacked 
capital. After having worked for some time and accumulated sufficient amounts of 
financial resources, some of the interviewed migrants had become self-employed. 
76 A very prominent example in the field of medical care is Ghana’s ‘heart man’: Prof. 
Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng, the founder of the Cardio Centre of the Korle Bu 
Teaching Hospital in Accra, who went to Germany in 1978 to study cardiothoracic 
surgery and who returned in 1992. In 2006, he went into politics. Recently, African 
students in Ohio, United States elected him as “African hero” (Tsikata 2012). Prof. 
Frimpong-Boateng promotes the use of ‘green’ friendly fuels in Ghana, producing bio-
diesel on a small scale in the process to run vehicles (Sey 2010). 
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issues on the micro-level, whereas the positive effects on the 
national, the macro-level, are ‘yet to be felt’:   
‘Though they are utilizing their human capital skills 
(acquired abroad working in diverse capacities as 
engineers, pharmacists, doctors, and business 
entrepreneurs), the collective impact of these 
contributions at the national level has yet to have any 
significant measurable impact on the society at-large 
[sic]’ (Arthur 2008: 155).  
Both positions, Ammassari’s and Arthur’s, confirm that returning 
migrants can stimulate development processes as employees. As 
such, they can introduce innovations on different levels. However, 
one has to see if the graduates’ profiles fit the particular labour 
market demand. Because, as Awumbila (2008: 58) correctly states, 
the returning migrants ‘are unlikely to be the key factor in the 
development of their homeland, but they can play significant roles 
(…) and can be playing a complementary role rather than the key 
role in transforming an economies’. However, this kind of 
complementary development in is only possible if the graduates find 
work at all. In this regards, the recent generation of Ghanaians who 
studied in Germany and returned does quite well. Their educational 
profile matches the emerging ‘green economy’s’ demand and hence 
they land jobs in the field of environmental protection and renewable 
energies. In addition, to facilitate their return financially, the German 
government even runs specific reintegration programmes, which in 
particular have the goal to contribute to development processes.77 
                                                 
77 In Germany, the two major programmes are the Returning Expert Programme (REP) 
and the Reintegrationprogramme (RE). The REP already exists since the 1980ies. 
Today, it is run on behalf of the Centre of International Migration and Development 
(CIM). CIM is a cooperation between the German International Cooperation (GIZ) 
GmbH and the International Job Placement Service (ZAV) of the German Federal 
Employment Agency (BA). Another long-term partner in the REP is the World 
University Service (WUS e.V.). WUS, an association working on the human right to 
education in Germany since 1950, designed the part of the workplace equipment 
subsidy in the 1990ies. WUS carries out this part on behalf of CIM (Laaser 2007: 345). 
See for more information about the programme and its combinable parts: 
www.returning-expert.de and www.wusgermany.de. The Protestant Association 
Church Development Service (EED) carries out the RE-Programme, which focuses on 
job-placing graduates in civil society organisations (see Sevegnani and Schuh 2010: 
6). For more detail please read the homepage: www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de. 
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Towards sustainable development in Ghana 
Since independence, Ghana’s government has gradually integrated 
aspects of environmental protection into its development policies.78 In 
2012, shortly after Rio+20, Ghana mainstreamed the concept of a 
‘green economy’ (UNEP 2011) into national development as an 
important tool to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(GNA 2012). This official step is an important signal. It shows that 
protection of the environment has become an urgent global task and 
that Ghana’s government has accepted the challenge to fight for a 
better environment. However, it has taken a long time for this 
concept to reach this level of awareness. In 1972, the United Nations 
(UN) globally launched the concept of sustainable development.79 
                                                 
78 Ghana’s development agenda after independence in 1957 at first mainly targeted 
economic growth. The first governmental strategy was the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) in 1983. It was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) supported by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Whereas this programme stabilised economic growth, it soon created severe 
environmental problems caused by overexploitation of natural resources and pollution. 
In 1994 therefore, as a long-term approach, Ghana’s Vision 2020 was promoted to 
target Ghana’s development in the period from 1996-2000. This vision merely focussed 
economic stability and it underrepresented the environment. Moreover, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) was launched in 2001. This strategy targeted 
development projects during the period 2003-2005. It followed the concept of the 
Agenda 21 and was in line with National Strategies for Sustainable Development 
(NSSD). Whereas GPRS I focused mainly on poverty reduction, the following strategy, 
the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), emphasised growth-inducing 
policies. This strategy was launched in 2006 and implemented in the period from 2006-
2010. It integrated all three pillars of sustainable development in Ghana (economic, 
social, and environmental development) for the first time. Strategic Environmental 
Assessments (SEAs) were involved and thus environmental components 
mainstreamed in sector strategies of the GPRS II (Rai 2008). Finally, the Ghana 
Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) succeeded the GPRS II in 2010. 
79 The global call for environmental protection started in 1972, when the UN organised 
the first conference on environment and development, the UN Conference on Human 
Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. In 1983, the UN set up the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, a 
former Prime Minister of Norway. Four years later, in 1987, the Commission published 
a report, ‘Our common future’, synonymously called the ‘Brundtland Report’. This 
report recommended creating synergies between economy and ecology and called on 
governments to take responsibility for environmental damage and to monitor the 
policies that cause the damage. What followed was the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
This conference was the Earth Summit or Rio 92. One of its main results was the final 
report, the AGENDA 21. This report was also described as a blueprint for sound 
development into the 21st Century. About ten years later, in 2002, a review conference 
was held in Johannesburg, South Africa to evaluate gains made since AGENDA 21, 
and in 2012 Rio+20 discussed current achievements. This latest conference strongly 
promoted the green economy concept (Awuku Apaw 2012). 
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The aim was to foster sustainable development to ensure that 
economic growth respects human rights and environmental 
protection; and that these measures become parts of the nations’ 
agendas (Koessler 1998: 178). Recently, in 2008, the UN launched 
the concept of a green economy to strengthen synergies between 
economy and environmental protection. Whereas the economy 
previously considered environmental protection measures to be 
‘uneconomic,’ this new concept highlights environmental protection 
as economically viable. This paradigm-shift (UNEM 2011: 153) 
targets three major goals. First, in order to prevent an increase in 
global warming, carbon emissions must be reduced. Second, natural 
resources should be used efficiently and renewable energies must be 
promoted to prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. Third, 
growth and employment should be socially inclusive (UNEP 2011: 
16).  
The reasons for Ghana adopting the concept of green economy are 
manifold. On the one hand, a rapidly growing population80 demands 
better economic prospects and on the other hand, these economic 
activities increase the country’s environmental problems. In 2011, 
Ghana’s economy was booming81 because its oil production was 
attracting many investors. Ghana even achieved an upgrade from a 
low-income to lower middle-income country, according to World Bank 
country classifications (WB 2011). Despite this upgrade, about 40 per 
cent of Ghanaians still do not have access to safe and potable water 
but have to rely on natural sources of water, including unprotected 
wells, lakes and rivers (NDPC 2010: 71), and only 14 per cent of 
Ghanaians have access to improved sanitation (Yirenya-Tawiah and 
Tweneboah Lawson 2012). Many open waters are polluted and 
unsafe due to illegal mining and the use of toxic chemicals like 
arsenic and cyanide to extract gold and other minerals from the soil. 
These chemicals are not disposed of in an environmentally friendly 
way, but simply drained to the rivers and lakes. In addition, a lack of 
modern sanitation and sewage systems is responsible for serious 
health problems in Ghana. Endemic illnesses like malaria, cholera, 
and the incidence of guinea worm are attributed directly to poor 
quality of water and insufficient sanitation (van Roosbroeck and 
Amlalo 2006: 22-23). In addition, the oil and gas exploitation itself 
                                                 
80 According to the latest results of the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) population and 
housing census, Ghana’s population increased from 18.9 million in 2000 to 24.6 million 
in 2010. This translates into a 30.4 per cent increase within the decade (Adeniran 
2012). 
81 Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011, with real GDP growth of 14.4 
percent made Ghana one of the fastest growing economies in the world (GSS 
2012: 7). 
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causes pollution and can severely damage the environment for rural 
populations as has happened in neighbouring countries like Nigeria 
(Egyir 2012: 2). These examples show that economic growth often 
goes hand in hand with environmental degradation. Still, as Egyir 
(2009) found in his empirical survey, Ghanaian society is not yet 
aware enough of the environmental issues that will cause challenges 
in the future, like soil erosion, climate change, and deforestation. 
Thus, concepts that integrate economic activities into 
environmentally friendly technologies, as promoted by the green 
economy, are long overdue. The implementation of this concept 
would create more awareness, foster economic activities in an 
environmentally friendly way and create new employment 
opportunities. Such ‘green-jobs’82 (UNEP et al. 2008) are likely to 
emerge in technology-intensive fields. These are, for instance, 
renewable energies (solar, wind and hydropower, and waste-to-
energy), construction, transportation and industries, emissions and 
pollutions mitigation and recycling. According to the optimistic 
calculations of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC 
2012: 9), Ghana has the potential to create 169,570 decent new jobs 
in the areas of energy, construction, water, and agriculture within the 
next five years.83 Because these jobs are technology-intense, they 
require specific skills from the workforce. However, Ghana’s 
institutions still lack workforces that are prepared to carry out these 
activities (Egyir 2009: 30). The country lacks in-country experts in 
these fields, because Ghanaian universities have only very recently 
started to integrate these emerging subjects into their curricula84 and 
their scholars have not yet graduated. Thus, before the introduction 
of these new subjects, students who were interested in these topics 
had to study abroad, for instance in Germany. 
                                                 
82 According to the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), a ‘green-job’ 
“reduces the environmental impacts of enterprises and economic sectors to 
sustainable levels, while providing decent work and living conditions to all those 
involved in production, and ensures workers’ rights are respected” (ITUC 2012: 3). 
83 ITUC’s figures based on high results, suggesting 2 per cent investment of GDP into 
the identified sectors. 
84 Ghanaian universities offer subjects like environmental engineering and, for 
instance, the University of Ghana recently launched the Institute for Environmental and 
Sanitation studies (ESS). Additionally, the private African University Communication 
College (AUCC) in Accra offers degrees that target green technologies (GNA 2011). 
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Ghanaian students and ‘green-degree’ programmes in Germany 
During the investigation period (2000-2010), 789 Ghanaians 
graduated from German universities (HIS 2012).85 A large part of this 
group had studied subjects related to the environment (Kubitschek 
2008: 16). Germany has offered such ‘green-degree’ (Mutz n.d.) 
programmes86 that focus on environmental resource management, 
tropical hydrogeology, engineering geology, environmental 
management, tropical forestry, waste, and recycling management 
since the late 1990s. Being a frontrunner for ecological policies and a 
pioneer in renewable energies87, Germany particularly designed 
these courses for international students in developing countries in 
order to compete for the best talents with other European and U.S. 
universities. This introduction of English language degrees, as 
bachelor and master programmes, was ‘a small revolution’ (Kuptsch 
2006: 45) because Germany formerly only offered degrees in the 
German language which took far longer, especially for foreign 
students due to difficulties in catching up with the German language. 
By 1999, about 425 programmes on ecological topics and resource 
management existed. The curricula of these programmes are often 
interdisciplinary and combine engineering with managerial subjects 
(Hennen 2001: 129). However, what do graduates of these 
programmes finally do for their profession, and more importantly, 
where do they start their careers? 
                                                 
85 The total of Ghanaian students in Germany is relatively stable at around 250, but low 
compared to students from other African nations such as Cameroon with more than 
5,000 students. Nevertheless, the figures for enrolment of Ghanaians in Germany 
show continuity: in the academic year 2000/2001, about 310 Ghanaians studied at 
German universities. There was an increase and the number almost doubled within 
only two years. The peak of this increase was in the academic term of 2002/2003, with 
656 Ghanaian registered students in Germany. Soon the number declined again, 
ostensibly due to the German embassy having to increase the bureaucratic hurdles for 
obtaining a student visa as a result of the growing demand (Klebs 2004, Nieswand 
2011: 412). Following this, in the academic year 2006/2007, about 309 Ghanaians 
studied in Germany. Since then, this figure has remained constant and in the academic 
year 2010/2011, about 280 Ghanaians studied in Germany (HIS 2012). 
86 Interestingly, until now there has been only little research interest on the outcome of 
these programmes. An exception is the study of the Centre for Development Studies 
(ZEF) in Bonn. The evaluation investigated the professional status of 65 graduates 
from African countries (Schraven et al. 2011). 
87 Ecological industrial policy started in 1961 with the implementation of environmental 
policies. Thanks to these policies (e.g. feed-in tariffs for renewable energy or 
environmental taxation), Germany became a driver of innovation and developed 
‘pioneer markets’ such as the high-tech intensive renewable energies (Schepelmann et 
al. 2012: 11). 
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Regarding the question of how many graduates finally return to 
Ghana, it must be said that it is still impossible to track the number of 
outgoing graduates on a large scale (Baraulina et al. 2008: 31). In 
Germany, the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
StBA) offers statistics from the Central Register of Foreigners 
(Ausländerzentralregister) that include the figures for outgoing 
Ghanaians in general. According to these statistics, 3,436 Ghanaians 
left Germany during the 2005-2010 (StBA 2005-2010). However, this 
statistic does not distinguish between the categories of migrants. 
Thus, it includes the short-term visitor who leaves Germany after 
being on vacation to see relatives abroad as well as those who leave 
Germany after their studies. In addition, this statistic does not reveal 
the country of destination. This means it also includes those 
Ghanaian migrants who leave for the United Kingdom or the United 
States or any other country apart from Ghana. As a means of 
determining approximately how many graduates might leave to return 
to Ghana, however, the internal statistics of the Programme for 
Returning Experts (PRE)88 provides figures that serve as rough 
estimates for returning graduates from transition and less developed 
countries. According to these estimates, 323 Ghanaians (who 
registered themselves voluntarily) returned from Germany directly to 
Ghana within the investigation period (2000-2010). This means that 
at least about 41 per cent of the number of graduates (789) returned 
straight to Ghana within this time, not including a) unreported cases 
and b) those that left Germany for Ghana via the U.K. or another 
transit country.  
The reasons for leaving Germany are various. Common push-factors 
are that Ghanaian students do not see realistic professional 
prospects forthcoming, are not well integrated in Germany,89 
experience racism, face language barriers, fear restrictive visa-
regulations and lack employment opportunities (Kubitschek 2008: 54-
55). Pull-factors why they explicitly return to their home country are 
emotional obligations in Ghana because they have family and kin 
(Tonah 2007) and, more interestingly, the urge to ‘develop’ the 
country. This aspect that Ghanaian graduates have a ‘strong notion 
                                                 
88 Internal statistics retrieved via www.zav-reintegration.de. This figure represents all 
persons who registered themselves voluntarily as returning. Included are only those 
who left Germany and went directly to Ghana. This means that those who went via the 
UK to work or visit family members first are not captured in this statistic. 
89 Evidence for this finding is that Ghanaian students are underrepresented in 
Ghanaian diaspora associations: whereas in the 1980s Ghanaian students were very 
active and established various student, church and regional associations in almost all 
big cities in Germany (Tonah 2007: 12; Nieswand 2011: 415), today these associations 
lack students (Appiah 2011). 
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for the development of Ghana’ (Kubitschek 2008: 17) has been 
highlighted in many studies about return migration to Ghana and it 
has been reported, that the interviewees repeated this statement 
almost like a ‘mantra’ (Bochmann et al. 2008: 40). Similarly, 
Ammassari (2009: 291) found that Ghanaians were very conscious of 
their role as potential agents for development. Even so, if they return, 
are they in a position to apply their knowledge on environmental 
protection? To answer this question, the next section introduces 
research findings about the professional whereabouts of Ghanaian 
graduates who have returned and started working in Ghana. 
Returning Ghanaians and their professional profiles 
This section reflects the findings from qualitative analysis90 of 
interviews91 with twenty-nine Ghanaians who graduated from 
German universities and returned to Ghana within the investigation 
period (2000-2010). The sample size of twenty-nine reflects roughly 
9 per cent of the overall number of those Ghanaians who definitely 
returned (323). The prime selection criteria were a) the return period, 
for which I choose the past decade 2000-2010 and b) their 
educational profile. The overview of their demographic profile shows 
that they returned in their best working age (table 1). The majority of 
graduates (55 per cent) was between 30-34; most men returned at 
this age (70 per cent) whereas the majority of the women (67 per 
cent) was slightly younger (25-29).  
Table 1: 
Age profile of 
Ghanaian returned 
graduates 
men in  per cent women in  per cent TOTAL in  
per 
cent 
25-29 2 10 6 67 8 30 
30-34 14 70 2 22 16 55 
35-40 4 20 1 11 5 17 
TOTAL 20 100 9 100 29 100   
Source: own compilation; Data collection Ghana 2008-2010. 
Regarding their degrees (table 2), most (69 per cent) completed a 
master’s degree, 14 per cent obtained their MBA and 17 per cent 
                                                 
90 Using a primarily qualitative approach is in contrast to most empirical studies on 
return migration that prefer quantitative surveys with larger sample sizes. The 
Transrede project used a sample size of 302 (Black et al. 2003) and the MIREM 
Project on return migration to the Maghreb used an even bigger sample size of 992 
return migrants (Cassarino 2008). 
91 I conducted problem-centred interviews (PCI) based on Witzel (2000). These 
combine longer narrative sequences with guided, topic-specific questions. 
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their PhDs. Only slightly more women completed their MBAs (33 per 
cent) in comparison to the men (5 per cent) and fewer women 
obtained their PhDs (11 per cent / 20 per cent).  
Table 2: 
Degree in Germany men in  per 
cent 
women in  per 
cent 
Total in  
per 
cent 
Master of Science (MSc.) 15 75 5 56 20 69 
Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) 
1 5 3 33 4 14 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(PhD) 
4 20 1 11 5 17 
 20 100 9 100  29 100 
Source: own compilation; Data collection Ghana 2008-2010. 
These post-graduate degrees have an average study period of three 
years. However, the majority stayed in Germany (table 3) between 
three to four years (69 per cent). Women stayed slightly shorter, only 
one to two years (67 per cent) than their male fellows. Only two men 
studied longer than this time and one person stayed in Germany for 
15, because he was able to find formal employment in his field of 
study (IT) following his graduation.92  
Table 3: 
Duration of stay in 
Germany 
men in  per 
cent 
women in  per 
cent 
Total in  
per 
cent 
1-2 1 5 6 67 7 24 
3-4 17 85 3 33 20 69 
5-10 1 5 0 0 1 3 
Over 10 1 5 0 0 1 3 
 20 100 9 100 29 100 
Source: own compilation; Data collection Ghana 2008-2010. 
Because the interviewees were pursuing post-graduate degrees, 
they had already completed their first degrees in subjects like 
geography, geological engineering, agricultural engineering, and 
                                                 
92 This IT-graduate was a contrastive case. In every respect this profile differed to the 
others regarding duration of stay, subject and professional reintegration upon return. It 
showed that the long duration in Germany and even formal work experience were no 
assets to professional entry. 
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classic civic engineering. Both men and women had limited formal 
work experience. As first-degree graduates, they had already 
completed their National Service93 in Ghana or had worked in 
temporary projects. Regarding their subjects in Germany, they 
concentrated (Fig. 1) on ‘green-degree’ programmes.  
 
Fig. 1: subjects of studies of interviewed Ghanaian graduates  
The subjects which Ghanaians in the sample preferred most were 
general resource management (31 per cent) and hydro engineering 
(28 per cent), followed by 14 per cent who concentrated on forestry 
in tropics and subtropics. Only 7 per cent enrolled for the classic 
domain of engineering, agriculture, and development management. 
One person (3 per cent) graduated from sciences (chemistry) and 
one (3 per cent) from information technology (IT). It is now of interest 
to find out how these graduates applied their expertise in their 
occupations upon their return to Ghana.  
                                                 
93 A military decree (N. R. C. D 208) established the Ghana National Service Scheme 
in 1973. It had the mandate to mobilise and deploy Ghanaian citizens aged 18 years 
and above. Since 1982, the duration of service was extended from one to two years. 
The scheme, since its inception, has become the institutional option for Ghanaian 
youth, especially tertiary education graduates, to exercise their civic responsibility 
towards the state (GNSS 2011). 
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Environmental knowledge transfers 
As indicated earlier, educational migrants can contribute to their 
countries’ development if their profiles match the labour market 
demand in specific fields of expertise. As previously cited, 
Ammassari and Arthur argue that the impact of their knowledge 
transfer strongly depends on the level at which migrants transfer this 
knowledge. I will now investigate whether this argument also applies 
to the example of the interviewed migrants, who graduated and have 
returned from Germany. Regarding their occupation, all secured 
formal employment in the tertiary sector, the services.94 Within the 
services sector they work in different industries (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2: employing industries of interviewed returning Ghanaians 
The majority of 34 per cent finds employment in local consultancy 
firms (including non-governmental organisations (NGOs)). Two equal 
parts (28 per cent) work in higher education and in the public service. 
Only three (10 per cent) start their career in international 
                                                 
94 In 2010, the contributions of the three economic sectors to the Ghanaian GDP were 
agriculture (25.6 per cent), industry (25.9 per cent), and services (48.5 per cent) (GSS 
2012: 5). 
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organisations.95 Now, I will show how the respondents transfer their 
environmental knowledge on three levels (Fig. 3).96  
 
Fig. 3: levels of occupational knowledge transfer 
The figure shows three levels and their impact spheres: first, at the 
micro-level, the interviewees implement their knowledge that 
positively affects life in rural communities. Second, at the meso-level, 
the graduates are building in-country capacities, thereby 
strengthening the country’s institutions that will profit on a long term 
from this measure. Third and finally, graduates at the macro-level are 
directly involved in designing environmental policies and thus have 
an impact on society at large.  
Implementing water and sanitation policies 
Ghanaians who graduate from the fields of hydro engineering are 
experts on sanitation, water, and wastewater management. Their 
expertise precisely meets the demands of many local consultancies 
that carry out current governmental policies (GPRSII) to improve 
access to safe water and sanitation in rural and urban areas. Today, 
these local consultancies and NGOs are important players in the 
water and sanitation sector (Yirenya-Tawiah and Tweneboah Lawson 
2012). In consequence, they offer employment for the returning 
graduates. A master’s degree holder of Water Resources 
                                                 
95 Consequently, I only chose examples from the first three employment categories: 
government, higher education, and consultancies. 
96 These levels of course may overlap: lecturers at universities also implement 
government curricula on environmental protection; workers in consultancies also 
create awareness in rural communities when they implement new technologies. 
Remembering the fact that the interviewed Ghanaians primarily studied the two 
subjects hydro and resource engineering (see fig. 1), the following examples 
concentrate on cases that show how their knowledge was applied in these two 
industries. 
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Engineering and Management (WAREM) from the University of 
Stuttgart, Mr. L., describes97 his work in the communities:  
For one year we have to be with the community. We 
go there to check the facility whether it is the way we 
want it to run, we look at the test, also check the 
quality of the water; look at the facility whether it is 
stable and we do recommendation for one year. We 
call something defective liability that is if something 
goes wrong according to the construction, the 
contractor would have to do it at his own cost. I will 
also go there to record any facility which is not good, 
come back write a letter to him that this one is not 
good, go and change it and he will go and do it at his 
own cost. After one year when everything is okay he 
hands over everything and I also leave. 
L’s work in the communities is time-consuming and intense. He 
carries out many technical steps and acts directly at the 
implementation level. His tasks include feasibility studies (“check the 
facility”), water quality tests (‘check the quality of the water’) and 
monitoring of the construction (‘look at the facility whether it is 
stable’). The results of L’s work are very tangible. It makes live of 
local community population easier and healthier. They have less 
problems accessing clean potable water, which reduces improves 
their life quality: 
Like, where I went to from Monday, you pass through 
villages, and you see a lot of them [people] carrying 
water from streams. If money is available all this 
[these, J.B.] people should be given boreholes with 
water (…) but there is no money, so the people are 
left to fetch from those streams anything (…) when I 
design, we do construction, the first time you open the 
tap, they get water, they start shouting: ‘eeehh’. At 
least you have solved some problem. Since I came I 
have done quite a lot, I have done about 10 designs 
and everybody is getting water out of it (…) 
Somebody helped us somewhere and we are also 
helping. 
This quote shows how L’s technical expertise enables him to “design” 
and to do “constructions” in the broad field of hydro engineering. 
Working in an employing structure that is empowered to implement 
                                                 
97 All interviews are anonymous and extracts are from transcribed interviews. To 
facilitate reading, I have slightly modified the spelling of the spoken language. 
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governmental policies on sanitation, he finally is able to improve the 
living conditions for many community members. He thus has an 
impact on development processes on the micro-level.  
Environmental awareness and capacity building 
Today, Ghana’s government is calling for more awareness in society 
concerning environmental issues and seeking to build in-country 
capacities. Graduates who studied ‘green-degree’ programmes in 
Germany and later multiply their knowledge in institutions of higher 
education, universities and polytechnics, contribute towards this 
demand. Their professional integration in this sector is likely because 
careers in the educational segment are attractive. ‘A university 
position’ as Neubert (2008: 100) outlines, ‘has a good reputation and 
offers good chances for consultancy work to add to the salary’ and 
might even become a ‘stepping stone’ for top jobs in the government 
or in international organisations. In addition, the demand for qualified 
lecturers in Ghana is high. The country faces an immense shortage 
of qualified academic staff, secondary school teachers and 
researchers due to the vast outmigration of the highly skilled (Manuh 
et al. 2005). Therefore, graduates with a degree from abroad can fill 
this gap perfectly well. Such is the case of Mr. U., a master’s degree 
holder from the University of Stuttgart in the field of Waste Water 
Management. After his return, U. first starts to work in a 
governmental consultancy and after two years, he applies at a 
polytechnic. From scratch, he gains the position of Head of 
Department in a polytechnic. When I ask him during the interview 
what he thought was the most important qualification to do the job as 
a head of department, U. mentions the degree in the first place:  
Yeah the qualification I got from Stuttgart of course it 
has been very helpful because to be a lecturer in a 
tertiary institution the minimum is a master’s level and 
if you have a BSc. in a polytechnic you can be an 
instructor but your conditions of service are not good. 
Getting the master’s degree had positioned me in a 
better place. In fact, there were other people who had 
been in the department before I came. But because 
they didn’t have their master’s even though they had a 
lot of experience in terms of “on the job” training, they 
are now in the background and I just came and I was 
made the HEAD of Department (…) it is because of 
the qualification, yes. 
Despite his lack of teaching experience, the degree itself positioned 
U. professionally ‘in a better place’. As a head of department, he is 
BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013: challenging notions of development and change from everyday life in Africa  
106 
 
 
also involved in the establishment of a new master’s degree 
programme on waste management:  
There are some of the courses you can’t get them 
here (…) there is no institution in Ghana that handles 
waste management and K-Poly is now trying to work 
on it. We are developing a curriculum, our dean went 
to Holland with the rector, and they went to (…) the 
Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg (HH) who is 
into this waste management/from Stuttgart we have 
the waste management aspect (…) So for such a 
course like this we need to train people at the MSc 
level; there is not any fair degree; we don’t have 
technology, we don’t have it. MSc – we don’t have it 
but each course is run in Germany, water resources 
(...) so for such courses if you don’t travel outside then 
you can’t have it and if you don’t have it there is no 
chance there is no way Ghana will have any 
education in that line. 
It shows that U. is supposed to build up a curriculum based on the 
raw model of the courses he took in Germany. Finally, the results of 
this knowledge transfer have an impact at an institutional (meso-) 
level. This is because as soon as the curricula are designed, many 
more students gain education up to master’s level. This new study 
programme will definitely generate more in-country experts and 
prevent further outmigration of young students. What is more, if 
‘green-degree’ graduates return and become lecturers in higher 
education, they become role models. They not only teach but also 
fulfil societal commitments at an institutional (meso-) level, which 
creates broader awareness of the environment. This is because the 
higher education institutes in most African countries are obliged to 
“prove [their, J.B.] usefulness through development activities even 
without a research component” (Neubert 2008: 98). Mr. B., a 
graduate from the BTU Cottbus Environmental Resource 
Management (ERM) programme, describes the impact of his 
additional societal commitment for environmental capacity building: 
When I came home, because of the experience in 
Germany, I realised that the situation was very bad 
(…) And that is why I established with some other 
colleagues/we started a clean-up service.98 We 
                                                 
98 Today, the scope of this formerly locally acting clean up service has become more 
global and professionalised. The members successfully registered as an NGO, 
developed further links to their former German professors and returned graduates in 
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organised the students, went to the hospitals and 
market areas, and planted trees. We also made 
educational campaigns to educate people on how to 
clean the environment. We organised forums, made 
some presentations and because of my teaching roles 
we were not able to do it more frequently. This is one 
thing that I have done for this particular region [in the 
Upper West] I had to develop these brochures 
because I think we had to move forward and advertise 
in the schools so that people will come (…) And I think 
that is my social responsibility help the nation to move 
forwards. 
What is interesting is that the actions towards awareness creation 
are not part of his lecturing duties. B. must carry them out in his 
spare time. Still, using his formal role as a lecturer enables him to 
reach a broad audience: his students, his colleagues, and people at 
the hospitals and the markets. This is definitely a more significant 
field of influence than in contrast to those who simply impart their 
knowledge to an individual (e.g. to their own children). These 
examples show that the knowledge transfer of returning graduates 
from Germany who work as lecturers in higher education builds 
capacities in Ghana’s institutions. They act as multipliers in passing 
on their specific knowledge at the (meso-) level. 
Influencing environmental policies 
The interviewees working in the public service are ambivalent about 
their impact opportunities. A very high level of knowledge transfer 
describes a resources engineer from the University of Karlsruhe, Ms. 
A. A. who starts working as a research assistant at the Ministry of 
Environment. There she is responsible for a section that advises the 
minister on environmental cooperation:   
I will give you a typical example like a letter from the 
German government wanting to establish ECOWAS 
climatic change research desk. The letter came and 
then normally what they will do (…) the minister will 
write letters ‘let us go straight to them’ so I will write a 
minute to them (…) I wrote a memo to the deputy 
minister saying that OK, reading what they want to 
establish, I think the Centre for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) can host this because they 
have research scientists on climatic change. It has 
                                                                                                                            
Uganda and Nigeria. The NGO “Clean Africa” is online at 
http://www.cleanafrica.org/clean/. 
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thirteen institutes so they can give enough people to 
do these things so the project should be and he 
agrees. What happens is, if he agrees with my 
suggestion, I go ahead and write a letter to the 
German government. But I don’t sign. He will sign but 
I write a letter.   
In this example, A. explains how much influence she has in the 
background (‘he will sign but I write a letter’), due to her expert 
knowledge. She is even in a position to actively shape international 
cooperation on climate change (‘establish ECOWAS climatic change 
research desk’). Her career, she explains, is the result of a course 
she completed in Germany:   
And more also another thing why they chose me (…) 
is the course I did in Germany (…) It is for policy 
makers, you know. It is for decision makers (…) And 
when I came here, it was also where I have to be from 
here. I make decisions. 
Another case that shows how graduates with green-degrees apply 
their knowledge at the macro-level is the case of another BTU 
Cottbus graduate, Mr. M. He studied Environmental Resource 
Management (ERM) and wrote his master’s thesis on environmental 
taxation. This thesis provided a model for Ghanaian future taxation 
schemes at the Ghanaian Internal Revenue Service:  
And then it happened that I had to do my master’s 
thesis and I contacted my boss at IRS [Internal 
Revenue Service, JB.] and he said (...) we have this 
problem in Ghana how to tax environmental 
resources. So when I say environmental resources 
minerals for instance gold, bauxite, manganese and 
diamond, timber and all that (…) look at the German 
tax system and then how I can apply it to Ghana (...). 
My supervisor helped me to study the tax system, 
especially in the area of environmental resources. So I 
did that and then I used that as a model. If you look at 
my thesis, Germany is a model to what I did, So I 
looked at what Germany has done and did a similar 
thing. I then brought it back to them and they were so 
excited because they have not had that thing done 
before. 
The example of M. shows that his specialisation fits the demand in a 
niche. By transferring this expertise and adapting the German model 
of environmental taxation to fit Ghana’s context, he even influences 
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the government’s budget.99 In both cases, the profiles of the 
interviewees match the concrete demand of the governmental 
institution and – which must not be taken for granted – their superiors 
welcome them both. Therefore, they both are in a position to 
influence the decision-making process on environmental policies. 
Their knowledge transfer will have an impact for society at the 
macro-level. However, as I mentioned earlier in this section, other 
graduates face constraints and challenges that hinder them 
advancing their environmental knowledge. 
Constraints on environmental knowledge transfer 
Whereas the previous examples of academics who studied in 
Germany and returned to Ghana suggest that everyone finds a job 
easily and can adopt what she or he learned abroad, undoubtedly, 
reality proofs different. Not all graduates who study in Germany are 
in a position to become ‘agents of change’. This, because many have 
to face serious challenges upon their return, which complicate and 
sometimes even totally block their knowledge transfer. Regarding the 
interviews, as well as taking evidence from previous studies on the 
topic of return migration to Ghana, I identified four main obstacles: 
first, finding work in the formal sector; second, receiving adequate 
payment; third, having the right equipment to work and fourth, being 
welcomed by employees and superiors. 
Searching for a job after graduation has become already a difficult 
transition process for academics who can search in familiar 
surroundings. However, it becomes even more difficult if one moves 
to another country first. Than it is a double transitional process and 
requires patience100 as Ms. C. explains: 
It is not easy with the job search in Ghana (.) but if 
you have the patience because something I realise 
that most people after just a year of frustration they 
leave to the US. Some people even go back to 
Germany, UK. BUT that’s one difference, if you have 
                                                 
99 The design of this taxation model would create a new source of income for the 
Ghanaian government. It is an ‘economic instrument’ (EI). Economic instruments like 
this require entities that cause environmental damage to pay taxes. This concerns 
foreign-based mining companies. Launching this type of taxation model in Ghana 
generates budgetary income and at the same time encourages foreign companies to 
capitalise on resources using environmentally friendly technologies (Kombat 2009: 26). 
100 Especially those who started in state universities complained that the recruitment 
procedures were too time-consuming. The shortest time from first interview to being on 
the pay roll was six months. In another case, it even took almost two years until the 
interviewee received his first salary. 
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the patience and wait. At least you find something in 
Ghana, no matter what. You will find something to do. 
And not only something. If you have the patience, you 
will really land yourself on a good job. But you know 
when we come the frustration is there. You wanna 
work you wanna work and within three four five 
months nothing comes. Because you had the 
opportunity to go outside getting a visa to another 
country is not difficult. But you will still come back and 
where are you going to start from? It is better you stay 
in and HOOK yourself somewhere. 
As Mrs. C. who studied Forest Ecosystem Management at the 
University of Freising mentions, it sometimes is so frustrating to 
return and to search for work unsuccessful in Ghana, that some 
people are tempted to leave the country again. What makes it so 
difficult to access the local labour market is work experience? Most 
employers require three to five years of qualified experience. The 
expert Dr. Bih, who has insights on the topic from his former 
experience as a job counsellor for returning graduates101 therefore 
suggests that to overcome the issue of work experience one must be 
prepared to take up lower positions/lower-paying jobs (2008: 12). 
The difficulties in finding a well-paid job have even increased since 
2008 because of the financial crisis. Since then, finding well-paid 
employment in the formal segment of Ghana’s labour market soon 
after return has become even more challenging even for those who 
have a matching profile, confirms Dr. V. who did complete her 
doctorate in chemistry in Bremen: 
As for the for the financial crisis it is not improving it is 
even getting worst, hmmm, things are not - you know 
the way they SHOULD be (…) you have to adjust 
yourself and combine everything that is it - that is what 
SCARES a lot of these young people. Either they do 
not come back or they come and they go BACK. That 
is the problem. Because if I look at myself I compare it 
and I try to change it you see that in Euro it is nothing 
- it is virtually nothing - if I would be working in Euro I 
would have been earning MORE than THIS (…) I 
really don’t want to compare because it doesn’t make 
                                                 
101 Since 1994, job counsellors who also studied in Germany have assisted fresh 
returns in finding jobs in the formal segment. The first job counsellors worked in the 
context of a migrant self-organisation, the “Rückkehreroffice” (Martin, 2005: 240). The 
organisation renamed itself the Ghanaian German Alumni-Network (GGAN) (Boger 
2010). Today, the counsellor works as part of the German International Cooperation 
office (GIZ) in Accra. 
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sense. It really doesn’t make sense because it will not 
help you if I make this comparison so I say economic 
situation is not getting better (…) if you really want to 
LIVE, you know, STANDARD, elite STANDARD. Of 
course, you can afford all basic things that you need 
in life (...). 
Low-payment can deter graduates to return, tells Mrs. V. Hence, in 
order to facilitate the financial transition into the home countries’ 
labour markets, the German government established reintegration 
programmes, tailored for highly skilled migrants who voluntarily 
return to developing countries. These programmes provide job 
placement assistance, financial incentives for transportation and 
finally a salary top-up, and workplace equipment. The latter is a 
crucial factor that the graduates are able to apply what they learned 
abroad (Martin 2006: 123). Mr. M. who works for the government 
knows how difficult it is to apply his computer skills, if the equipment 
simply lacks: 
Then the other thing is that until I was assisted with 
some equipment it is sometimes disheartening when 
you have the knowledge and you have all the stuff 
and you cannot get the equipment to work then. 
Because if I cannot prepare PowerPoint, I cannot 
prepare attachments because we do not have 
Internet; if there are so many things, you wish you 
could do, I could not do because I lacked the 
equipment. Sometimes that is the disadvantage when 
it comes to my country. You have the knowledge but 
you do not have the equipment to work with (…) you 
have to beg somebody to type for you. You have to go 
and print it elsewhere. It was discouraging, despite 
[the fact that, J.B] I had the knowledge and I was back 
home, that side, I wasn’t too happy.  
Finally, the worst-case scenario is when graduates who return find an 
adequate position, are sponsored by one of the reintegration 
programmes and are still ‘blocked’ by their bosses. Again, former 
counsellor Dr. Bih recalls from his personal experience: 
(…) they [graduates, J.B.] come back with a higher 
qualification and others come apart with their bosses 
or sometimes will be even having a higher 
qualification than their bosses. Than instead of letting 
you in a way that the organisation will gain from the 
knowledge that you have got, they try to BLOCK you. 
Because they think if they let you in you will bypass 
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them [laughs] (...) it is the mind-set of people: they 
think if you are at a higher position maybe through 
manipulating things they are able to get some things 
extra kind of things. So those positions become very 
enviable positions and they see that if I lose that 
position it means I am going to lose some of these 
benefits. So they want to secure [ensure, J.B.] that 
nobody will actually take it from them and by so doing 
they also block people who will come in with 
innovations and new ideas. 
Unfortunately, especially those who work for the government have 
this experience of being ‘blocked’ more often. This is because, in 
contrast, the local consultancies highly depend on good workers but 
do not have secure monetary budgets. Therefore, they welcome the 
well-trained graduates who are willing to work for a small salary 
(topped up by a reintegration subsidy).  
In sum, returning graduates can overcome most obstacles that 
hinder the knowledge transfer (finding a job; getting adequate 
payment and having the right equipment to work with) with the 
assistance of governmental reintegration programmes. However, the 
crucial problem of being ‘blocked’ by a superior (or sometimes 
colleagues) remains problematic. This is because, in Dr. Bih’s terms, 
it concerns the ‘mind-set’ of the people, which cannot be easily 
influenced by external factors like a reintegration programme. In 
those cases, the only possible way out is to start searching for 
another work opportunity immediately. 
Conclusion and outlook 
This article supports the notion that knowledge transfer fosters 
development. In this regard, educational return migrants in particular 
act as ‘drivers of change’. A specific trend that fosters sustainable 
environmental development is already underway in the case of 
Ghana. Ghanaian graduates who studied ‘green-degree’ 
programmes at German universities and found employment upon 
return forward their knowledge in their workplaces. Notwithstanding 
the relatively small number of Ghanaian graduates who have 
returned from Germany, the results of their knowledge transfers are 
far-reaching. Working in ‘green-jobs’, they contribute significantly to 
the Ghanaian government’s ambitions to promote the emerging field 
of ‘green economy’. This finding proves on an empirical basis what 
Patterson (2007, 2008, 2011) suggested applying strategically in his 
vision on how Sub-Saharan African countries could become the 
front-runners in ecological industries. What is more, the article 
provides in-depth information about the workplaces and systemises 
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this information. The results of this analysis indicate that 
Ammassari’s (2009) and Arthur’s (2008) conclusions are not far-
reaching enough. Even though Ammassari made an important 
contribution in emphasising the contributions of returning migrants 
employed in their spheres of work, her findings could not explain why 
returning migrants had more or less impact in different segments of 
the labour market. Therefore, this analysis goes further and 
examines the categories and their specific labour market demand in 
which the graduates worked. This in-depth analysis makes clear that 
returning graduates have the strongest impact at the meso-level. 
Even though the same number of graduates worked in the 
implementing structures (consultancies and NGOs) because they 
play a key role in implementing governmental policies, the highest 
demand was in the educational sector. This is a very crucial finding 
because graduates who work as lecturers in the fields of higher 
education and research finally act as multipliers in passing on their 
specific knowledge. They build tomorrow’s in-country capacities to 
tackle impending environmental issues. The weakest impact was 
identified at the macro-level in the public services. Here, the support 
given by reintegration programmes of the German government could 
not compensate interpersonal problems between employee and 
superior, in case the latter envied the new employee’s experience of 
having studied abroad.  
This finding, however, also indicates that successful knowledge 
transfer does not solely depend on the migrant’s educational 
background and their performance, but also on external factors. It 
even depends on national concepts. As mentioned earlier, the 
premise for a successful knowledge transfer is that governments 
adopt global economic reforms and mainstream them. The 
implementation of these reforms, however, is also a cost factor. The 
future will show whether Ghana’s government will continue to invest 
in its green economy. This depends not least on the extent to which 
the country succeeds in countering the negative effects of the current 
global financial crisis. If this is achieved successfully, the formal 
labour market could absorb future generations of highly skilled 
environmentalists trained abroad.  
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Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe/Sambia – viele 
Herausforderungen, kreative Lösungen 
Felix Brinkmann102 
Abstract 
Über Kleinhandel in Afrika und dessen Herausforderungen existiert 
bereits eine Vielzahl an Literatur. Immer wieder wird dabei auf die 
schwierige Lage von Kleinhändlern  in wirtschaftlicher wie personaler 
Hinsicht verwiesen. Häufig herrscht Kapitalmangel, hoher 
Konkurrenzdruck in einem kompetitiven Umfeld sowie wenig bis 
keine Regulierung des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens. Diese Faktoren 
gelten ebenfalls für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in 
Kitwe/Sambia. Die Wirtschaft Sambias basiert im Wesentlichen auf 
Kupferabbau- und Export, dessen Zentrum Kitwe ist. In kaum einem 
anderen Land Afrikas spüren Kleinhändler die Auswirkungen eines 
volatilen Rohstoffpreises so drastisch wie in Sambia. In Zeiten 
niedriger Kupferpreise auf dem Weltmarkt sinkt die Kaufkraft der 
örtlichen Bevölkerung. Bei steigendem Kupferpreis stellt sich nur 
eine teilweise Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Situation her. 
Hervorgerufen durch Arbeitslosigkeit, möchten viele Sambianer an 
dem wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung  teilhaben und eröffnen zusätzliche 
Marktstände, was zu einem Überangebot führt.103 Der Chisokone-
Markt ist der zweitgrößte seiner Art in Sambia und ist nie offiziell als 
solcher registriert worden. Mehrere Akteure konkurrieren um Einfluss 
und Macht. Das gesetzlich für die Verwaltung zuständige Kitwe City 
Coucil (KCC)  ist seit Jahren nicht im Stande eine angemessene 
Verwaltung zu gewährleisten. In diese Lücke sind 
Händlerorganisationen getreten, die quasi als 
Substitutivmarktverwaltungen agieren und ebenso wie das KCC den 
Chisokone-Markt als Einnahmequelle  nutzen. Zwischen diesen 
Akteuren  herrscht je nach Opportunität Konkurrenz oder 
Kooperation, was das wirtschaftliche Handeln für Kleinhändler 
zusätzlich erschwert und kaum planbar macht. Dieser Artikel zeigt, 
welche betrieblichen und personalen Strategien Kleinhändler 
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anwenden, um in diesem wirtschaftlich wie institutionell 
ungewöhnlichen Umfeld bestehen zu können. Dabei geht die 
Darlegung über klassische betriebswirtschaftliche Sichtweisen  
hinaus und widmet sich ebenso dem Normen- und Wertesystem der 
Kleinhändler, welches ein entscheidender Faktor im örtlichen 
Marktaublauf ist.  Der Artikel arbeitet Erfolgsfaktoren für eine 
günstige ökonomische Entwicklung der Kleinhändler heraus und 
thematisiert ebenso die Grenzen ökonomisch rationalen Handelns im 
sambianischen Kontext. Die Anforderungen der wirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung zwingen die Kleinhändler, ein hohes Maß an Flexibilität 
und informeller Kooperation einzugehen. 
Stichwörter: die Kleinhändlern, Kupferabbau- und Export, 
betrieblichen und personalen Strategien, der Chisokone-Markt, 
Sambia. 
Über Kleinhandel in Afrika und dessen Herausforderungen existiert 
bereits eine Vielzahl an Literatur.104 Immer wieder wird dabei auf die 
schwierige Lage von Kleinhändlern in wirtschaftlicher wie personaler 
Hinsicht verwiesen.105 Häufig herrscht Kapitalmangel, hoher 
Konkurrenzdruck in einem kompetitiven Umfeld sowie wenig bis 
keine Regulierung des wirtschaftlichen Rahmens. Diese Faktoren 
gelten ebenfalls für Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt in Kitwe, 
Sambia. 
Dieser Artikel zeigt, welche Strategien und Netzwerke Kleinhändler 
anwenden, um in einem wirtschaftlich wie institutionell 
ungewöhnlichen Umfeld bestehen zu können. Dabei geht die 
Darlegung über klassische betriebswirtschaftliche Sichtweisen 
hinaus. Zudem erfolgen eine genaue Beschreibung und ein Blick auf 
das institutionelle Umfeld, in dem die Kleinhändler agieren müssen. 
Der Artikel arbeitet Erfolgsfaktoren für eine günstige ökonomische 
Entwicklung der Kleinhändler heraus und thematisiert ebenso die 
Grenzen ökonomisch rationalen Handelns im sambianischen 
Kontext. Die Anforderungen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 
zwingen die Kleinhändler, ein hohes Maß an Flexibilität und 
informeller Kooperation einzugehen.  
Die Wirtschaft Sambias basiert im Wesentlichen auf Kupferabbau- 
und Export, dessen Zentrum Kitwe ist.106 In kaum einem anderen 
Land Afrikas spüren Kleinhändler die Auswirkungen eines volatilen 
Rohstoffpreises so drastisch wie in Sambia. In Zeiten niedriger 
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Kupferpreise auf dem Weltmarkt sinkt die Kaufkraft der örtlichen 
Bevölkerung. Dies war besonders während der Wirtschafts- und 
Finanzkrise in den Jahren 2008 bis 2009 zu beobachten. Bei 
steigendem Kupferpreis stellt sich nur teilweise eine Verbesserung 
der wirtschaftlichen Situation ein. Von hoher Arbeitslosigkeit 
betroffen, möchten viele Sambianer am wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung 
seit 2010 teilhaben und eröffnen zusätzliche Marktstände, was zu 
einem Überangebot führt.107 Der Chisokone-Markt ist der zweitgrößte 
seiner Art in Sambia und ist nie offiziell als solcher registriert worden. 
Mehrere Akteure konkurrieren um Einfluss und Macht. Das 
gesetzlich für die Verwaltung zuständige Kitwe City Council (KCC) ist 
seit Jahren nicht im Stande, eine angemessene Verwaltung zu 
gewährleisten. In diese Lücke sind Händlerorganisationen getreten, 
die quasi als Substitutivmarktverwaltungen agieren und ebenso wie 
das KCC den Chisokone-Markt als Einnahmequelle nutzen. 
Zwischen diesen Akteuren  herrscht je nach Opportunität Konkurrenz 
oder Kooperation, was das wirtschaftliche Handeln für Kleinhändler 
zusätzlich erschwert und kaum planbar macht.  
Hauptgrund für das ungenügende wirtschaftliche Umfeld für 
Kleinhändler auf dem Chisokone-Markt ist die bis heute nicht 
vollständig geklärte Frage, wer letztendlich die Marktverwaltung 
innehat. Das angesprochene KCC kann bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt 
keine angemessene Verwaltung des Marktes gewährleisten, da es 
unter chronischem Personalmangel und Unterfinanzierung leidet. 
Dabei spielt auch die Entstehung des Marktes eine wesentliche 
Rolle. Der Chisokone-Markt entstand in Kitwe in den 1950er Jahren 
und war ursprünglich für den Handel mit Lebensmitteln bestimmt. 
Dabei sollte der Markt insbesondere der weißen Bevölkerung zu 
Gute kommen, da er von der örtlichen Kolonialverwaltung installiert 
wurde. Im Verlauf der Lossagung und der Unabhängigkeit Sambias 
im Jahr 1964 änderte sich auch die Struktur des Chisokone-Marktes, 
da er nun von allen Bevölkerungsschichten genutzt werden konnte. 
Durch seine zentrale Lage nahe dem Stadtzentrum erfreute sich der 
Markt zunehmender Beliebtheit, wurde aber nie als solcher offiziell 
registriert; trotz stetigen Wachstums. Im Zuge der 
Minenprivatisierung erfuhr der Chisokone-Markt eine Neu- und 
Umgestaltung. Hervorgerufen durch Massenentlassungen und hohe 
Arbeitslosigkeit wichen zunehmend vormalige Minenarbeiter in den 
informellen Sektor aus und betätigten sich als Händler. Auf dem 
Chisokone-Markt wuchs durch die zunehmende Händleranzahl das 
Warenagebot und dessen Vielfalt rasant. Dabei dehnte sich das 
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Marktgeschehen auch örtlich aus. Aus voranschreitendem 
Wachstum und dem nie geklärtem rechtlichen Status des Chisokone-
Marktes entstanden die bis heute dem Markt immanenten Probleme. 
Durch den illegalen Status fühlte sich das KCC anfangs nicht für die 
Verwaltung zuständig und leitete damit der unkontrollierten 
Ausbreitung und den prekären Verhältnissen Vorschub. In diese 
Verwaltungslücke stießen Anfang der 1990er Jahre dann so 
genannte Market Boards, die den Markt in Eigenregie verwalten 
sollten. Relativ rasch zeigte sich, dass diese Organe aufgrund der 
zahlreichen divergierenden Interessen seiner Mitglieder nicht in der 
Lage war, im Sinne einer angemessenen Verwaltung des Chisokone-
Marktes zu handeln. Folge hiervon war die Gründung der 
Marktorganisation ZANAMA (Zambia National Marketeers 
Association) im Jahr 1999,108 die sich zur Aufgabe machte, die 
Interessen der Händler gegenüber staatlichen Institutionen sowie 
anderen Interessensgruppen zu vertreten. Ob seiner Größe und 
zentralen Lage wurde der Chisokone-Markt neben dem City Market 
in Lusaka sehr bald zu einem Hauptoperationszentrum der 
Organisation. Durch die unbefriedigenden Administrationsversuche 
des KCC stieg ZANAMA ab dem Jahr 2000 zu einer Quasi-
Marktverwaltung auf und verdrängte das KCC als 
Hauptverwaltungsorgan. Allerdings hatte sich bis zur Gründung von 
ZANAMA bereits eine desolate Infrastruktur entwickelt. ZANAMA 
verwaltete also den Mangel, tatsächliche Verbesserungen der 
Marktstrukturen konnte die Handelsorganisation nie realisieren. 
Außerdem wurde der Chisokone-Markt zum Politikum. Entgegen 
ihrer Konstitution handelte ZANAMA keineswegs politisch neutral, 
sondern agierte als Interessenvertreter der damals herrschenden 
Partei MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy). Diese 
Einseitigkeit schlug sich im Marktgeschehen in Chisokone nieder. 
Durch die politische Rückendeckung gelang es ZANAMA in 
zunehmenden Maße, den Chisokone-Markt zu beherrschen und die 
Verwaltung fast komplett zu übernehmen. Allerdings profitieren von 
der Verwaltungsübernahme lediglich Händler, die politisch dem MMD 
nahestanden. Andere Händler, die der Opposition gewogen waren 
oder auch neutral agierten, wurden zum Teil systematisch unter 
Druck gesetzt und ihr Wirtschaften erschwert.  
Es häuften sich Skandale und Kompetenzüberschreitungen, wie 
beispielsweise das erheben von illegalen Steuern auf 
„Großhandelsware“. Des Weiteren ging ZANAMA sogar so weit, in 
einigen Marktsektionen Zwangsabgaben einzufordern und bei 
Nichtentrichtung Waren der betroffenen Händler zu konfiszieren und 
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so deren Geschäftsgrundlage zu ruinieren. Darüber hinaus führte 
ZANAMA bei Nichteinhaltung der von ihr aufgestellten Marktregeln 
sogar Arretierungen durch und sperrte Delinquenten in Zellen, die 
sich im Hauptquartier der Organisation befanden. Dabei kam es 
sogar zu Todesfällen, wie auch „The Post“ im Januar 2010 
berichtet.109 Daraufhin fand eine Erstürmung einer ZANAMA-Filiale 
durch aufgebrachte Händler statt und deren Mitarbeiter konnten sich 
nur knapp retten.  
Unter den betroffenen Händlern regte sich zunehmend Unmut über 
das Gebaren von ZANAMA und die Inkompetenz des KCC. Der 
Chisokone-Markt bot Händlern zwar eine Plattform, um ihren 
Geschäften nachzugehen, die Umstände kann man allerdings nur als 
unzulänglich bezeichnen: Keine klare Verwaltungsstruktur, eine 
zunehmende Korruption und Dominanz seitens ZANAMA, eine 
schlechte Infrastruktur sowie eine steigendes Ungleichgewicht von 
zu vielen Händlern und zu wenigen Kunden. Dennoch erfuhr der 
Chisokone-Markt ein stetiges Wachstum, da es durch die lückenhafte 
Verwaltung keine Limitierung der Händleranzahl gab und viele 
Sambianer eine Tätigkeit als Händler der Arbeitslosigkeit vorziehen.  
Das anarchische Marktgeschehen in Chisokone blieb nicht ohne 
Folgen. Frustriert durch die Kompetenzüberschreitungen von 
ZANAMA und die Unfähigkeit des KCC, gründete sich im Jahr 2004 
ZATMA (Zambia Traders and Marketeers Association), eine weitere 
Handelsorganisation mit dem Ziel, die Rechte aller Händler 
tatsächlich zu vertreten. Die aus einer Abspaltungsbewegung von 
ZANAMA entstandene Handelsorganisation etablierte sich auf dem 
Chisokone-Markt als dritter institutioneller Akteur, wobei eine 
temporäre strategische Partnerschaft zwischen dem KCC und 
ZATMA stattfand. Im Gegensatz zu ZANAMA reklamiert ZATMA 
keine Ansprüche, die Marktverwaltung oder Teile der 
Verwaltungsaufgaben übernehmen zu wollen.   
Die Wahlen im September 2011 haben die Lage auf dem Chisokone-
Markt noch einmal grundlegend verändert. Dabei können zwei 
Ebenen unterschieden werden: Institutionell wie auf Seiten der 
Händler. Da der Markt schon immer unter politischen Einfluss stand, 
waren die politischen Änderungen mit dem Sieg der PF (Patriotic 
Front) auch auf dem Chisokone-Markt bemerkbar. So verschob sich 
das gesamte, den Markt betreffende institutionelle Gefüge. Die neue 
politische Direktive hatte zur Folge, dass ausschließlich die örtlichen 
Councils die Marktverwaltungen in ganz Sambia übernehmen sollten 
und es erfolgte ein fast kompletter Entzug der Handlungs- und 
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Geschäftsgrundlage der Händlervereinigungen. Das KCC ist seither 
der alleinige Verwalter des Marktes. Freilich kann eine solche 
Aufgabe nicht ohne Anlaufschwierigkeiten vonstattengehen. Das 
KCC verfügt bis heute über kaum ausreichende Ressourcen, um 
eine befriedigende Administration zu gewährleisten. Ebenso ist es 
schwierig, mit über Jahre gewachsenen Strukturen und den 
Ambitionen der Händlerorganisationen zu brechen. Demzufolge ist 
die Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt zurzeit von Verunsicherung 
einerseits und  Neustrukturierungsversuchen des KCC andererseits 
geprägt. 
Der institutionelle Rahmen ist wichtig für ein Verständnis der 
Strategieentwicklung der Kleinhändler, die im doppelten Sinne mit 
Herausforderungen zu kämpfen haben, was ihre Situation 
außergewöhnlich schwierig macht. Die mehrfachen 
Herausforderungen bestehen aus dem unsicheren institutionellen 
Umfeld sowie den Auswirkungen des schwankenden Kupferpreises, 
der sich in Form volatiler Kaufkraft und hoher Konkurrenzsituation 
auf dem Markt selbst niederschlägt. Wer in solch einem Umfeld 
erfolgreich agieren will, braucht Strategien und ebenso ökonomische 
wie soziale Netzwerke, die es erlauben, auf die dargelegten 
Schwierigkeiten reagieren zu können. Im Zuge zweier 
Feldforschungen in Kitwe 2011 und 2012 konnten mit Hilfe 
zahlreicher halbstandardisierter Interviews (insgesamt 45) mit 
Kleinhändlern und Experten (u. a.  der Vorsitzenden von ZATMA, 
dem Vorsitzenden der Handelskammer Kitwe, dem Leiter der 
Abteilung Marktadministration des KCC) ökonomische wie personale 
Strategien der Händler herausgearbeitet werden.  
Ein ganz wesentlicher Erfolgsfaktor ist die Einkaufspraxis der 
Kleinhändler. Durch das Warenüberangebot ist das Preisniveau 
extrem niedrig, Kunden sind hochgradig preissensibel und die 
Einkaufs-/Verkaufsmarge der Händler beträgt teilweise nur fünf bis 
zehn Prozent. Kostendeckendes Wirtschaften oder gar 
Gewinnerzielung ist unter solchen Voraussetzungen kaum möglich.  
Erfolgreiche Händler überspringen in Sambia ansässige 
Großhändler, die mittlerweile häufig von Chinesen geführt werden 
und kaufen ihre Ware zumeist direkt in Daressalam (Tansania) ein. 
Dabei können Händler einen Aufschlag von bis zu 100 Prozent des 
Einkaufspreises als Verkaufspreis erzielen! Es verkehren täglich 
Busse zwischen Kitwe und Daressalam (mit Übernacht-Stopp am 
Grenzort Nakonde), die sich auf Handelsreisende spezialisiert haben 
und eigens Anhänger für die eingekauften Waren der Händler mit 
führen. Ebenfalls beliebt als Wareneinkaufsländer sind Südafrika und 
Botsuana. Wobei in diesen Ländern vor allem 
Unterhaltungselektronik und hochwertige Textilien erworben werden. 
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In Tansania kaufen Händler überwiegend günstige Textilien aus 
chinesischer Produktion ein. Um diese Warenbeschaffung zu 
realisieren, benötigt man allerdings ein gewisses Grundkapital, um 
die Reise finanzieren zu können und Waren in größeren Mengen zu 
erwerben. Hiermit haben die allermeisten Händler ein Problem: Drei 
Viertel der befragten Händler gaben an, über nicht genügend Kapital 
zu verfügen, und beschreiben ihr eigenes Geschäftsmodell als „hand 
to mouth“. Unabdingbar ist für die Warenbeschaffung im Ausland ist 
auch ein verlässliches Netzwerk. Um nicht jeden Monat persönlich 
eine Geschäftsreise antreten zu müssen, haben sich viele Händler in 
informellen Einkaufsverbünden organisiert. Diese bestehen aus 
zumeist vier bis fünf Händlern, die sich seit etlichen Jahren kennen, 
vertrauen und kooperieren. Im Rotationsprinzip fährt ein Händler des 
Netzwerkes in die erwähnten Länder und kauft für die anderen mit 
ein, wobei er das Geld hierfür im Vorhinein von seinen 
Netzwerkpartnern erhält.  
Über ein derartiges Netzwerk verfügen allerdings nicht viele. Eher 
herrscht durch den enormen Konkurrenzdruck und das Händler- und 
Warenüberangebot eine ungesunde Konkurrenzsituation. Etwa die 
Hälfte der Befragten gab an, sich lieber auf den eigenen 
Geschäftsablauf konzentrieren zu wollen, da sie schon oft von 
anderen Händler persönlich wie geschäftlich enttäuscht wurden; 
häufige Aussage hierbei: „You better trust no one“. Ein 
funktionierendes Netzwerk ist also ein entscheidender 
Wettbewerbsvorteil, der nicht einfach durch Kapital oder ein 
gelungenes Geschäftsmodell hergestellt werden kann; vielmehr 
muss es in jahrelanger Arbeit aufgebaut werden: Verlässliche 
Partnerschaften entstehen nicht über Nacht. Interessant in diesem 
Zusammenhang ist die komplett fehlende ethnische Komponente in 
Sambia, die häufig in andern Ländern Afrikas vorzufinden ist. Henrik 
Egbert110 beschreibt sie am Beispiel Tansanias und den dortigen 
Händlernetzwerken. Die befragten Händler auf dem Chisokone-Markt 
wunderten sich über die Frage, ob sie die beschriebenen Netzwerke 
unter ethnischen Gesichtspunkten aufbauten. Alle gaben an, dass es 
völlig gleichgültig sei, welcher ethnischen Gruppe jemand angehöre. 
Vertrauen, Zuverlässigkeit und gegenseitige Unterstützung sind die 
entscheidenden Komponenten.  
Ein weiterer bedeutender Aspekt ist das Sortiment. Grundsätzlich ist 
für jede Unternehmung eine fachgemäße, auf die Kundenwünsche 
ausgerichtete Sortimentspolitik zentral. Auf dem Chisokone-Markt 
kann sie unmittelbar über Erfolg und Misserfolg eines Geschäftes 
entscheiden. Es herrscht ein drastisches Überangebot an günstigen 
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Textilien aus chinesischer Produktion. Grund hierfür ist, dass es 
relativ einfach ist, ein solches Geschäftsmodell ins Leben zu rufen, 
da es wenig kapitalintensiv ist und die Textilien im Einkauf relativ 
günstig sind. Durch das Überangebot und die Preissensibilität sind 
diese Artikel extrem margenschwach. Kaum ein Händler, der in 
diesem Segment handelt, ist erfolgreich. Ähnlich wie in vielen 
anderen Ländern Afrikas hat sich auch in Sambia eine auf 
Prestigekonsum ausgerichtete, kaufkräftige Mittelschicht gebildet. In 
Kitwe, obwohl zweitgrößte Stadt Sambias, existiert noch kein 
modernes Einkaufszentrum. In diese Lücke sind einige Händler 
getreten und verkaufen sehr erfolgreich Unterhaltungselektronik. 
Direkt neben dem Chisokone-Markt in der Kingston Road sind die 
meisten der Elektronikanbieter angesiedelt. Mittlerweile stuft das 
KCC die Kingston Road als eigenen Marktabschnitt ein.  
Noch mehr als beim Textilerwerb im Ausland benötigt ein Händler 
ausreichend Grundkapital, um die Elektronikwaren zu beschaffen 
und sie nach Kitwe zu transportieren. Ein Transport der eingekauften 
Waren mit Reisebussen ist aufgrund der Sperrigkeit der Artikel nicht 
möglich. Händler, die ihre Ware – zumeist in Botsuana – kaufen, 
verfügen über ein eigenes Fahrzeug. Die Margen sind enorm: Bei 
Flachbildschirmfernsehern können Händler einen Aufschlag von bis 
zu 80 Prozent verlangen. So berichten ausnahmslos alle Händler, die 
im Bereich Unterhaltungselektronik operieren, von ausgezeichneten 
Geschäften. Manche geben an, kaum die Nachfrage stillen zu 
können.  
Ein Weg, auch in schwierigen Zeiten bestehen zu können  -  wie 
etwa während der letzten Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise 2008/2009 - 
ist eine Diversifizierungsstrategie. Sobald genügend Kapital 
vorhanden ist, versuchen Händler, ein neues Geschäft auf dem 
Markt zu eröffnen, welches möglichst fern vom ursprünglichen 
Standort lokalisiert ist. Hierfür gibt es einen einfachen Grund: Durch 
die angesprochene institutionelle Unsicherheit ist es sinnvoll, das 
Geschäftsrisiko zu streuen. In manchen Bereichen wurden bis zur 
letzten Wahl teilweise doppelt Gebühren erhoben; von ZANAMA und 
vom KCC. Im Bereich Chisokone-Markt B allerdings erhob alleinig 
die ZANAMA Gebühren, was aber keinesfalls einen Vorteil bedeuten 
muss, da ZANAMA durch ihre rüde Verwaltungspraxis die 
Geschäftsgrundlage vieler Händler gefährdete. Die eigentliche 
Diversifizierung liegt aber in dem Warenangebot, welches sich vom 
Ursprungsgeschäft unterscheidet. So ist es Händlern auf zwei 
Ebenen möglich, ihr Risiko abzusichern: Zum einen ändern sich 
Moden und Nachfrageverhalten sehr schnell, zum zweiten kann ein 
Geschäft im ungünstigen Fall den Misserfolg des anderen 
ausgleichen. Ebenfalls ist es somit möglich, auf die mangelhafte und 
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unberechenbare Verwaltung zu reagieren. Gebühren können, wie 
beschrieben, je nach Marktlage eines Geschäftes unterschiedlich 
hoch ausfallen. Inwieweit durch die Übernahme des KCC eine 
transparente Vereinheitlichung der Gebühreneinzugspraxis 
geschieht, bleibt abzuwarten. Diejenigen Händler, die es sich nicht 
erlauben können, ein weiteres Geschäft zu eröffnen, versuchen 
häufig innerhalb ihres Geschäftes zu diversifizieren. Häufig führt das 
zu einer Mischung aus so genannten Schnelldrehern (Artikel mit 
geringer Marge, die sich rasch und in großen Mengen abverkaufen) 
und Artikeln mit höherer Gewinnmarge, dafür aber längerer 
Lagerdauer.  
Ein anderer Weg ist die Spezialisierung. Um diese erfolgreich zu 
gestalten, muss eine Marktlücke entdeckt werden. Es gelingt 
allerdings nur sehr wenigen Händlern, mit einer 
Spezialisierungsstrategie erfolgreich zu sein. Ein Beispiel ist die 
„Baby Boy Company“,111 deren Besitzer sich auf hochwertige, den 
allerneusten Moden entsprechende Herrenbekleidung aus Südafrika 
spezialisiert hat. Kunden sind die so genannten „Hipster“, die aus der 
kaufkräftigen Mittel- und Oberschicht kommen. Wer im Bereich der 
Spezialisierung erfolgreich sein möchte, muss sein Geschäft auch 
optisch entsprechend gestalten.  
Eine weitere Strategie ist es, sich gleichzeitig als „Großhändler“ und 
Kleinhändler zu betätigen. Zwar sind laut Gesetz Großhändler auf 
dem Chisokone-Markt nicht gestattet, doch hat sich aufgrund des 
dargelegten wirtschaftlichen Rahmens eine Situation ergeben, die es 
Händlern erlaubt, als solche zu wirtschaften. Die Händler, die sich im 
Bereich des Großhandels bewegen, versorgen vor allem die so 
genannten „fliegenden Händler“, die ihre Ware am Körper tragen und 
feilbieten. Ähnlich wie bei der Diversifikation ist eine solche 
Doppelstrategie erfolgsversprechend, da das Risiko verteilt werden 
kann. Zwar sind die Margen beim Verkauf an „fliegende Händler“ 
sehr niedrig, durch die ständige Abnahme und die hohe Anzahl an 
„fliegenden Händlern“ ist ein solches Geschäftsmodell dennoch 
einträglich.  
Sofern ein Händler nicht selbst im Geschäft zugegen ist (z.B. weil er 
auf Geschäftsreise ist) oder mehrere Geschäfte betrieben werden, ist 
es notwendig, Angestellte zu engagieren. Die Kriterien für die 
Auswahl geeigneter Mitarbeiter sind meist nicht rein ökonomischer 
Natur. Viele Händler fühlen sich von ihrem familiären Umfeld unter 
Druck gesetzt und sehen sich genötigt, enge Verwandte einzustellen. 
Eine solche Praxis hat sowohl Vor- als auch Nachteile: Befragte 
                                                 
111 Siehe Anhang 1. 
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Händler beschwerten häufig sich über die schlechte Arbeitsmoral der 
Verwandten. Diese wüssten, dass sie ohnehin aufgrund ihres 
verwandtschaftlichen Verhältnisses bezahlt würden und fielen durch 
Abstinenz, Unmotiviertheit sowie Passivität im Kundenumgang auf. 
Gleichwohl erfüllt ein Händler so familiäre Verpflichtungen. Ein 
unschätzbarer Vorteil eines verwandtschaftlich verbundenen 
Angestellten ist dessen Ehrlichkeit. Es gilt das Prinzip: Bestehlen 
innerhalb eines (erweiterten) Familienverbundes ist tabu. Die soziale 
Observation im Bereich des Geschäftes und ebenso innerhalb des 
Familienverbundes trägt hierzu bei. So ist das Verhältnis der Händler 
zu ihren Angestellten aus dem familiären Umkreis häufig ambivalent.  
Diebstahl durch eigene Angestellte ist generell ein schwerwiegendes 
Problem, das kaum in den Griff zu bekommen ist. Zu verhindern ist 
dies durch eine ständige Inventur, eine genau Katalogisierung der 
Waren und einer exakten Buchführung, welche Waren zu welchem 
Preis verkauft wurden. Aber auch diese Maßnahmen schützen nur 
bis zu einem gewissen Grad vor unredlichem Verhalten mancher 
Angestellter. Insbesondere fielen dabei männliche Angestellte 
negativ auf. Fast alle Kleinhändler gaben an, sofern sie keine 
Verwandten anstellten, schlechte Erfahrungen mit männlichem 
Personal gemacht zu haben. In den durchgeführten Interviews traten 
dabei immer wieder die Schlüsselwörter „absenteeism“,“ alcoholism“ 
und „abuse“ auf. Besitzer beklagten sich über unentschuldigtes 
Fehlen, welches sich häufig durch übermäßigen Alkoholkonsum 
erklären lässt, oder aber durch Unzuverlässigkeit und/oder einer 
geringen Identifikation mit dem eigenen Arbeitsplatz. Diese Faktoren 
decken sich mit sozialen Phänomenen in Sambia. Der 
Alkoholkonsum, insbesondere unter der männlichen Bevölkerung, ist 
in Sambia ein großes Problem, wie die WHO in einem Bericht 2004 
feststellen musste.112 Dabei werden fast alle sozialen, familiären und 
eben wirtschaftliche Ebenen tangiert. Die Händler des Chisokone-
Marktes haben darauf eine relativ einfache Antwort: es werden 
überwiegend Frauen eingestellt. Diese gelten als zuverlässiger, 
aufrichtiger und weniger alkoholaffin. Drei Zitate aus 
unterschiedlichen Interviews mit Kleinhändlern bringen den letzten 
Abschnitt zur Einstellungspraxis etwas überspitzt auf den Punkt: 
men are crooks 
woman are more afraid to steal  
family members or close relatives are also acceptable, 
but somehow lazy113 
                                                 
112 Vgl. <http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/en/zambia.pdf>, 
aufgerufen 10. März 2012. 
113 Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann,  Interviews 2012 Kitwe, Maxwell Sinkala am 16. 
April 2012, Irene Chiwera am 01. April 2012 und Felix Kabwe am 17. April 2012. 
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Ein Problem für die Kleinhändler ist, dass sowohl die Trennung von 
betrieblichem und privatem Kapital als auch die Trennung zwischen 
familiären und geschäftlichen Verhältnissen schwer fällt. Oft können 
betrieblich sinnvolle und rationale Strategien aufgrund des sozialen 
Erwartungen nicht umgesetzt werden. Erfolgreichere Händler 
versuchen, dem mit der Gründung einer offiziellen Firma entgegen 
zu wirken. Diese hat ihren Sitz dann zwar auf einem illegalen Markt, 
wird aber dennoch von der PACRA (Patents and Companies 
Registration Agency) akzeptiert und vom sambianischen 
Steuerregister erfasst. Dieser Schritt ist aber nur sehr wenigen 
vorbehalten. Er hat aber ganz entscheidende Vorteile. Ohne ein 
Firmenkonto ist es nahezu unmöglich, an einen Kredit zu 
marktüblichen Zinsen zu gelangen. Grundsätzlich sind Banken nur 
bereit, einen Kredit zu gewähren, wenn der Bewerber sich im 
formellen Sektor bewegt und seine finanzielle Situation transparent 
darlegt. Händler, die im informellen Sektor agieren (wie es die ganz 
überwiegende Zahl an Kleinhändlern auf dem Chisokone-Markt tut), 
müssen sich an eine der vielen Mikrokredit-Banken in Kitwe wenden. 
Allerdings sind deren Zinsen enorm, da das Ausfallrisiko durch die 
unsichere rechtliche wie institutionelle Lage auf dem Chisokone-
Markt sehr hoch ist. Wer es allerdings schafft, eine Firma zu gründen 
und an marktübliche Kredite zu gelangen, ist in der Lage, sein 
Geschäft zügig auszubauen und den hoch lukrativen Wareneinkauf 
im benachbarten Ausland zu tätigen.  
Immer mehr kommt es auf dem Chisokone-Markt zu einer Spaltung 
der Händler. Circa 20 Prozent der Händler können die 
beschriebenen Faktoren umsetzen und so erfolgreich auf dem Markt 
operieren. Durch ihre Finanzkraft, Kreditwürdigkeit und 
nachgefragtes Warenangebot entfernen sie sich zusehends von der 
Mehrzahl der Kleinhändler, deren Geschäftsmodell am Rande des 
Existenzminimums rangiert. Gleichwohl ist ein großer Kapitalstock 
kein Garant für eine erfolgreiche Unternehmung. Diese Erfahrung 
mussten etliche im Zuge der globalen Finanzkrise entlassene 
Minenarbeiter machen, die sich ab 2008/2009 als Händler auf dem 
Chisokone-Markt versuchten. Ohne Erfahrung im Bereich des 
Handels ist es schwierig, gerade die kritische Anfangsphase einer 
Unternehmung zu überstehen. Hauptgrund für das vielfache 
Scheitern war eine verfehlte Preispolitik. Die ehemaligen 
Minenarbeiter versuchten, mit Kampfpreisen konkurrenzfähig zu 
werden, ihre Unternehmung missglückte aber dann rasch aufgrund 
einer rasant schmelzenden Kapitaldecke und einer verfehlten 
Sortimentspolitik. 
Aber auch das Geschäftsmodell der bis heute erfolgreichen Händler 
ist risikobehaftet. Dabei droht Gefahr von außerhalb. Durch die 
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lasche Regulierung kann im Grunde jeder ein Geschäft auf dem 
Chisokone-Markt eröffnen – auch ausländische Händler. Die hohen 
Gewinnspannen haben sich bis nach Tansania herumgesprochen; 
immer mehr Händler aus Tansania eröffnen nun Geschäfte und 
machen den alteingesessenen Händlern aus Kitwe Konkurrenz. Der 
Ärger unter den Händlern darüber ist groß und protektionistische 
Stimmen, die eine Verbannung ausländischer Händler fordern, 
werden immer lauter. Ebenfalls für Schwierigkeiten könnte die zu 
lässig gehandhabte Praxis der fehlenden Trennung zwischen Groß- 
und Kleinhandel auf dem Chisokone-Markt sein. Zwar machen sich 
Händler eine solche Zwitterstellung ökonomisch zu Nutzen, sie birgt 
aber auch Risiken. Diese kommen von Seiten der chinesischen 
Großhändler, die bis vor kurzem ausschließlich als 
Beschaffungsoption der sambianischen Händler wahrgenommen 
wurden. Mittlerweile greifen die chinesischen Händler ganz direkt in 
den Endverbrauchermarkt ein und eröffnen Geschäfte auf dem 
Chisokone-Markt. Aufgrund ihres Beschaffungsvorteils können sie 
Waren konkurrenzlos günstig veräußern. Das Image der Chinesen in 
Sambia und insbesondere im Kupfergürtel kann allerdings nur als 
ausgesprochen negativ  bezeichnet werden. Hierzu haben etliche 
Skandale in chinesischen Firmen und Bergbauunternehmen 
beigetragen.114 Mr. Mofya, der Vorsitzende der Händlervereinigung 
ZATMA, sagte in einem Interview, angesprochen auf die chinesische 
Präsenz in Kitwe: „the worst investors we ever had“.115 Diese 
Imageproblem versuchen chinesische Händler durch die Anstellung 
von Sambianern zu umgehen, die dem Geschäft auf dem Chisokone-
Markt einen lokalen Anstrich geben sollen. Klar ist, dass sich eine 
derartige Praxis schnell herumspricht und allgemein bekannt ist, 
welches Geschäft von Chinesen geführt wird. Es bleibt also 
abzuwarten, wie sich der Einfluss der ausländischen Händler aus 
Tansania und China auswirken wird. Viel wird auch davon abhängen, 
in wie weit es das KCC schaffen wird, in den nächsten Jahren eine 
funktionierende Administration aufzubauen und den Marktablauf in 
geregelte Bahnen zu lenken. 
Ein ganz anderer Faktor wird sein, wann das erste Shopping-Center 
in Kitwe eröffnet. Dann werden die bis heute erfolgreichen Händler 
ernsthafte Konkurrenz erhalten. Kaum jemand wird freiwillig den 
Chisokone-Markt mit seiner kundenunfreundlichen Infrastruktur, den 
Unbequemlichkeiten und den chaotischen Warendarbietungen einem 
geordneten, sauberen und dem Zeitgeist entsprechenden Konsumort 
vorziehen. Sollte es so weit kommen, können sich Händler fast 
                                                 
114 Vgl. Raine 2009, S. 138  –  S. 139. 
115  Vgl. Archiv Felix Brinkmann, Interviews 2012 Kitwe, Mr. Mofya am 23. Mai 2012. 
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ausschließlich über den Preis positionieren und es besteht die 
Gefahr, dass sich der schon jetzt statt findende, zum Teil ruinöse, 
Preiswettbewerb fortsetzt. Es ist nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, bis 
das besagte Einkaufszentrum errichtet wird. Unmittelbar neben dem 
Freedom Park ist bereits eine Fläche hierfür ausgewiesen, die nur 
knapp einen Kilometer vom Chisokone-Markt entfernt liegt.  
Nicht ohne Grund haben sich die ganz überwiegend sehr 
erfolgreichen Elektronikhändler am Rand des Marktes platziert, um 
so auch klar sichtbar eine Abgrenzung zum restlichen 
Marktgeschehen zu schaffen. Dieser Bereich wird bereits als eine 
separate Marktsektion vom KCC verwaltet. Auch in diesem Falle hat 
das KCC nicht proaktiv gehandelt, sondern seine 
Verwaltungsstruktur den reellen Entwicklungen anpassen müssen. 
Mittlerweile ist der zweitgrößte Markt Sambias in einem derart 
schlechten Zustand, dass Händler wie Kunden die momentane 
Situation als nicht mehr tragbar ansehen. Dabei ist das 
Grundproblem, dass alle verwaltenden Institutionen den Markt nicht 
als Handelsplattform verstehen und etablieren wollen, sondern als 
Einnahmequelle. Der jahrelange Machtkampf auf dem Markt und die 
Dominanz von ZANAMA haben Strukturen geschaffen, die immer 
noch nachwirken. Bis heute versucht ZATMA, wieder an Einfluss zu 
gewinnen und ist in zähen Verhandlungen mit dem KCC, wie die 
„Rollenverteilung“ in den nächsten Jahren aussehen soll. Über 
Restrukturierungen oder gar Reformen lassen beide Akteure wenig 
verlautbaren. Es drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass beide daran 
interessiert sind, sich für die nächste Zeit in eine Position zu 
manövrieren, die es erlaubt, weiterhin finanziell von den strukturellen 
wie administrativen Unzulänglichkeiten des Chisokone-Marktes zu 
profitieren. 
Dabei sollten allen Akteuren neuere Entwicklungen eine Warnung 
sein. Seit der letzten Wahl 2011 ist es „Street Vendors“ erlaubt, im 
ganzen Stadtgebiet Handel zu treiben, wovon auch ausgiebig 
Gebrauch gemacht wird. Seitdem klagen fast alle Händler auf dem 
Chisokone-Markt über massive Umsatzeinbußen, wie meine 
Befragungen der letzten Feldforschung im Frühjahr 2012 ergeben 
haben. Sobald eine Alternative vorhanden ist, vermeiden es Kunden, 
sich in das kundenunfreundliche Marktgeschehen zu begeben. 
Sobald die angesprochene Shopping Mall errichtet ist, kann davon 
ausgegangen werden, dass der Markt weiter an Kunden und damit 
auch an Bedeutung verliert. So kursieren seit einigen Jahren 
Gerüchte und Halbwahrheiten um eine Neugestaltung des 
Chisokone-Marktes in Kitwe. Allen Beteiligten ist klar, dass diese 
schnellstmöglich umgesetzt werden müsste. Wenn aber bis heute 
kaum ausgemacht ist, dass das KCC endgültig die Verwaltung 
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übernimmt und sogar die verbannte ZANAMA wieder versucht, im 
Dunstkreis des Chisokone-Marktes Fuß zu fassen, ist es schwer 
vorstellbar, dass in absehbarer Zeit eine Neugestaltung des Marktes 
vonstatten geht. Eine sinnvolle Lösung bietet der Vorsitzende der 
Handelskammer in Kitwe, Herr Banda, an. Da die Händler die 
Rochaden und Machtspiele der institutionellen Akteure und die damit 
verbundene Lähmung leid sind, schlägt er einen privaten Investor 
vor.116 Dieser übernähme die Verwaltung des Marktes, gestaltete ihn 
um und nähme dringend notwendige Renovierungsarbeiten vor. Ein 
privater Investor könnte aus Sicht des Vorsitzenden das 
Marktgelände von der Stadt für beispielsweise 20 Jahre anmieten 
und die Marktgebühren selbst einnehmen, wobei Obergrenzen 
festgesetzt werden müssten. Herr Banda betont bei diesem 
Verfahren im Besonderen die Neutralität. Bei einer Neugestaltung 
seitens des KCC befürchtet er, dass Geschäfte in günstiger Lage 
nicht transparent vergeben werden, sondern im klientelistischen bzw. 
patrimonialem Stil an Günstlinge verteilt werden.  
Bis es zu einer Verbesserung der Lage auf dem Chisokone-Markt 
kommt, bleibt die Situation für die Händler prekär. Weiterhin besteht 
die große Unsicherheit, wer eigentlich den Markt letztendlich 
verwalten wird und ob dieser in seiner jetzigen Form Bestand haben 
kann. Ein solches Umfeld schafft kein investitionsfreundliches Klima 
und bremst damit die Anstrengungen der Händler aus. Selbst 
diejenigen, die erfolgreich Handel treiben, halten sich mit 
Expansionsplänen zurück. Viel wird davon abhängen, ob es in Kitwe 
gelingt, eine funktionierende Verwaltung zu installieren, die auch als 
solche von allen an dem Markt beteiligten Akteuren anerkannt wird. 
Das KCC als alleinige Verwaltung zu benennen und die Macht der 
Händlerorganisationen zu kappen, war ein erster richtiger Schritt. 
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Anhang 1: eine filiale der Baby Boy Company auf dem Chisokone-Markt 
 
 
 
 
 
